teohjitkhiam’s Reviews > Counterinsurgency In Modern Warfare > Status Update

The chapter on the Northern Ireland insurgency largely endorses the concept of wedding the use of MASS SURVEILLANCE - carried out by soldiers eyeballing suspects & vehicles - to BIG DATA analytics, although it wasn't called such then. Another takeaway is regular security operations needn't necessarily yield immediate, observable results. A stringent deployment forces insurgents to take on more risks just to evade it.

Reading a brutal & clumsy British COIN campaign, east of Suez at Aden, is another nod to the the perception that Malaya got very lucky in its own COIN campaign against the communist insurgents. Malaya was spared the longstanding mark of "Cain" - Conflict And INstability - that long haunted or continues to haunt lands where failed COINs were single-mindedly military-driven & absent of clearly-defined political goals.

Apocalypse Now. #NuffSaid

With hindsight being 20/20, it's undeniable that the tipping point of the then stumbling COIN strategy in Malaya - to the success story it's lauded today - was the appointment of Sir Gerald Templer. It's safe to say that without Lt. Gen. Templer's vision, Malaya's COIN operations would've continued down a path of being military-driven & Malaysia could've suffered the fates of the then junta-ruled Indonesia & Myanmar.

Hindsight is always 20/20, but it should seem obvious to France - or the many of continental European colonial powers - that the conceit of re-establishing its former imperial domains in Vietnam & Algeria shortly after the end of WWII coupled with the fact that they themselves were decisively defeated & occupied by Germany in Europe, is downright an act of hubris & seems a poor substitute for "national emasculation".

#QOTD "This psychological impact and a political legitimacy were perhaps their greatest achievement [despite partisan activities never posing a serious threat to Nazi rule]. On the other hand, [Nazi] rule failed to offer an alternative to the population [other than suppression or even annihilation]."

The inclusion of a chapter on American intervention at Central America in the early 20th century is out of place. The interventions hardly qualifies as COINs & resembles more of colonial wars. And the issue leading to such interventions were the "dollar diplomacy" in which debts owed to European powers, were consolidated & re-securitized, by & to the Americans. In other words, U.S. engaged itself in "debt diplomacy".

A quite different portrayal of the American "COIN" in Philippines - as opposed to the articles one reads from dubious sources in social media these days - at the beginning of the 20th century. Interesting that the political & military leaders of the insurgency were co-opted to the extent that both participated in the post-insurgency elections by contesting against each other. Fascinating & most revealing.

#QOTD "It was, and remains, the task of governments, not armies, to assess the feasibility of applying military force to solve a political problem."