Although Lucknow was declared taken in March 1858, the mutiny was hardly over. Many rebels had escaped the battered city and made their way into the surrounding provinces, lighting new fires as they went and enflaming old ones with renewed vigour. It was not helped by Lord Canning’s ill-timed proclamation. Oudh had already undergone a massive land settlement following annexation in 1856, and was one of the key reasons for revolt in the province. What Canning did now fermented a long- standing distrust of the British and prolonged an already lengthy war.

The Land Settlements – What Happened Before 1857

The British had an idea that moving away from the Talukdari system that existed, not only in Oudh but through most of India, would impart a semblance of fair governance. The problem was that they did not take into consideration the very nature of the system in existence, nor could they resist using it to fuel their own greed. Although there were many points to consider, the main ones were as follows:

Direct Settlement with Villagers: The British aimed to establish direct revenue agreements with village communities and individual cultivators, bypassing any and all traditional intermediaries.Removal of Talukdars: The policy simply assumed that Talukdars were “interlopers” who had established their claims through force and fraud. As a result, Talukdari holdings plummeted from 67% of villages under the Nawabs to just 38% under this settlement.Assumption of “Illegitimate” Ownership: British officials believed Talukdars were not the rightful owners but recent impositions on the land. By removing them, the British hoped to restore what they viewed as the “original” village proprietors. For this, they opened a whole other kettle of fish as they set themselves the task of conducting “summary” land surveys in an attempt to establish who was the original owner of the land. This led to claims, counter-claims, counter-counter claims, illogical boundaries and tied up the system in petitions and endless wrangling. Increased Revenue Demands: The stated goal was to protect peasants from exploitation, but the settlement often increased the actual revenue burden, and it also threw many of the talukdars and their dependents into a state of poverty. While they may not have had great monetary assets to begin with, and their wealth was purely of a hereditary nature, losing their estates resulted in not only a loss of face and prestige but a significant loss of income. In some of the “settled” districts, the revenue demand rose from 30% to as much as 70% of gross assets, leaving, in reality, only one winner – the EICo.

This, of course, led to another brainchild of the EICo – Revenue Settlement. The British attempted to dismantle the Talukdari system in favour of direct settlement with village communities. Under the old system, Nawabs and Talukdars managed their vast estates, maintained law and order and held significant judicial powers within their territories. In 1856, the EICo effectively stripped them of all these roles, in favour of dispossession, decentralisation and a complete loss of judicial authority; private armies were disbanded and local courts disallowed. These measures left the villagers, whom the British thought they were protecting, in effect, defenceless and bewildered by the mountains of red tape the British unleashed on them, unable to comprehend a system that was not only foreign, but downright alien. They were also to pay their taxes directly to the British without the talukdars receiving their cut, something that was utterly unheard of and viewed with obvious horror. The British, we must remember, were not doing this from the goodness of their hearts, but to increase the size of their own pockets. Revenue estimates were often based on over-inflated figures, leaving the peasants worse off than before. Whereas a village, in the past, for example, suffering from drought, could apply to their talukdar for relief and consideration, the British left little room in their new management for just such emergencies. Small proprietors, now directly responsible for heavy revenue demands without the traditional “protection” or credit lines of the Talukdars, faced unjustifiable hardship. As for the talukdars themselves, having lost their power, their armies and in many cases their forts, which were razed to the ground, they had to undergo an equally humiliating assessment – estates that were in debt faced severe consequences, ultimately leading to their confiscation and the very loss of the talukdar’s land rights and authority.

It is no wonder, then, in 1857, Oudh was the scene of a popular revolt – the entire population had a grudge against the British.

