Spencer’s Reviews > On War > Status Update

As usual, it is quite impossible to cover every case that could conceivably arise; but we maintain that the decision on the main objective will, with few exceptions, carry the minor ones as well. That is the principle on which action should invariably be based unless there are obvious reasons to the contrary.

It is of course easier to reach a nearby object than a more distant one. But if the first does not suit our purpose, a pause, a suspension of activity, will not necessarily make the second half of the journey any easier to complete. A short jump is certainly easier than a long one: but no one wanting to get across a wide ditch would begin by jumping half-way.

It is even possible that the attacker, reinforced by the psychological forces peculiar to attack, will in spite of his exhaustion find it less difficult to go on than to stop—like a horse pulling a load uphill…this demonstrates without inconsistency how an attacker can overshoot the point at which, if he stopped and assumed the defensive, there would still be a chance of success—that is, of equilibrium.

In war, where imperfect intelligence, the threat of a catastrophe, and the number of accidents are incomparably greater than in any other human endeavor, the amount of missed opportunities, so to speak, is, therefore, also bound to be greater. This is the fertile field in which the defender may glean a harvest he did not sow.

But in war as in the world of inanimate matter the effect produced on a center of gravity is determined and limited by the cohesion of the parts. In either case, a blow may well be stronger than the resistance requires, and in that case it may strike nothing but air, and so be a waste of energy.

The enemy force can never assemble and advance so secretly that the defender's first news of it would come from his outposts. If that were to happen, one could only feel very sorry for him.

Generally speaking, mountains are well suited for any disposition in which one does not intend to accept a major engagement, because in the mountains each unit is stronger individually; only their aggregate strength will be less.

One may admit that even where the decision has been bloodless, it was determined in the last analysis by engagements that did not take place but had merely been offered. In that case, it will be argued, the strategic planning of these engagements, rather than the tactical decision, should be considered the operative principle.

Possibly this overall impression is greater than it ought to be: the advantages of higher ground impress the mind more acutely than the circumstances that modify them. The impression may, therefore, exceed the facts, in which case this trick of the imagination must be counted as an additional element that reinforces the effect of holding high ground.

In short there are hundreds of cogent local and special conditions to which the abstract rule must yield. Experience shows nevertheless that abstract reasons are used more frequently and thrust aside less often than one might suppose.