Douglas A. Macgregor's Blog

WASHINGTON — The Space Force plans to issue a request to industry on Dec. 7 for prototype kinetic energy space-based interceptors (SBIs) for midcourse missile defense, Space Systems Command (SSC) announced.

The pre-solicitation notice, published on Thursday, appears to follow the prize-based model set out in the service’s prototype program for boost-phase SBIs initiated in September. The notice states that SSC envisions “multiple fixed price Other Transaction Agreements,” and “may also incorporate Prize Competitions.”

Other than stating that the call is for hit-to-kill rather than directed-energy systems for shooting down adversary missiles during their orbital flight trajectory, the notice is lacking technical detail. Instead, companies are instructed to apply to receive bidding documents, which will go to those validated as meeting government criteria.

SSC gives interested firms until Dec. 4 to ask for the bidding documents, and “anticipates” awards in February 2026. The announcement was first reported by Inside Defense.

In principle, having a constellation of midcourse interceptors would provide the Space Force an additional layer of defenses potentially able to take out enemy intercontinental ballistic missiles missed by boost-phase SBIs.

Further, space-based midcourse defense have some advantages over boost-phase solutions due to the laws of physics: a shorter strike distance and the lack of atmospheric effects that complicate the ability of both kinetic- and directed-energy interceptors to target adversary missiles just after launch.

On the other hand, there are also some disadvantages. In particular, an adversary can complicate midcourse solutions by using decoys released once the missile reaches orbit and no longer burns brightly, which makes it difficult to discriminate the now-dim target from its equally dim imposters.

JERUSALEM — Israeli firm Rafael has officially opened a new US factory to produce Iron Dome interceptors, an announcement that came hours after Israel’s Ministry of Defense announced a “multi-billion dollar contract” to the firm for new munitions.

The Ministry of Defense said in a statement Thursday that its Director General Maj. Gen. Amir Baram had “signed a procurement order that will accelerate the production of the Iron Dome defense system.” Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz added the “signing of this landmark contract represents a strategic leap forward that will significantly reinforce our air defense capabilities against adversaries who remain relentless in their efforts to threaten Israel’s security.”

The Iron Dome money comes as a result of a $8.7 billion aid package passed by the US Congress in April 2024, which included $5.2 billion for air defense assets. The signing ceremony for the new buy took place in Tel Aviv at the ministry’s headquarters with US Defense Attaché Maj. Gen. Aaron Drake along with key Israeli defense officials in attendance.

“The enduring strategic partnership … continues to secure Israel’s technological edge in air defense,” the statement said. Baram added that “joint production in Israel and the United States exemplifies the potential of our technological and industrial partnership — a collaboration the Israel Ministry of Defense is eager to expand across additional systems and domains.”

Along those lines, Rafael announced on Friday that its R2S joint venture with Raytheon has officially opened its new facility in Camden, Arkansas. Raytheon also announced that the facility has received a $1.25 billion deal to begin supplying Tamir interceptors to Israel for use on Iron Dome. Rafael did not specify if the $1.25 billion deal with R2S is part of the ministry’s procurement deal, however a spokesperson did note that part of the investment from Israel’s Ministry of Defense is going towards manufacturing Tamir interceptors in the US through R2S.

RELATED: Lasers and AI: Inside Rafael’s vision of Israel’s future air defense

Acting as the US prime, Raytheon is marketing Iron Dome as “SkyHunter” domestically, with hopes to win the US Marine Corps Medium-Range Intercept Capability (MRIC) program. But the facility was built with production for Israel or future foreign customers in mind.

“The opening of this facility marks another meaningful step in strengthening the availability of proven air-defense capabilities for the United States and its partners,” said Yoav Tourgeman, the president and CEO of Rafael. He noted that the new facility provides a “robust American production base, ensuring that the Tamir and SkyHunter interceptors can be delivered efficiently and at scale

R2S Chief Executive Officer Jonathan Casey noted that this is “the first production contract for the R2S joint venture and a major milestone for both Raytheon and Rafael.” He added that “the new Camden site is the first all-up-round production facility in the US to manufacture Tamir and SkyHunter missiles.”

The Iron Dome air defense system is one the lower layer of Israel’s multi-layered air defense systems, with David’s Sling and Arrow as the middle and upper tier respectively. All the systems played a key role in Israel’s last two years of multi-front war which saw thousands of rockets and drones launched at Israel. The Iron Dome has also been systematically upgraded to deal with emerging threats.

At a Thursday briefing at JINSA on Israel’s 12-day conflict with Iran, retired US General Charles Wald, noted that “the Iron Dome, fortunately, was upgraded just prior to the attacks by Iran to be able to take on larger missiles.” As such, the system is even more relevant in is role, defending against short and medium range rockets and drones.