However, even the greediest of companies will eventually realise that some compromise must be reached, as in the case of the EICo, if they are going to keep their very heads on their shoulders. As such, in 1857, a cry went up to pacify the talukdars, nawabs, zamindars and just about everyone else of influence, by any means possible. It was thought to be good policy to pacify ruffled feathers by issuing promises, and most of these were directed at Oudh.
During the Siege of Lucknow, Sir James Outram had tried to motivate the landowners, talukdars and petty Rajas of Oudh to side with the British, and as late as September 1857, it would appear Canning agreed with him. He authorised Outram to
“…promise to any Landed Proprietor who deserves well of the Government and who has suffered by the summary settlement, that his case shall be heard anew and that he shall certainly not be worse off than he was before our rule.” As such, a proclamation was issued to this effect, and some landowners were even singled out for special treatment. Man Singh, who had proved himself a reluctant rebel but an even more distant friend, was sent several letters, each asking him to continue showing “effective proof” of his fidelity to the Government to secure the restoration of his estates. Other talukdars received similar letters. However, Canning refused to offer a “general reversal of the settlement” as it would undermine the British position in cases where the settlements had indeed been just. By the end of 1857, however, things were not looking any better. The people of Oudh continued to exhibit universal hostility, and James Outram, now Chief Commissioner of the province, was more than eager to win over the talukdars to their previous state of merely disgruntled instead of downright murderous. In January 1858, he suggested to Canning that the talukdars be promised their original land holdings in full, whether they had been a part of the rebellion or not, provided they now cooperated with the British.
“I see no prospect of restoring tranquillity, except by having recourse for the next few years to the old Talukdari system.” He further maintained that the village proprietors simply did not carry enough weight or, for that matter, influence to be of much use in the current crisis. Unfortunately, while Sir James Outram was right, Lord Canning decided to follow a different path altogether. His proclamation was designed with very little thought, and its repercussions would further the waves of dissent.

Lord Canning, 1860Proclamation by the Right Hon’ble the Governor-General of India

To all the Chiefs, Landholders, and People of the Province of Oudh.

In the month of January last the army of the British Government, under the command of Sir Colin Campbell, rescued the city of Lucknow, and the garrison which had so long defended it, from the tyranny of the rebels. It then became the duty of the Governor-General to consider in what manner the Province of Oudh should henceforth be governed.

The Governor-General now announces to the Chiefs, the Landholders, and the People of Oudh, the principles by which the Government of Her Majesty the Queen of England will be guided in the disposal of their country.

1. The Proprietary Right in the Soil of the Province.
The right of proprietary in the soil of the Province of Oudh is confiscated to the British Government, which will dispose of that right in such manner as to it may seem fitting.

2. Exceptions to the General Rule of Confiscation.
To those among the Chiefs, Taluqdars, and Landholders of Oudh, who at once, or within twenty-one days after the issue of this Proclamation, shall plainly show their loyalty by coming in, and making their submission to the Chief Commissioner of Oudh, at his headquarters in Lucknow, the Governor-General promises that their lives shall be spared, provided that they are not already marked out by special crimes for exemplary punishment.
But with regard to the property in land of such persons, the Governor-General reserves to himself entire freedom of action. In many cases, it will be restored in whole or in part, but in some cases it may be wholly confiscated. The Governor-General will decide according to the conduct of each individual, and the position which he has held in the rebel army, or in the rebel Government.

3. To the Mass of the People.
To all others, besides the Chiefs, Taluqdars, and Landholders, in Oudh, who shall make immediate submission to the Chief Commissioner, the Governor-General promises protection of life, and a free pardon for rebellion, provided that their hands are not stained with English blood, murderously shed.

4. Treatment of the Rebel Army.
The Governor-General further notifies to the people of Oudh, that whenever the rebel army, which still keeps together under its worthless leaders, shall have dispersed, and shall have delivered up its guns, the Governor-General will be ready to consider the cases of those who have been compelled by that army to join its ranks, and will extend to them a free pardon for the rebellion, upon their submission.

5. A Warning.
But the Governor-General directs all to understand, that the British Army is now entering Oudh, not only to drive out the rebels, but also to destroy them. Therefore, all who are in arms against the Government, and who do not at once submit, must expect the utmost severity of war. Their blood will be upon their own heads.

6. A Final Chance.
Nevertheless, the Governor-General is willing to hold out one last offer of mercy even to those who have so long resisted the British power. If, within fifteen days from the date of this Proclamation, they shall lay down their arms, and shall deliver up the rebel leaders against whom special orders will be given, they shall, on making their submission as above, receive the promise of the Governor-General that their lives shall be spared, provided that they are not already marked out for special punishment.

