Dimitri’s Reviews > At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor > Status Update

By the second half of November, the Japanese fleet was ready to sail in secret while "according to the latest reports, three carriers are stationed at Pearl Harbour and move in and out of the area like the other ships of Kimmel's command." and the US State Department grasped at every straw with Marshall's blessing - to avoid war to complete defensive preparations in the Philippines.

"all warfare is based on deception", wrote Sun-Tzu around 500 BC in that Chinese classic The Art of War. He had further words of wisdom: "if the enemy leaves a door open, you must rush in" At the psychological moment the US had left a door ajar & Tokyo hastened to thrust a foot over the treshold. (the midsummer economic freeze had immobilized Japanese commercial shipping, with passenger vessels stranded on the US.)

The new cabinet under Tojo conferred vaguely about changes in national policy, without touching Pearl Harbour. The Army was informed of the operation & between October 20-25, Hirohito himself.

Prague does not quote a verbal reaction but inserts the mental phrase "The Emperor's shield had become the Emperor's sword". (Traditionally, the Fleet fought in its own waters, protecting the home islands.)

Training shallow water torpedo attacks in Kagoshima Bay meant flying over the namesake city rooftops at forty meters (!) Even the red light district dispaired that "those Navy pilots were becoming unusually fresh." Most of the pilots conjectured that they might be training for an attack on Singapore. Fushida rather encouraged this convenient red herring.

Few people have ever seen the spectacle of a full admiral and a full general squirming like sheepish schoolboys. Add to them an angry Emperor of Japan and you have a truly memorable scene.

So it went on 5 September, when Hirohito turned his unfanthomable dark eyes upon them about "placing war preparations first and diplomatic negations second".

"With that confidence do you say 3 months?" [About a Pacific conquest]

All things considered, with the closing of Japanese consulats in the balmy month of May, without confirmation on the in-or-out position of the Pacific Fleet on X-Day the whole idea of striking at Pearl Harbor could have passed from the realm of reality back into the shades of fantasy whence Yamamoto had recently managed to lift it.

In dispatches between Tokyo & other adresses than Washington the Japanese came out from behind their fans & showed the real face of agression.
Japan wanted the resources of SE Asia so badly it would fight any combination of powers to secure them: the bear, the lion and the eagle while still entwined in the dragon's tail.
Because the State Department had access through Magic, it had a good idea of Japans intentions.

"The net effect was to reduce Naval Intelligence to a collecting and distributing clearinghouse. Even more serious, Stark's decision placed the responsibility for evaluating Japanese intentions in the hands of officers who did not know Japan, its language or its armed forces as did those in ONI"

The Pacific fleet had only 11 tankers, 4 capable of fueling at sea. To get an idea of the needs: "a single destroyer at full speed went dry in 30-40h"
[ how many carrier group hours can a tanker ship?].

Every teaspoon of oil had to be shipped across 2.000 miles, stored in plain sight above ground. The possibility of a tank catching fire accidentally or by enemy action was a recurring Navy nightmare.

Here was the bedrock of American naval policy at the time. No illusions about the Japanese tiger, but let's not poke him into action while Hitlers killer sharks infest the Atlantic. Keep Britain above water -that was the prime objective.

On the other hand, all things considered, the view from a mountain was much more important than the establishment of an efficient radar screen for the detection of an approach.