Jonathan Hockey’s Reviews > The Philosophy of Physical Science: Tarner Lectures > Status Update

Struggling to make out what this position of his of selective subjectivism is meant to be. Even though I appreciate and agree with the sentiments of aspects of his view, the way in which he brings them together, doesn't seem to be based on any clear rationale or reason. Just seems a misuse of the term subjective to describe physical laws in such a way and certainly to try and call them concurrently a priori

Ultimately the problem he will have by framing things in this simplistic subjective way is that any sense of realism will be removed from the authority of science. Yes, we need to find a place for the knowing subject to understanding reality, but we need more subtle approaches akin to Kant, rather than rushing to a pure subjectivism or idealism.

Now it is to be remembered that whatever is accounted for epistemologically is ipso facto subjective; it is demolished as part of the objective world." [This is another incorrect statement for anyone who were to have a good appreciation of Kantian epistemology would realise] It seems to me that Eddington as a scientist coming later to philosophy is a bit of a dabbler who does not really know his stuff or terminology.

making in our claims based on the theory. I believe there is such a shared intuition lying in there deeply and subtly in a taken for granted manner, but it will take some real hard work extracting it, and it will involve not just epistemological pronouncements but metaphysical and ontological commitments, that will not have a subjective character.

Though I would argue this is also not likely to be the case. The whole Kantian epistemology needs to be dismantled and reassembled from scratch if we are to disentangle some a priori style elements to the structure of relativity theory. The result would have to be some core mathematical insight or intuition that underlies all the physics involved as a common structural prerequisite or presumption, that we are all...

I did not set out with any preconceived idea of the scope
of the epistemological method; and the conclusion that the
whole of the fundamental laws of nature can be deduced
from epistemological considerations was the result of trial.

[This claim also I believe to be clearly incorrect. At least it is not shown by the sciences of relativity and quantum theory. But perhaps could be true based on unrelated considerations

Kant never would use the word subjective in this sense, because it indeed would undermine a meaningful a priori quality to such truths. They have to be based on a transcendent apperception, that is not really subjective at all. The other problem is that we cannot see it in this Kantian way anymore, relativity undermined the synthetic a priori intuition of space and time.

.. Or, to put it equivalently, all the laws of nature that are usually classed as fundamental can be foreseen wholly from epistemological considerations. They correspond to a priori knowledge, and are therefore wholly subjective. [This seems to be a slightly garbled misunderstanding of the A priori and Kantian epistemology here by Eddington]

Here my conclusion, based on purely scientific investigation, is much more drastic than that of most of my colleagues. I believe that the whole system of fundamental hypotheses can be replaced by epistemological principles...

I do not see how anyone who accepts the theory of relativity
can dispute that there has been some replacement of physical
hypotheses by epistemological principles ; nor do I think that
those who accept the theory with understanding will be
inclined to dispute it. The more controversial question is.
How far can this replacement extend ?