Chairman, House Armed Services (HASC) Subcommittee on ReadinessRep. Jack Bergman, R-1 District, Michigan

Responsibilities

The FY26 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) tackles the human quotient of overall force readiness, bolstering long-standing issues such as affordable military child care; increased military housing inventories; and improved housing programs; including those that hold private housing contractors accountable for the quality and safety of homes they provide. This comes as welcomed legislation to the Readiness Subcommittee given its mandate to oversee DoD policy and programs related to family housing; construction; military installations; real property management, training, logistics and maintenance.Other readiness issues in the House defense spending bill include the Toxic Exposure Accountability provision, which addresses the impacts on military bases exposed to hazardous “forever” chemicals.Cleaning up toxic substances from affected military bases has long been on Congressman Bergman’s radar. It also informs the subcommittee’s legislative agenda which includes responsibility to oversee the organic industrial base; environment; energy-related issues; and base realignments and closures. 

Quote

In June of 2025, Bergman co-introduced the bipartisan Military PFAS Transparency Act, which offers a set of methodologies to removing toxic chemicals from impacted military bases. Considered the precursor of the House Toxic Exposure Accountability provision, Bergman said of the introduced legislation: “the problem has been studied extensively — it’s time to act. This is about turning analysis into accountability and moving the Pentagon from paperwork to real-world cleanup.”

Committees

Chairman of HASC Readiness Subcommittee.Member of: House Committee on Armed Services; Seapower and Projection Forces; Budget Committee; Committee on Veterans’ Affairs; and Subcommittee on Disability Assistance and Memorial Affairs.

Military Service 

Bergman served in the US Marine Corps for 40 years, flying both rotary and fixed-winged aircraft, culminating as commander of Marine Forces North/Marine Forces Reserve in New Orleans. He retired in 2009 at the rank of lieutenant general, having earned more than 15 medals and commendations including: Distinguished Service Medal (Navy); Defense Meritorious Service Medal; Vietnam Service Medal with 3 bronze campaign stars; Air Medal w/Valor device and Strike/Flight numeral “1”; Selected Marine Corps Reserve Medal with 1 silver service star; National Defense Service Medal with 2 bronze service stars; Navy & Marine Corps Overseas Service Ribbon with 1 bronze service star; and Vietnam Gallantry Cross w/bronze star, among others.

Political/Professional Career

Served as US Representative from Michigan’s 1st Congressional District since 2017, becoming the highest-ranking combat veteran elected to Congress.The boundaries of his district extend from the Upper Peninsula down to the northern lower Peninsula.Flew 22 years as a commercial airline pilot and launched two startup businesses in the medical equipment field. 

Education

Masters degree in business administration from the University of West Florida; and a business degree from Gustavus Adolphus College.His military education includes: Naval Aviation Flight Training; Naval War College; Amphibious Warfare School; Marine Corps Command & Staff College; Air Command Element ; and Reserve Component National Security.

Personal

John Warren Bergman was born February 2, 1947, in Shakopee, MN.His family roots in Michigan’s Upper Peninsula date back to the late 1800’s when his ancestors worked the mines rich in iron ore. Married to his wife, Cindy, for nearly three decades, they live in Watersmeet, Michigan, on the western edge of what is colloquially known as the UP.Jack is a grandfather to ten grandchildren.

WASHINGTON — Independent government auditors found that the Coast Guard’s aircraft availability rates and inventories overall have seen a bit of a decline in the past two decades, though they remained generally on par with the availability of the Pentagon’s fleets.

The Coast Guard’s aviation fleets are currently comprised of roughly 100 H-65 helicopters, 50 H-60 helicopters and 50 fixed-wing aircraft varying in size and purpose, from medium-range surveillance to heavy transport.

Taken together, the Congressional Budget Office found a slight drop in both availability rates and inventory, though fixed-wing aircraft availability overall increased from 41.8 to 50.5 percent from 2006 to 2024, while helicopter availability dropped from 60.7 to 47.8 percent.

“CBO found that Coast Guard helicopters tend to have availability rates that are lower than the rates for Army helicopters, higher than the rates for Department of the Navy (DoN) helicopters, and similar to those of Air Force helicopters,” according to the report published Thursday.

Regarding aircraft inventories, while CBO wrote that the number of aircraft “has generally declined,” the dynamic was flipped.

“Fixed-wing aircraft have decreased in number, whereas the number of helicopters has increased,” the report said. The Coast Guard had 68 fixed-wing aircraft and 134 helicopters in 2006 compared to 53 fixed-wing aircraft and 146 helicopters in 2024. (In total, CBO numbers show a combined drop of just three aircraft when comparing inventory for 2024 to 2006.)

Auditors noted the recent reconciliation legislation provided $3.7 billion to the Coast Guard to procure additional aircraft. The bill also includes $2.2 billion for depot-level maintenance facilities.

During a Senate hearing on Wednesday, Adm. Kevin Lunday, who is nominated to become commandant of the Coast Guard, said the service is looking to procure up to 40 MH-60 helicopters with those funds as well as six C-130Js. Lunday’s nomination was publicly announced earlier this year but the White House did not formally submit his name to the Senate until this fall.

