heptagrammaton’s Reviews > Ungleiche Brüder: Russen und Ukrainer vom Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart (Beck Paperback 6284) > Status Update

- troubles of the shock doctrine, parallels; differences (the petrol-propped economy of Russia and her imperial heirship)

- the Crimea question, historical developments, dividing the Black Sea fleet

- the 1997 Frienship Treaty and prospects for NATO sphere expansion

- multivectoral foreign policy, walking the tightrope

- the phantasm of the All-Russian world & its prevalent adoption in the West, and amid much of the Russianised Ukrainian cultural consciousness

- the Commonwealth of Independent States as a project of a hegemon's continued sphere of interest (& other dead dreams of empire)

- status quo of the late 90s, some points regarding: brotherhood, navigating the mental wound of border divisions, negotiating equality

- the family of nations

- the supranatural soviet consciousness, still persistent

- aftershocks of a day in the woods of Belarus, December 1991

(Vovochka calls it 'the greatest geopolitical catastophe of the 20th century, he malded about it for two hours in front of an increasingly befuggled Tucker Carlson, or something. He's very mad. He'll stay mad. But he's not mad. He's a very stable genius.)

- korenizatsiya and affirmative action of 1920s Soviet nationalies politics

- retraction therefrom, return to Zarist imperial patriotism

-- Peter the Great & other figures of expansion returned to places of commemoration

- mazepists==petlurists==banderites (later to be joined by L. Kravchuk in the string of Rus. conceptionalized stereoty[es of the Ukr. nat. traitor)

- demographics of post-WWII Ukraine

One has to ask why the President of Russia would feel compelled to but into Ukraine's inner matters and why Russian historians, journalists and politicians unanimously deny that Stalin's terror in 1932/33 was specifically aimed against Ukrainians... Russia's current state and leadership {supposedly} is separate and discontinous from Solviet repression. {Phrasing paraphrased in translation.}

One wonders why indeed.

Das Zirkular von 1863 leitete eine Russifizierungspolitik gegenüber den Ukrainer ein, die im Prinzip vierzig Jahre aufrechterhalten wurde. Sie wurde rigoroser durchgeführt als gegenüber allen anderen Nationalitäten, selbts gegenüber den Polen, was die Bedeutung, die man mit Abstand größten ethnischen Minderheit und ihrer Nationalnewegungb zumaß, unterstreicht.

(note for later review, irrelecant to precise markdown point in text)

Continuity between the Kievan Rus and Russia is a new idea that doesn't seem to bear out any significance until its use as imperial justification into the 19th century. On the contrary, the farmer's Varangian (I.e. Germanic) origins seem to at times have problematiczs appropriation of the Rus state at all.

- Mazepa's duofold legacy, Poltava's meaning
- the "delayed nations" (term via H.Plessner), incompatible w/ standard Western models of the nationstate:
—– state discontinuity a wrench in Ukrainian nation-building;
—– incongruencies between Rus. Imperial supraethnic ideology and the needs of a nation-state, autocracy at stress point wlat democratic self-determi nation, problematic persistant up until today