Mesoscope’s Reviews > Establishing Appearances as Divine: Rongzom Chökyi Zangpo on Reasoning, Madhyamaka, and Purity > Status Update

There's a lot of technical jargon there; it would be helpful to have the Tibetan or Sanskrit.

I read something recently that made clear(er) that "inconceivable" in the context of Dzogchen does not necessarily mean quite what it typically means in common English. I'll see if I can track it down. That also might be easier with the Tibetan.

I don't think this is what I was looking for, but while I hunt, perhaps Cf. Dalai Lama /Dzogchen/ pp. 128–130

Keith wrote: "I read something recently that made clear(er) that "inconceivable" in the context of Dzogchen does not..."

If that's what's going on here, it's where the reader really needs an endnote. I wish Köppl (and Sur in his translation of "Entering the Way") had followed the example of John Pettit in annotating Rongzompa, you often have to deal with sentences or paragraphs where it's literally not possible to understand what is being said.

Werd

Any idea if "discriminating knowledge" here is meant to be jñana?

Keith wrote: "Any idea if "discriminating knowledge" here is meant to be jñana?"

My meager Tibetan's not up for digging through this passage in the original, unfortunately. This is the entire passage for context:

Here the issue might be raised, “although the scriptures do teach this [that phenomena are originally enlightened, basically BT], there is no certainty whether it is to be taken at face value or requires interpretation. Therefore the essential purity of phenomena may well be established, but it is unreasonable to say that precisely the nature of that which appears as subjects with attributes is primordially enlightened. For, if it were that way, thorough affliction and saṃsāra would be entirely absent. There can’t be a reasoning that establishes such a philosophy.” The conceptual mind that takes objects that appear in the experience of sentient beings as valid is, since beginningless time, deluded. It accepts or negates with reference to the way things appear to it. With such dialectics it is, indeed, not possible to establish the vast and profound meaning. Nevertheless, since the nature of phenomena is inconceivable, it is not the case that there is no way to realize it by means of discriminating knowledge. Thus it is not in any way a mistake if one, rather than that, is inclined to approach simply by faith, regarding the scriptures and oral instructions as valid. One will then gain access through trust.

In the long introduction, Köppl cites part of this passage as an indication that Rongzompa has "a certain ambiguity with regard to the status and value of reasoning itself," but does not fully explain her meaning - it seems to have something to do with whether reasoning is to be understood as grounded on the side of the subject or the object.

Ah, OK, so I have thought about that, but they're not the sort I can type with my thumb. Poke me if I lose track of coming back.

*thoughts

See what I mean about thumbs?

This is the parallel passage from Sur/Lotsawa House, yes?

From time immemorial, sentient beings, have assumed the validity of the objects appearing within their experience and have offered intellectually confused proofs and refutations about them. Indeed, dialectics is incapable of proving what is of deep and profound significance. Still, reality being inconceivable does not mean there is no technique for penetrating that deeper significance by means of discriminating awareness. Indeed, it is entirely unproblematic if the devout, accessing what is of deep and profound significance through faith alone, having accepted the validity of scripture and the teacher's pith instructions, access the deep and profound with confidence.

Keith wrote: "This is the parallel passage from Sur/Lotsawa House, yes?"

I believe so, yes. Sur's translation of the vexing sentence seems to give the exact opposite meaning of Köppl, which leads me to strongly suspect Köppl simply made an error.

Köppl: "Nevertheless, since the nature of phenomena is inconceivable, it is not the case that there is no way to realize it by means of discriminating knowledge." = "BECAUSE phenomena are inconceivable, there is a way to realize their nature by discriminating knowledge."

Sur "Still, reality being inconceivable does not mean there is no technique for penetrating that deeper significance by means of discriminating awareness." = "ALTHOUGH phenomena are inconceivable, there is a way to realize their nature by discriminating knowledge."

I'll have to give his translation a read, thanks!

I concur with your reading of Sur's rendering, and that approximates my promised thoughts, tho I still have not succeeded in tracking down the "inconceivable" reference, which I now suspect was in Reynolds' Golden Letters, which is more difficult to search.