During the hearing, some Democratic senators said the Coast Guard purchased “two luxury executive jets for more than $172 million” and raised concerns that funding could have been used to sustain search and rescue stations the Coast Guard is now considering shutting down as part of its force restructuring efforts instituted by the administration.

Regarding the jets, Lunday said those planes are necessary for operations to give senior DHS and service leadership access to secure command and control capabilities during emergencies.

Lunday said of the potential closures that the analysis was still in its early stages and that he could not commit to whether certain facilities will be shuttered.

“But there is a statutory process if the Coast Guard were to move forward with any closure of stations that includes public comment and input, and we know that the members of the public are very interested in the Coast Guard facilities and stations in their communities,” he said.

When British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stood side-by-side in Ankara on Oct. 28 to announce Turkey’s purchase of 20 Eurofighter Typhoons worth roughly $10 billion, the optics were triumphal. Starmer touted a boost for British industry and a strengthening of NATO ties. Erdogan celebrated what he called “a milestone” in modernizing Turkey’s Air Force.

For London, the sale looks like an industrial success story. For Ankara, it’s a strategic breakthrough — its first major non-US fighter acquisition, and a bridge to full defense independence. But for the alliance, it’s a strategic blunder — and a missed opportunity from Starmer to push for concessions from Erdogan.

The Eurofighter sale capped off a two-year negotiation. After Ankara reached a preliminary understanding with the UK in mid-2025, the deal still required the consent of the Eurofighter consortium’s four partners — Britain, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Berlin’s initial hesitation delayed final approval until October.

For Turkey, the acquisition fills an urgent capability gap. The country’s F-16 fleet, once cutting-edge, is aging fast. Ankara’s plan to buy F-35s collapsed in 2019 when it was ejected from the program and sanctioned under CAATSA for purchasing the Russian S-400 air defense system — a system NATO leaders warned could expose the F-35’s stealth profile.

Since then, Ankara has searched for alternatives. It sought new Block-70 F-16s but found the price tag high and US political appetite low. The Eurofighter Typhoon now serves as a stopgap: a capable 4.5-generation platform that bridges the gap until Turkey’s homegrown KAAN fighter can reach production.

That bridge, however, comes with geopolitical freight. The Typhoon deal underscores Turkey’s intent to diversify away from the United States and build a defense posture less constrained by Western oversight.The Eurofighter purchase is more than a fleet update —it’s part of Erdogan’s long-term strategy to free Turkey from reliance on US technology.

The centerpiece of that ambition is the KAAN, Turkey’s prototype fifth-generation jet. Ankara’s goal is to field a stealth aircraft that can compete with the F-35. The early flight tests have generated national pride but remain dependent on US-built F-110 engines. Export licenses for future engines are already constrained by Congress.

Until Turkey can manufacture its own powerplants, KAAN remains aspirational. That’s why the Typhoon acquisition matters. It gives Turkey time, training continuity, and leverage — all while sending a message that Ankara can find partners outside Washington when it wants to.

From London’s perspective, approving the deal was a simple equation: More exports means more jobs. The UK defense sector, especially BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce, will benefit, while Starmer gains political credit at home as a jobs champion.

But this industrial win masks a strategic loss. Turkey’s defense modernization no longer serves NATO’s collective security — it serves Erdogan’s autonomy project.

Moving Away From The West?

Turkey is not buying Western aircraft to enhance interoperability. It is buying them to go its own way. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said as much on Oct. 5, complaining that Turkey is “encircled” by alliances in the Eastern Mediterranean — naming Greece, Cyprus, Israel, and the United States — and warning that unresolved disputes could be handed to the military.

In other words, the aircraft London just agreed to sell could one day confront the very allies Britain claims to support.

Starmer’s decision also ignores a glaring precedent: Turkey still possesses the S-400 system that got it kicked out of the F-35 program. Ankara has made no attempt to divest itself of these missiles. Yet Erdogan continues to insist Turkey deserves to receive F-35s because it paid for them.

That mindset betrays what one US observer described as a “transactional and entitled” understanding of defense procurement — one that ignores export controls, end-user agreements, and trust. (Turkey has also secured rights to purchase additional used Eurofighters from Qatar and Oman, but their eventual transfer to Ankara will still require London’s consent.)

By approving the Typhoon sale, Britain effectively validates Erdogan’s argument that cash trumps conduct. It tells Ankara — and other would-be buyers — that alliance norms are negotiable. Washington has long refrained from authorizing the sale of advanced weapons capabilities to Ankara, suspicious of Turkey’s short- and long-term intentions as an ally. There may have been a prudent path to greenlighting a jet sale to Turkey, especially when Starmer was holding a winning hand. Instead, he chose to settle.

