From the Dardanelles to Oran by Arthur J. Marder

My rating: 4 of 5 stars


This book comprises five essays, four of which are updated versions of earlier work and the last written especially for this 1974 publication.
The first chapter, The Dardanelles Revisited, revisits the thorny question of whether a purely naval assault on the straits in 1915 could have succeeded. In this he revises his earlier view in From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: Vol II The War Years: To and argues that there were two moments when it might just have worked. The better opportunity was in April 1915 when the navy had fast, shallow-draught minesweepers, it had worked out the techniques of air spotting naval gunfire, and the Turkish batteries were still critically short of armour-piercing ammunition - a fact which the British knew. What then? Granted casualties would have been heavy and the fleet would have had to face the battlecruiser Yavuz Sultan Selim (formerly SMS Breslau) the investment of Constantinople (Istanbul) would either have knocked Turkey out of the war or it would not. In the latter case Marder dismisses the risk of the allied fleet being cut off because it would control the supply routes to the forts, which were in any case undefended from the rear. In the former he argues that the loss of Turkey to the Central Powers would have appreciably shortened the war - worth almost any risk. I scratch my head over this. Arguably the only saving grace of the Dardanelles campaign was that it prevented any serious consideration of Fisher's Baltic adventure, which might have been an even greater disaster.
And so to Chapter 2, The Influence of History on Sea Power, which addresses the lessons learnt (and ignored) from the conflict of 1914-18 during the inter-war period. As such it invites comparison with Hugh Roskill's Naval Policy Between the Wars, though Marder's chapter is much shorter and easier to read. He also makes no bones about the rivalry between the two authors. It is a brief chapter and takes a bleak view of the - sometimes wilful - loss of knowledge and skills that characterised the period. It may not give enough credit (if that is the word) to the financial stringency that cut programme after programme and drove out some of the navy's best brains. Now, what does that remind me of?
Chapter 3, The Royal Navy and the Ethiopian Crisis of 1935-1936 returns to the theme of alternative history. What would have happened if the Royal Navy had stopped Mussolini in his tracks by blocking his access to the Suez Canal and to the Atlantic via Gibraltar? It is reasonable to suggest that, starved of supplies, his Ethiopian adventure would have collapsed. The longer term consequences are imponderable. Marder suggests that a show of force then could have avoided WW2 altogether. On the other hand, Britain was in no condition to fight a war and still had hopes of retaining Italy as an ally. Sorry, Ethiopia.
Winston is Back, the penultimate chapter, addresses Churchill's time as First Lord of the Admiralty in 1939-1940 before he became Prime Minister. It resumes Marder's sparring with Roskill by inviting comparison with Churchill and The Admirals. Marder's argument is that, as First Lord, Churchill did not directly interfere in operational matters. His frequent, annoying 'prayers' ('Pray this', 'Pray that') and nutty ideas caused First Sea Lord Pound to task his already overworked staff to develop plans showing why they were impossible. Nonetheless they fostered a spirit of pace and aggression which served the navy well. Interestingly, in view of the current debate about Churchill's views, he insisted on naval recruitment and promotion being open to people of all colours and classes. Up to a point. Marder's case is interesting but I am not convinced that his examples wholly support it. Best to read for yourself and see what you think.
And so to the meat of the book, Oran, 3 July 1930. This review of the attack on Mers-el-Kébir is by far the longest chapter. It takes in the background to the French Armistice, the strength and disposition of the French fleet, the events at Portsmouth, Plymouth and Alexandria, and the military and political consequences. Running through it all is the question, could and should the bloodshed have been avoided? Marder wisely avoids coming down on one side or the other but lays out the arguments coherently and clearly.
Originally published in 1974 and reprinted in 2015 this work loses nothing with the passing of time. While I am not convinced by every point he makes the issues he raises are as relevant today as ever. Heartily recommended.



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