Dreadnought: Britain,Germany and the Coming of the Great War by Robert K Massie (13-Dec-2007) Paperback by Robert K. Massie

My rating: 4 of 5 stars


Most of us think of the First World War starting when Gavrilo Princip fired a fatal shot which triggered a web of interlocking treaties, dragging Europe and then the globe into a pointless cataclysm.
Massie steps back and looks at the grinding tectonic forces that just might have made the war inevitable, despite the struggles of politicians on all sides.
The first nine chapters (this is a big book) deal with Queen Victoria's failed attempt to ensure European peace through dynastic marriages and the consolidation of Germany under Prussian control. Despite the title, there is very little focus on ships in this part. Part 2 (chapters 10-21) surveys the messy international politics and military adventures of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Part 3 (chapters 22-28) finally turns to the Royal Navy, Part 4 (29-38) to the growing tension between Britain and Germany and Part 5 (39-46) the road to Armageddon.
Some key points emerge. From the British perspective, policy had always been to support the weaker continental power(s) and prevent any one nation establishing hegemony. That given, they were welcome to fight among themselves so long as they left control of the sea to us. As an island nation, free use of the sea lanes was life or death to Britain but a 'luxury' to the continental powers.
Germany, on the other hand, had unified and then defeated both Austria and France. Its population and economic growth rate far outstripped its competitors, and in the space of a decade or so it acquired overseas colonies in Africa and the Far East. The Kaiser, both admiring and resentful of British maritime power, did not see why his access to foreign trade should be by grace of his uncle's ships.
Things came to a head with the 'Navy Scare' of 1909. In the previous year the British Liberal Government had cut the Dreadnought building programme to two per year. The German Navy Law had sanctioned four. Worse, it was believed that Krupp was stockpiling guns and armour plate for a building surge which would allow the German navy to match the Royal Navy ship for ship before British yards could respond. Diplomats insisted that German building was for their own needs only, but it was clear that their focus was on modern, short-range battleships whose only plausible use was in the North Sea. Against Britain.
And so back to the collapsing card houses of July and August 1914. With Austria and Russia at war Germany was committed to helping Austria. But to attack Russia they had to knock France out first - hence the Schlieffen Plan, which involved a massive thrust through Belgium to bypass French defences. No-one asked the Belgians.
This affected Britain in two ways: firstly as a guarantor of Belgian neutrality (which was relevant only when the Belgians chose to resist), and secondly the fear of German hegemony, which would surely be turned against the UK sooner or later.
Massie deals with the complex twist and turns of European politics well. He writes clearly and raises some interesting points, not least the embedded antisemitism of the time. When dealing with the Navy Scare it might have been worthwhile to bring in the 1909 Baltic cruise of HMS Cornwall. Ostensibly a cadet training and diplomatic glad-handing trip, the cruise also had a covert purpose: charting navigable channels, landing beaches, coastal defences and dockyards. The ship's captain was Reginald 'Blinker' Hall who later, as head of Naval Intelligence, would be one of the twentieth century's most influential spymasters.



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