Starmer squandered a valuable opportunity to demand firm assurances from Ankara before approving the sale. Conditioning the Eurofighter deal on Turkey’s commitment to halt belligerent actions against Britain’s European allies like Greece and Cyprus, or to take a firm stand against terrorist entities like Hamas, would have been entirely reasonable —especially given Ankara’s provocations that risk triggering armed conflict in the eastern Mediterranean.

Britain could also have demanded tangible action from Ankara beyond its token gestures against Russia. Since Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, Erdogan has avoided any decisive stance against Moscow. Turkey did close the straits to Russian warships and supplied drones to Ukraine, but it simultaneously helped sustain Russia’s war economy — selling dual-use goods like microchips and only halting illicit financial flows after severe warnings from US Treasury officials. Despite its NATO membership, Ankara continues to resist implementing the international sanctions regime and has repeatedly sought to join organizations that undermine British and European security interests, notably BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

The UK also could have used the sale to push towards more democratic reforms. Shortly after Starmer inked the contract in Ankara, Turkey’s pro-government media accused opposition leader Ekrem Imamoglu of being a British agent working for MI6. The accusation — a transparent smear designed to silence Erdogan’s most credible rival — didn’t seem to trouble Downing Street.

That silence matters. When the leader of one of the world’s oldest democracies signs a multibillion-dollar defense deal with a president who jails journalists and criminalizes opposition, it signals that industrial profits outweigh democratic principles.

There is precedent here. The Biden administration only approved the sale of Block 70 F-16 fighters to Turkey after Erdogan relented and agreed to approve Finland and Sweden’s application to join the NATO alliance in January 2024. Approving the sale of fourth-generation F-16s by Washington was tied to tangible gains. It demonstrated Washington’s resolve to help modernize a NATO ally’s military capability, but showed that even allies have to follow rules to get what they want. This was an example that Starmer could have adopted.

It’s also something that the US should follow when debating the question of whether to allow Turkey back into the F-35 program. I have argued previously that Turkey should not be allowed back in, but the Trump administration seems at least somewhat inclined to approve the F-35 in the future. If that is the case, the administration needs to think strongly through what concessions it wants in return, whether that be democratic reforms, increased basing rights or something else.

Unlike London, Washington should seek to maximize its leverage while it has it, because as soon as Erdogan gets what he wants that leverage will disappear.

Britain’s Eurofighter sale may deliver economic dividends, but strategically it’s a misstep that empowers a regime moving in the wrong direction. Erdogan is building an independent defense ecosystem — one that will eventually compete with, not complement, Western industry. The Eurofighter deal won’t bring Turkey closer to NATO — it will show Erdogan that pushing in his own direction comes with no real cost.

Starmer’s government can celebrate jobs and exports today. But the price will come later — when Turkey’s next-generation jets, built on a foundation Britain helped supply, fly missions that serve Ankara’s ambitions rather than NATO’s.

Sinan Ciddi is the Turkey director at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

DUBAI AIRSHOW — Emirati defense giant EDGE Group was an unmistakable presence here at the Dubai Airshow, where the conglomerate unveiled several new systems on the show floor and announced more than a dozen new deals or cooperation agreements, including several with international partners half a world away from the UAE.

The moves are part of what EDGE CEO Hamad Al Marar told Breaking Defense was a focus on an international market where he hopes export sales will one day cover just about all of EDGE’s expenses.

“I want to make sure [in the future] that EDGE Group relies on exports to be self-sufficient, to [diversify] the clientele, and to keep this advancement happening,” Al Marar told Breaking Defense in an interview on Thursday.

Right now, he said, exports account for “a little bit over 50 percent of our sales,” adding that EDGE has a presence in over 100 countries. The firm has racked up a backlog worth $21 billion, Al Marar said.

Among the swath of signings at the airshow, EDGE announced new or expanding partnerships with companies hailing from Vietnam to South Korea to Spain and Italy. But perhaps the most eye-catching deal was one with a serious valuation attached to it: A cooperation agreement with Indonesia’s Republikorp that includes a “comprehensive modernisation programme for the Indonesian Armed Forces,” total financing and procurements of which are estimated to be worth $7 billion.

The announcement of that deal on Wednesday called it the “largest international programme to date” for EDGE.

“When it comes to armament strategy, [Indonesia] comprises of many islands, and therefore the solutions they might ask for would be always with a multiplier. It is a program that will take many years to fulfill,” Al Marar told Breaking Defense.

As part of the deal, EDGE defense hardware is to be localized in Indonesia, including the SKYKNIGHT air defense missile system, infantry fighting vehicles, unmanned boats, cyber defense software, as well as ammunition.

Al Marar added that Indonesia’s requirement has been in “study for the last three [to] four years.”

He said the localization element “is not imposed on us fully, but we always tend to try and create local work packages, employment opportunities, capacity growth in any country we go to.”

Al Marar told Breaking defense that the last supply batch of this deal “would be in eight years. So it is quite a program.”