Given under the hand and seal of the Governor-General, at Allahabad, this fifteenth day of March, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty-eight.

CANNING.

It is no wonder that when the Proclamation was issued in March 1858, just after the fall of Lucknow, it caused more than a stir in India and, above all, in Parliament back in England. The only man who seemed to be convinced of the just nature of it was Lord Canning. McLeod Innes, in his book, “The Sepoy Revolt – a Critical Narrative,” had this to say:

“By it all the chiefs, except some half dozen men of no importance, were declared to have been guilty of rebellion and of waging war against the Queen, and to have consequently forfeited all their proprietary rights. The chiefs at once realized that their position was desperate, and they rose en masse in active rebellion, which they certainly had not done before.
It was a singular act on Lord Canning’s part, because he seemed to stand almost alone as its author, and alone in his insistence on it. He was strenuously opposed by Outram, who prophesied of it precisely what happened. It was condemned by every authority and every class in India. It raised a storm of surprise and indignation in England and caused the severest crisis in the fate of the English Ministry. Its policy was defended with his utmost ability by Lord Canning; but, however just and sound theoretically, results showed that it was practically a blunder, and led to the very widespread increase which has been mentioned in the hostility of the country.”

Above all, it left the talukdars with nothing to lose, except their lives, forcing them further into desperate, last-ditch resistance. If Canning had believed his proclamation would stamp out the fire, he had actually just added another dose of fuel.

One man, among many, would argue the case for the talukdars, and that man was Sir James Outram. He protested vigorously against the proclamation, declaring it overly harsh and uncalled for; convinced that the summary confiscation of land would render his task of bringing wavering talukdars over to the British side by strategic incitements of favours, practically hopeless. Talukdars who had been unfairly treated in the first round of settlements in 1856 would hardly be inclined to take up any cause now but their own. He quickly drew up a list of men he believed should be exempt altogether from the proclamation –

Drigbijaye Singh, Raja of Bulrampore.Kushal Singh, Talookdar of Padnaha.Hurdeo Buksh, of Katriya.Kashi Pershad, Talukdar of Sissendi.Zubr Singh, Raja of Gopal Kheir.Chundi Lal, Talookdar of Purwa.Raja Drigbijaye Singh

Drigbijaye Singh accepted the terms, surrendered, and actively assisted British forces. As a reward, he was not only restored but later granted more territory than he originally held. The Maharaja of Balrampur became a pillar of loyalty in post-1858 Oudh.
Kushal Singh (Padnaha) & Hurdeo Baksh (Katriya): They also surrendered under these terms and were eventually restored to a significant portion of their estates after demonstrating loyalty.
Kashi Pershad (Sissendi), Zubr Singh (Gopal Kheir), & Chundi Lal (Purwa): Their cases were more complicated. They entered into negotiations or made initial submissions, but distrust ran deep. They were hesitant, fearing British betrayal or the loss of their status. Their surrender was less decisive, and their eventual restoration was slower and less complete. In some cases, parts of their lands were given to others as rewards.

Outram’s list included many others, but only a few names are of particular importance:

Raja Hanwant Singh of Kalakankar

Raja Hanwant Singh of Kalakankar: A very important and powerful Talukdar. Outram actively negotiated with him, and the Raja eventually surrendered. He became a classic example of the “settlement” policy, being restored to a substantial portion of his estate and becoming a loyal supporter.

Raja Lal Madho Singh of Majhora: Another major landholder who was seen as potentially detachable from the rebel cause. He was offered terms to surrender.

The Raja of Churda (or perhaps Charda): This chief’s territory was strategically located, and Outram was hoping to avoid any fights with him.

Beni Madho Singh (or Bani Madho), Rana of Shankarpur: A formidable rebel military leader, Outram and Canning specifically hoped to separate him from the Begum Hazrat Mahal. Extraordinary terms were hinted at—possibly even the restoration of all his lands—if he would abandon the rebel court in Lucknow. He ultimately refused, choosing to fight on.

