withdrawn’s Reviews > The Golden Age of Indian Buddhist Philosophy > Status Update
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is on page 211 of 352
“While it is true that for the Mādhyamika there is no thesis, philosophical position, or other linguistic item that could express ultimate truth, his reason for this view is not that conceptualization necessarily distorts the reality it sets out to represent, as the Yogācārin would have it, but a global anti-realism about truth. . . .
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— Mar 17, 2021 01:32PM
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is on page 224 of 352
am not entirely convinced by this supposed connection between Nāgārjuna and Dinnāga, primarily because I do not consider it to be very likely that in the Vigrahvyāvartani Nāgārjuna was in fact pursuing a skeptical agenda. "It is true that Nāgārjuna argues against a foundationalist conception of the epistemic instruments, a picture according to which these instruments . . . .
[see comment]
— Mar 21, 2021 08:01PM
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is on page 193 of 352
“Throughout the history of Madhyamaka some of its opponents have considered this view as tantamount to nihilism. For if everything is only made up of something else, and therefore empty of intrinsic nature and 'not really there', there must be something not made up of anything else at the bottom of the chain, for otherwise nothing is 'really there'. . . .
— Mar 15, 2021 05:21PM
withdrawn
is on page 88 of 352
“Having thought: 'Did these Tathāgatas come from somewhere? Did I go anywhere?' he understands that those Tathãgatas did not come from anywhere. Having comprehended that his own body did not go anywhere either, he thinks: These triple worlds are only mind. Why? Because however I mentally construct things, so they appear."
— Feb 18, 2021 10:27PM
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Mar 17, 2021 01:34PM
... For the Mādhyamika there is no way things are ultimately; for the Yogācarin there is such a way, but it is inexpressible. When the Mädhyamika asserts that ultimate reality is inexpressible (anabhilāpya) and non-conceptual (nirvikalpaka), he does not mean that there might be some other way of epistemic access to this reality, one that does not go via expressions or concepts, but that there is no access by expressions and concepts because there is nothing for them (or any other epistemic instrument) to access here: there is no ultimate reality, no way things are 'no matter what'.”
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