Among the international customers of interest is one of the largest: the US. Al Marar told Breaking Defense that EDGE is “definitely” looking to penetrate that market.

A few days before the Dubai Airshow, EDGE Group and American defense startup Anduril entered a joint venture to coproduce drones, including a mid-size drone called Omen, which was on display on the show’s floor.

Al Marar described the team-up with Anduril as a “genuine partnership that would bring benefits” to both parties.

“From a technology perspective, it would add so much value, given that it’s also American tech. The UAE would bring so much value because we [have] also started on a clean slate, and we had to be innovative to go and have a product ready fast, to become efficient and to have cost effective solutions to the market,” he told Breaking Defense.

He added that both firms will “come together on joint development that will help create an export base also … for Anduril for the rest of the [international] markets. As you may know, the US is a very large market, and all the orders are really huge, and you would need the capacity elsewhere to serve other markets.”

Regarding other markets, Al Marar said that EDGE is heavily engaged in talks with North African nations, “specifically Egypt and Morocco, and we have been conducting efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa actively. So we do see that Africa is the market.”

Tech On The Show Floor And, Later, In Space

At the airshow EDGE made a splash on the show floor with a large presentation area and several unveilings. In the autonomous systems domain, other than the Omen, EDGE unveiled its medium-altitude, long-endurance UAV dubbed JERNAS-M as well as the VORTEX-E counter-drone interceptor.  

The firm also displayed smart weapons, including long-range cruise missile WSM-1, DARKWING air- or ground-launched munition and THUNDER-ER smart munition.

On the software side of things, EDGE unveiled ZENITH, which the company describes as the “UAE’s soverieign space operations and data orchestration platform unifying access to multi-sensor imagery and data from national, commercial, and allied constellations.”

“ZENITH can be integrated either on prem[ises] or on cloud, [a] solution that can be offered to the clients, and most importantly, what we need is what we already have done is to integrate with the different imagery satellite providers,” Waleid Al Mesmari, EDGE Group’s president of space and cyber technologies cluster, told Breaking Defense

As part of its space endeavors, EDGE Group’s subsidiary FADA is expecting to launch the first satellite of its Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) Satellite, otherwise known as SIRB, constellation by 2028.

“SIRB is about launching SAR satellite constellation that can observe the Earth and provide different applications either for border protection [and security], mining and other civil applications,” Al Mesmari said.

He told Breaking Defense that as of now the partners of the program have been selected: Singapore’s ST Engineering, Italy’s Metasensing and three UAE entities — TII (Technology Innovation Institute), Space 42, and NSSTC (National Space Science and Technology Center), led by the national space agency.

The constellation is expected to be comprised of three satellites that will be launched in two phases.

“The first phase [consists] of [launching the first] satellite that can enable us to transfer the knowledge and upskill our Emirati engineers to understand how to develop, design, and produce SAR satellites [and] will be concluded by 2028, with the first satellite [launch],” Al Mesmari told Breaking Defense.

He added that afterwards comes the second phase of working on the second and third satellite of the constellation.

“Within the first quarter of next year, our local engineers will travel to our partners in Italy, to get and understand and participate in the design and the development phase of the SAR payload, enabling them to come back with the right knowledge to sustain this capability in the future,” he added.

JERUSALEM — Israeli experts and politicians are reacting to news that the US may sell the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter to Saudi Arabia with a mix of concern and pragmatism, with the general consensus seeming to be a cautious “wait and see.”

Experts point to two key questions: how capable the Saudi F-35s may be, and just how long their arrival may take.

The White House officially announced that it would sell the F-35, long-sought by Riyadh, to the Saudis during a Nov. 18 meeting between US President Donald Trump and Saudi leader Mohammed bin Salman. Notably, Trump seemed to indicate that the Saudis would be sold the same caliber of F-35 as the Israelis operate.

“When you look at the F-35, and you’re asking me is it the same, I think it’s going to be pretty similar, yeah,” Trump said. “This is a great ally, and Israel’s a great ally, and I know they’d like you to get planes of reduced caliber. I don’t think that makes you too happy,” Trump said, directing his comments to bin Salman.

“We‘re looking at that exactly right now, but as far as I’m concerned, I think they are both at the level where they should get top of the line.”

That statement would seem to fly in the face of a requirement that the US always maintains Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME), a policy that became law in 2008. And while a US official was quoted in local media as saying the Trump administration “will not breach” the QME law, there is still plenty of concern in Israeli circles.

Israel was an early acquirer of the advanced plane, signing a deal in 2010 and receiving its first two aircraft in 2016; it is believed to have been the first country to use the plane in combat in 2018. The warplane was a backbone of strikes against Iran, the Houthis and other adversaries over the last two years of war.

Officially, the Netanyahu government is being cautious. A spokesperson for Israel’s Prime Minister responded to a question about the F-35 sale Thursday, saying “The Prime Minister and the President of the United States and Israel have a longstanding understanding, which is that Israel maintains the qualitative edge when it comes to its defense. That was true yesterday, that has been true today, and the Prime Minister believes that will be true tomorrow and in the future, of course.”

