This is the latest in a series of regular columns by  Robbin Laird , where he will tackle current defense issues through the lens of more than 45 years of defense expertise in both the US and abroad. The goal of these columns: to look back at how questions and perspectives of the past should inform decisions being made today. He’s joined on this piece by Ed Timperlake, a former CO of VMFA-321, a Marine Fighter Attack Squadron.

Last week, we met with Under Secretary of the Navy Hung Cao in his Pentagon office to discuss his recent visits to Vietnam and Guam, two locations that encapsulate both his personal journey and the strategic transformation reshaping American power projection in the Pacific.

Cao was sworn in as Under Secretary of the Navy on Oct. 3. Less than three weeks later, he traveled to Guam in his capacity as Senior Defense Official for Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. Shortly thereafter, on Nov. 2, he accompanied Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth to Vietnam, returning to the country he fled as a four-year-old refugee fifty years earlier.

It’s important to set the stage for any discussion about the role of smaller Pacific countries and how it has changed.

In 2013, we published an article for AOL Defense — now Breaking Defense — illustrating a strategic triangle of Hawaii, Guam, and Japan as three foundational bases from which the United States projected military power. At the time we noted that you could expand that to include Australia and South Korea.

If we redrew those graphics today, they would look fundamentally different. The transformation reflects evolution in how American military power operates in the twenty-first century. It would represent something more complex and resilient: a network of overlapping partnerships, each calibrated to specific circumstances but collectively creating a web of relationships enhancing regional stability. This network distributes both capability and strategic commitment across multiple nations and locations.

Cao explained that the goal extends beyond Guam to encompass the broader Mariana Islands, significantly expanding the area available for force protection and projection. Adding the Northern Mariana Islands to Guam for US military operational purposes increases total land area by more than 80 percent — from approximately 212 square miles to 391 square miles.

Guam has become increasingly conceptualized as a node in a distributed network, a place from which capabilities can be rapidly dispersed throughout the region in response to specific crises.

This shift reflects hard-learned lessons. Concentration of forces creates vulnerability, particularly in an era of precision strike and advanced targeting. By distributing capabilities across wider geographic areas, emphasizing mobility and rapid repositioning, and building infrastructure to support dispersed operations, the United States makes itself a more difficult target while enhancing its ability to respond flexibly.

This expanded operational space provides multiple advantages: it complicates adversary targeting, creates redundancy in critical capabilities, enables forces to operate from unexpected vectors, and provides depth for logistics and sustainment operations.

Another expanded node on the geographic map is Vietnam, where Cao’s visit centered on maritime security and the joint commitment both nations share to maintaining an open and free Pacific.

Vietnam, like the Philippines, has experienced repeated aggressive actions by Chinese maritime forces against civilian vessels operating in waters Vietnam considers within its legitimate maritime zone. Chinese government vessels, including law enforcement and maritime militia, have regularly attacked and harassed Vietnamese fishing vessels in the South China Sea. Documented incidents include beatings of crew members, use of iron bars and water cannons, ramming and sinking of vessels, confiscation of equipment, and detention of fishermen.

These acts have created genuine alarm in Hanoi and driven Vietnamese interest in enhancing their capacity to monitor, patrol, and defend their maritime approaches. The United States has assisted through concrete capability transfers: Over recent years, Washington has transferred three Hamilton-class cutters from the US Coast Guard to the Vietnamese Coast Guard, refurbished to ensure operational effectiveness.

By enhancing Vietnamese maritime domain awareness and patrol capability, the United States strengthens the collective capacity of regional states to resist coercion and maintain freedom of navigation. Cao emphasized that this cooperation represents the core of what both nations are working toward: keeping the Pacific open and free for commercial shipping, trade, and peaceful economic activity.

The transformation of Guam’s role and deepening of US-Vietnam maritime cooperation are parts of a broader reconfiguration of Pacific security architecture.

Cao’s visits in his first weeks reflects a fundamental reality: The United States cannot unilaterally ensure Pacific security. The region is too vast, challenges too diverse, and resources required to substantial for any single nation. But the United States benefits from an unmatched network of allies and partners sharing American concerns about coercion and erosion of the rules-based international order.

Vietnam’s evolution from adversary to partner represents one of the more remarkable transformations in this network. The relationship remains carefully calibrated, conscious of historical sensitivities. Vietnamese leadership has articulated the Four Nos: no participation in military alliances; no aligning with one country to oppose another; no foreign military bases in Vietnamese territory; and no use of force in international relations.

This policy, sometimes termed “bamboo diplomacy,” reflects the flexible yet resilient balancing act Vietnam maintains amid major power rivalry. The Hamilton-class transfers exemplify a broader American approach that sees capability building in partner nations as force multiplication, respecting Vietnam’s autonomy while addressing shared security concerns.

But shared concerns about Chinese maritime behavior, mutual interest in free trade and open sea lanes, and complementary strategic perspectives have created genuine common ground.

This pattern repeats throughout the region. The Philippines has reinvigorated its alliance with the United States. Australia has committed to unprecedented defense integration. Japan continues expanding defense capabilities and operational cooperation with American forces. South Korea maintains its fundamental alliance commitment.

The Pacific remains vast, diverse, economically vital, and strategically crucial. How the United States engages with this region will shape global security for decades to come. Cao’s early emphasis on Guam and Vietnam signals this engagement will be grounded in strategic realism and appreciation for the region’s complexity. His personal journey from refugee to defense leader adds human dimension to these strategic imperatives.