Various Chiefs of the Baiswara Region: The fertile Baiswara region south of the Gomti River was a rebel stronghold. Outram’s list included several Baiswara chieftains whose submission would open up this area.

Canning slightly changes his mind

Then, on 29 March, barely two weeks after Canning had issued his proclamation, he added another paragraph. While it was titled the Explanatory Paragraph, in India it was widely known as the Mercy Paragraph, although for whom the mercy was intended was left very much open to debate, as it seemed Canning would soon be needing some. The initial backlash to the original proclamation was fierce from not only British officials in India but also from the press.

Explanatory Paragraph

“With regard to the landed tenures of Oudh, the Governor-General wishes it to be understood that the measure of confiscation announced in the Proclamation of the 15th instant is not intended to apply to the talukdars and landholders of the Province as a class, but only to those who are proved to have been in rebellion, and who are found at the time of the British re-occupation of their estates to have been still persistently resisting the authority of the Government.”

Canning now attempted to back out of his plans for universal confiscation, by stating it was only meant for those who were still actively participating in rebellion at the time of the fall of Lucknow; he was also trying a weak tea version of political damage control which in the end, made the original proclamation more ambiguous, as it did not address the following questions: Who was “proved to have been in rebellion”? What constituted “persistently resisting” at the exact moment of re-occupation? This vagueness left immense discretionary power in the hands of local British officers who would be examining rebellious talukdars if they came forward, and there was no accounting for their bias, which could very well be based on their own experiences in the mutiny.
While it was a step in some direction, the critics of the proclamation were hardly satisfied. It was simply too little, too late. For many of the talukdars, the shock and insult of the original proclamation could not be smoothed over by a vague paragraph, still leaving them with the horror of their impending ruin. They also saw the contradictory nature of it as a sign of a weak and confused British government. The talukdars had no reason to believe it was not merely intended as a ruse to get them to lay down their arms, after which they would still face arbitrary dispossession.
When the proclamation reached England, as indeed it did, the political firestorm it created would amount to months of debates; finally, on 1 November 1858, the Queen’s Proclamation, issued just after the British had assumed direct control over India from the defunct EICo, not only superseded but also reversed Canning’s proclamation.

The Queen’s proclamation famously promised a general amnesty to all (except those directly involved in the murder of British subjects). “We hereby announce to the Native Princes of India that all Treaties… will be scrupulously maintained…” “We desire no extension of our present Territorial Possessions.” A policy of non-interference in religious matters. Equal protection of the law and eligibility for public office for all subjects, irrespective of race or creed.

In line with this new conciliatory policy, most Talukdars in Oudh had their lands restored by 1859-60, turning them into a loyal aristocratic prop for British rule.

However, as we shall see, it was a long way until November.

Sources:
Kaye’s and Malleson’s History of the Indian Mutiny of 1857-58, edited by Colonel Malleson, Vol IV & Vol V (London: W. H. Allen & Co., 1889 & London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1907)
Metcalfe, Thomas R. – The Aftermath of Revolt (Princeton University Press, 1964)
McLeod, Lieutenant General Innes – The Sepoy Revolt, a Critical Narrative ( London: A. D. Innes, 1897)
Raj, J. (1957). British Land Policy in Oudh 1856-68. [PhD thesis, SOAS University of London]. https://doi.org/10.25501/SOAS.00033584
A compendium of the law specially relating to the Taluqdars of Oudh: being the Oudh Estates Act (I) of 1869, an act to amend the Oudh Estate Act, 1869, (Act X of 1885), the Oudh Sub-Settlement Act (XXVI) of 1866, the Oudh Taluqdars’ Relief Act (XXIV) of 1870, and parts of the Oudh Rent Act (XIX) of 1868, and the Oudh Land Revenue Act (XVII) of 1876 / with a full introduction, notes and appendices by John Gaskell Walker Sykes.
https://indianculture.gov.in/digital-district-repository/district-repository/taluqdars-oudh-participates-revolt-1857