r0b’s Reviews > The Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical India: Nāgārjuna, Jayarāśi, and Śrī Harṣa > Status Update
r0b
is on page 57 of 254
‘...The thesis of this book is that skepticism about philosophy was handed down from the earliest beginnings of Indian philosophy until at least the end of the classical era. The roots of skepticism were found in the Ṛg Veda, Upaniṣads, and early Buddhist texts and these roots were later cultivated by philosophers in at least three different centuries coming out of what are usually considered to be three different...
— Oct 16, 2022 07:47PM
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r0b
is on page 144 of 254
...But then, Jayarāśi might ask, if one takes rūpa or ākāra in the sense of appearance, Dignāgan phenomenalism makes it difficult to see how one particular can have more than one appearance if that particular simply is an appearance.’
— Nov 11, 2022 10:47PM
r0b
is on page 144 of 254
(Footnote to above):
‘...Dignāga has established that a single cognition has two forms (dvi-rūpa): the form of itself and the form of the object. Dignāga means that a single cognition, being a unique particular, ultimately has just one form, but that that form itself has two aspects and therefore the difference between perception and inference is established by the different aspects of their forms. But then,..
— Nov 11, 2022 10:46PM
‘...Dignāga has established that a single cognition has two forms (dvi-rūpa): the form of itself and the form of the object. Dignāga means that a single cognition, being a unique particular, ultimately has just one form, but that that form itself has two aspects and therefore the difference between perception and inference is established by the different aspects of their forms. But then,..
r0b
is on page 144 of 254
‘...by a systematic process of elimination, Jayarāśi aims to demonstrate that there is no possible avenue for Dignāga and Dharmakīrti to establish any distinction between the two means of knowledge: perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna). As their entire theory rests on this fundamental distinction, Jayarāśi’s argument can be seen as a rejection of the Buddhists’ epistemology as a whole.’
— Nov 11, 2022 10:44PM
r0b
is on page 130 of 254
‘In the context of epistemology, epistemology self-destructs; in the context of everyday practice, there is no need for epistemology.’
— Nov 04, 2022 10:40PM
r0b
is on page 116 of 254
‘Jayarāśi hopes to be free, not from saṃsāra, but from the epistemological dogmatism that detracts from one’s enjoyment of everyday life.’
Excerpt From
Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical India
Ethan Mills
This material may be protected by copyright.
— Nov 03, 2022 11:23PM
Excerpt From
Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical India
Ethan Mills
This material may be protected by copyright.
r0b
is on page 105 of 254
‘Interpretations that see a more constructive side to Pyrrhonism and Madhyamaka (e.g., Dreyfus and Garfield 2011) obscure the real point that Sextus and Nāgārjuna do in fact share: they use philosophical arguments to cure their readers of the desire to do philosophy, a point that others have noted (e.g., Kuzminski 2008, Ch. 2, McEvilley 2002, Ch. 17).’
— Oct 27, 2022 03:41PM
r0b
is on page 105 of 254
‘While there are obvious resonances between Nāgārjuna and Western philosophers such as Sextus, Hume, and Wittgenstein, these comparisons are themselves often faulty in various ways. Therefore, these comparisons—at least in their typical forms in existing literature—do not support the interpretations of Nāgārjuna they are adduced to support.’
— Oct 27, 2022 03:40PM
r0b
is on page 105 of 254
...According to Garfield, causes have essences and causal powers; conditions, on the other hand, are conventional designations based on observed regularities in experience, which do not require positing the existence of causal powers.’
— Oct 27, 2022 03:38PM
r0b
is on page 105 of 254
‘Having given my version of the structure of the argument, I move to my second question: what is the point of this argument?
For many interpreters, the point is to rule out essentialist and realist theories of causation to make room for an alternative theory of empty causation. Garfield is one prominent proponent of this variety of interpretation.’
— Oct 27, 2022 03:37PM
For many interpreters, the point is to rule out essentialist and realist theories of causation to make room for an alternative theory of empty causation. Garfield is one prominent proponent of this variety of interpretation.’
r0b
is on page 88 of 254
...Nāgārjuna’s most explicit treatment of the means of knowledge (pramāṇas) can be found among these objections and replies.’
— Oct 26, 2022 11:13PM