Israel’s Ynet, a major daily paper, noted that the Israeli Air Force has concerns about the F-35 deal, writing that “Air Force officials stressed that the F-35’s advanced detection, data-processing and networked systems give Israel an edge unmatched by any other country in the region.”

Breaking Defense reached out to several members of Knesset from the coalition and opposition parties and did not receive a response, except for opposition leader Yair Lapid, whose office pointed to an X post that reads, “it cannot be that because of the government’s weakness we will give up Israeli security interests and allow the F35 deal.” 

Expert Reaction: Acceptance, But Concerns

Among experts and former officials more willing to talk, the Saudi news has been met with mixed responses, at best.

Yaakov Amidror, a former major general and National Security Advisor now at Washington-based Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA), noted that Israel can’t realistically dictate to the US who to sell warplanes to. But, “in the end of the day we have concerns because it is clear that this plane in the hands of another country in the Middle East will be problematic, because we will lose some uniqueness we had of having this capacity and plane.”

Amidror, who is also a senior fellow at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS) emphasized how important QME is to Israel. “It was understood years ago that Israel is a small country with limited demography and the only way to bridge the gap of asymmetry is QME and that is technology, training and experience.”

If Trump holds true to his statement that the Saudis will get the same level of F-35 as Israel, Amidror noted that the QME could be maintained through the addition of some other capability that would give Israel an edge over the Saudis.

Time also plays into this, with Amidror predicting it will take five to 10 years for the Saudis to get their first F-35s. That’s a timeline echoed by Yoel Guzansky, a senior researcher and head of the Gulf program at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), who noted that if the F-35 sale is tied up in the Saudis normalizing relations with Israel, that could also impact the timeline.

The F-35 is “a status symbol, it’s important to MBS to show he get the plane first in the Arab countries,” Guzansky said, noting the UAE has also sought the F-35. As a result, Riyadh will need to keep up good relations with the US, potentially caving on normalization.

“They will need the US beside them and this bonds them with the US. I think it’s in Israel’s interest to have the US more present,” he said.

Charles Wald, a retired US Air Force general, said at a briefing hosted by JINSA this week that it would take time for Riyadh to get the plane and that Israel has developed the plane to a degree that it would likely retain QME, while noting that the sale could be beneficial and aid integration with the Abraham Accords. “I think the F-35 being in Saudi Arabia, if the Abraham Accords come about, would be a good thing. But like I said, it’s going to take a while,” he said.

In contrast, Eric Mandel, the director of the Middle East Political Information Network and the senior security editor of the Jerusalem Report, noted to Breaking Defense that “even a slightly downgraded fifth-generation F-35 in Saudi hands would be a strategic game-changer. The Israeli Air Force, along with U.S. intelligence and defense officials, believes such a sale would undermine Israel’s military dominance and its control of regional airspace.”

He said, “any F-35 delivery should be absolutely contingent on Riyadh distancing itself from China — America’s primary strategic adversary — with whom the Saudis recently held joint military exercises. Beijing is eager to gain access to this transformative technology.”

Israel, Mandel insisted, should receive “meaningful compensation for this shift should include both full normalization with Saudi Arabia and participation in the shared R&D of America’s sixth-generation fighter, the F-47.”

This is the latest in a series of regular columns by  Robbin Laird , where he will tackle current defense issues through the lens of more than 45 years of defense expertise in both the US and abroad. The goal of these columns: to look back at how questions and perspectives of the past should inform decisions being made today. He’s joined on this piece by Ed Timperlake, a former CO of VMFA-321, a Marine Fighter Attack Squadron.

Last week, we met with Under Secretary of the Navy Hung Cao in his Pentagon office to discuss his recent visits to Vietnam and Guam, two locations that encapsulate both his personal journey and the strategic transformation reshaping American power projection in the Pacific.

Cao was sworn in as Under Secretary of the Navy on Oct. 3. Less than three weeks later, he traveled to Guam in his capacity as Senior Defense Official for Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. Shortly thereafter, on Nov. 2, he accompanied Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth to Vietnam, returning to the country he fled as a four-year-old refugee fifty years earlier.

It’s important to set the stage for any discussion about the role of smaller Pacific countries and how it has changed.

In 2013, we published an article for AOL Defense — now Breaking Defense — illustrating a strategic triangle of Hawaii, Guam, and Japan as three foundational bases from which the United States projected military power. At the time we noted that you could expand that to include Australia and South Korea.

If we redrew those graphics today, they would look fundamentally different. The transformation reflects evolution in how American military power operates in the twenty-first century. It would represent something more complex and resilient: a network of overlapping partnerships, each calibrated to specific circumstances but collectively creating a web of relationships enhancing regional stability. This network distributes both capability and strategic commitment across multiple nations and locations.

