Abdulla’s Reviews > The Anatomy of Error: Ancient Military Disasters and Their Lessons for Modern Strategists > Status Update

Chapter 8 discusses the failure of Emperor Julian, one of the biggest what-ifs of ancient history. Julian's death in battle meant the sweep of Christianity would never again be seriously challenged, and Julian known as "the apostate." Julian's problem was arrogance; too strong a belief in his own abilities. His invasion of the Persian Empire was overly risky, needless, and improperly coordinated.

Chapter 7 was about Octavian's defeat of Antony in the last Roman Civil War. Antony made two major mistakes: He launched an unsuccessful campaign against the Parthians, and he ignored the impact of Propaganda on his image. Particularly the second point is a lesson that even hardened realists must take into account how their actions are perceived. Military strategy is not enough, and Octavian was a master politician.

Chapter 6 is about the Jugurthine Wars, fought by Rome against the client-king Jugurtha. The chapter doesn't really fit the rest of the book, as it's clear Jugurtha didn't really make "a mistake." The argument made is that the war also had a negative impact on Rome. The ultimate lesson: This war had dire consequences for Rome's political health, and should not have been fought (certainly not four times over).

Chapter 5 was about Hannibal's invasion of Rome. To some extent, Hannibal is Alexander if the Persians had put up a stronger resistance. Tactically brilliant, he and Carthage could not harness three spectacular battle victories into a victory in the war.
Also a reminder of the grit of the Romans; only they could lose over a hundred thousand men in the first years of a war and still come back to win.

Chapter 4 is about Darius III's failed defense of Persia from Alexander the Great. The combination of politics, culture, and personality (+ bad luck) meant that Darius III could not adopt the scorched earth policy which would have worked best against Alexander. The point stressed is that Alex was extremely vulnerable early on, and might have been defeated. It was not inevitable that he would be "the great".

Chapter 3 is about the Spartan attempt, and ultimate failure, to establish a hegemony over Greece from 404-371 under King Agesilaeus. Once again the attempt is adeptly summarized. The central thesis is: Sparta was on the verge of a demographic collapse, and it needed a reformer. Instead it got Lysander, a man too self-interested to care, and Agesilaeus, a traditionalist rigidly dedicated to the old ways.

Chapter 2 was about the Athenian defeat in the Peloponnesian War. This is a perspective I've heard much more about than the previous (the war is nearly always considered from that position.)
The authors argue that the Athenian defeat was political in nature: politicians doing what was best for themselves rather than the Athenian state, a tendency exemplified by Alcibiades (though shared by most others as well).

Chapter 1 was about Xerxes' invasion of Greece. The authors point out that Xerxes' army served two often conflicting purposes:
1. To conquer Greece
2. As a means of propaganda to demonstrate the strength and unity of the empire, and to establish Xerxes' reputation as a conquerer (something vitally important in the militaristic Achaemenid empire).
The strategic mistake was in trying to do both at the same time.