Cao explained that the goal extends beyond Guam to encompass the broader Mariana Islands, significantly expanding the area available for force protection and projection. Adding the Northern Mariana Islands to Guam for US military operational purposes increases total land area by more than 80 percent — from approximately 212 square miles to 391 square miles.

Guam has become increasingly conceptualized as a node in a distributed network, a place from which capabilities can be rapidly dispersed throughout the region in response to specific crises.

This shift reflects hard-learned lessons. Concentration of forces creates vulnerability, particularly in an era of precision strike and advanced targeting. By distributing capabilities across wider geographic areas, emphasizing mobility and rapid repositioning, and building infrastructure to support dispersed operations, the United States makes itself a more difficult target while enhancing its ability to respond flexibly.

This expanded operational space provides multiple advantages: it complicates adversary targeting, creates redundancy in critical capabilities, enables forces to operate from unexpected vectors, and provides depth for logistics and sustainment operations.

Another expanded node on the geographic map is Vietnam, where Cao’s visit centered on maritime security and the joint commitment both nations share to maintaining an open and free Pacific.

Vietnam, like the Philippines, has experienced repeated aggressive actions by Chinese maritime forces against civilian vessels operating in waters Vietnam considers within its legitimate maritime zone. Chinese government vessels, including law enforcement and maritime militia, have regularly attacked and harassed Vietnamese fishing vessels in the South China Sea. Documented incidents include beatings of crew members, use of iron bars and water cannons, ramming and sinking of vessels, confiscation of equipment, and detention of fishermen.

These acts have created genuine alarm in Hanoi and driven Vietnamese interest in enhancing their capacity to monitor, patrol, and defend their maritime approaches. The United States has assisted through concrete capability transfers: Over recent years, Washington has transferred three Hamilton-class cutters from the US Coast Guard to the Vietnamese Coast Guard, refurbished to ensure operational effectiveness.

By enhancing Vietnamese maritime domain awareness and patrol capability, the United States strengthens the collective capacity of regional states to resist coercion and maintain freedom of navigation. Cao emphasized that this cooperation represents the core of what both nations are working toward: keeping the Pacific open and free for commercial shipping, trade, and peaceful economic activity.

The Alliance Network: America’s Strategic Advantage

The transformation of Guam’s role and deepening of US-Vietnam maritime cooperation are parts of a broader reconfiguration of Pacific security architecture.

Cao’s visits in his first weeks reflects a fundamental reality: The United States cannot unilaterally ensure Pacific security. The region is too vast, challenges too diverse, and resources required to substantial for any single nation. But the United States benefits from an unmatched network of allies and partners sharing American concerns about coercion and erosion of the rules-based international order.

Vietnam’s evolution from adversary to partner represents one of the more remarkable transformations in this network. The relationship remains carefully calibrated, conscious of historical sensitivities. Vietnamese leadership has articulated the Four Nos: no participation in military alliances; no aligning with one country to oppose another; no foreign military bases in Vietnamese territory; and no use of force in international relations.

This policy, sometimes termed “bamboo diplomacy,” reflects the flexible yet resilient balancing act Vietnam maintains amid major power rivalry. The Hamilton-class transfers exemplify a broader American approach that sees capability building in partner nations as force multiplication, respecting Vietnam’s autonomy while addressing shared security concerns.

But shared concerns about Chinese maritime behavior, mutual interest in free trade and open sea lanes, and complementary strategic perspectives have created genuine common ground.

This pattern repeats throughout the region. The Philippines has reinvigorated its alliance with the United States. Australia has committed to unprecedented defense integration. Japan continues expanding defense capabilities and operational cooperation with American forces. South Korea maintains its fundamental alliance commitment.

The Pacific remains vast, diverse, economically vital, and strategically crucial. How the United States engages with this region will shape global security for decades to come. Cao’s early emphasis on Guam and Vietnam signals this engagement will be grounded in strategic realism and appreciation for the region’s complexity. His personal journey from refugee to defense leader adds human dimension to these strategic imperatives.

STOCKHOLM — Sweden’s Defence Minister Pål Jonson said Wednesday that Canada’s “strong avionics sector” and skilled workforce make it the perfect partner to help Saab rapidly expand Gripen production — capacity urgently needed to supply Ukraine with the 100–150 Gripen fighters it seeks.

In a Canadian public broadcaster interview, Jonson made clear that Sweden cannot ramp up production alone if a Western coalition green-lights a major Gripen transfer to Ukraine. Hence, Sweden is on the hunt for another industrial partner to handle the potential jump in production.

“We are looking for increased production,” Jonson said. “To produce 100 to 150 additional Gripen fighters on top of what we’re doing right now in Sweden — and with Brazil, Colombia, and others already in the queue — might be challenging to do it all in Sweden. That’s why I am talking about partnership.”

Jonson highlighted the existing Saab–Bombardier partnership on the GlobalEye AEW&C program as proof the two countries can successfully coproduce advanced aircraft.

“If we can reach an agreement to provide Ukraine with the Gripen-E as the backbone of their air-defence system, then the components of all of this align very broadly,” Jonson noted, pointing to Canada’s strong Ukrainian diaspora and Ottawa’s role in Kyiv’s military support.

Jonson’s comments sit against the backdrop of Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s decision to reexamine Canada’s troubled F-35 procurement in light of the escalating US trade war under President Donald Trump. 

A high-level delegation — led by the Swedish king and queen, alongside Deputy Prime Minister Ebba Busch — traveled to Canada this week to promote the Gripen as a viable alternative to the Lockheed Martin-produced F-35, while also pushing for coproduction deals and potential Canadian sales of the Saab GlobalEye AEW&C aircraft and the Saab-Kockums A26 fifth-generation submarine currently built for the Swedish Navy.

Saab and the Swedish government are offering as many as 10,000 new jobs in Canada, potential production-line expansion in partnership with companies such as Bombardier, and full technology transfer — incentives Canada’s Industry Minister Mélanie Joly described as “very interesting.”

“Of course, we’re very much interested in the offer by Saab on the Gripen and the creation of jobs in Canada and working together regarding Ukraine,” Joly told Busch Wednesday at a joint business event. “We need to have more details … but we’ll continue the conversations for sure.”

However, the clock is ticking fast on Canada’s fighter jet replacement. The last major overhaul of the current CF-18 fleet only extends their safe operational life. With the first Canadian F-35s scheduled to arrive 2028 and full operational capability of F-35s in 2032-2034, the margin for further delays or a protracted new competition is razor-thin.

Saab is slowly expanding the Gripen’s global footprint. In August, Thailand signed a $550 million deal for four jets. Last week, Colombia officially joined neighbor Brazil as a Gripen operator. Brazil already has 36 on order and hosts a domestic final-assembly line; it remains unclear whether Colombia’s 17 aircraft will also be built there. Talks with Peru continue. 

And perhaps most notably, last month Ukraine and Sweden signed a letter of intent for Kyiv to potentially acquire 100–150 Saab Gripen E fighter jets. 

Addressing the perennial Canadian concern about operating a “mixed fleet” alongside the F-35, Jonson pointed to a successful Nordic air-power integration.

“In the Nordic cooperation, Finland, Denmark, and Norway are using the F-35; we’re using Gripens, but we still have a common Nordic air-power concept and we work very, very closely together,” he said. “From a strategic perspective, it actually creates more dilemmas for Russia because they have to diversify their air defense systems.” He also stressed that Gripen is fully compatible with NATO’s data communication links 16 and 22.

WASHINGTON — As the Space Force doubles down on its efforts to further speed acquisition cycles to implement the Pentagon’s reform push, it needs to figure out how to define what minimum capability is good enough for any new kit to be operationally useful, according to the service’s top acquisition official.

The Space Force hasn’t yet “gotten the work done on test and operational acceptance,” needed to hash out the issues that “center around risk and operational risk,” Maj. Gen. Stephen Purdy, acting assistant secretary for space acquisition and integration at the Department of the Air Force, said today at a conference sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Hudson Institute.

Reducing testing requirements, and cutting the time the testing and validation process takes, will be key elements of the Space Force’s acquisition reform efforts that will focus on rapid delivery of systems with “minimum viable capability” that can be incrementally improved, Chief of Space Operations Gen. Chance Saltzman told the conference in his opening remarks.

“The goal is not to chase perfection in requirements or performance, but rather to deliver some capability incrementally, improving on what we have that can be ready quickly, and then we improve on that continually and use it operationally. … [T]his new mindset requires an evolution of our test and fielding framework,” he said.

Saltzman said the goal is “continuous, streamline test approaches, shifting our test mindset to validate only what is required to ensure the minimum viable capability is effective for the users and no more. Streamlining test documentation and execution with a focus on acceptance, not assurance, will ensure testing is integrated, focused and does not unnecessarily slow down fielding of capability.”

The rub, Purdy cautioned, is how to ensure that those minimum viable products are actually useful and beneficial to warfighters — with the unspoken implication being that getting something out the door at top speed won’t matter if it’s not fit for purpose.

“We’re really set for some really interesting discussions. Because I can go ramp up the acquisition system … I can start low, and I can pump things out fast. But we need to have a real discussion on the operator side and the requirements side, because … these are war fighting systems, and there’s a joint warfighting force that has to produce guaranteed results,” he said.

[W]hat is the appetite for fast, rapid delivery of capability? Because that capability will not be the 100 percent capability. It probably won’t even be the 80 percent; it might be the 40 percent. It might have issues. It might have some bugs. It might cause you [the operators] to be down a little bit,” he said. “I want to deliver as fast as possible … but there’ll be risks there; there’ll be operational risk there. And there’s not a good answer to that question yet. So, that’s going to be a hot moment of debate here going forward over the next few months,” he said.