Eva Chatterji's Blog

In order to save the reader time, I have compiled a list of where one can find the specific post that looks in detail at the Victoria Cross recipient. The list is organised alphabetically, and all 182 names have been listed. Where there is no link, the campaign or action has not yet been covered and will be added in due time.
For some background on the Victoria Cross itself, the reader may avail themselves of
How To Win a Victoria Cross
And for an explanation of the Lucknow VCs, there is
Some Thoughts on the Lucknow VCs

I wish you many hours of delightful exploration into the recipients of the Victoria Cross for the Indian Mutiny.

A-DA.Augustus AnsonCharles AndersonRobert AikmanDesanges, Louis William; Lieutenant Frederick Robertson Aikman (1828-1888), 4th Regiment (Bengal) Native Infantry, Commanding 3rd Regiment (Sikh) Irregular Cavalry, Winning the Victoria Cross NamePlace of ActionDate of ActionLinkAddison, Henry (Pte) 43rd FootKurrereah2 January 1859 Aikman, Frederick (Lt) 4th BNI Jalandhar CavalryAmethi1 March 1858Frederick Robertson-Aikman VC                    The Robertson-Aikmans of the RossAitken, Robert (Lt) 13th BNILucknow30 June 1857 to 22 November 1857The Path of Duty is the Way to GloryAnderson, Charles (Pte) 2nd Dragoon GuardsSudeela, Oudh8 October 1858 Anson, Augustus (Capt) 9th LancersBulandshahr; Lucknow28 Sept. 1857, 16 Nov. 1857The Seven VCs of Bulandshahr    Courage in ChaosB.

Some Points of Interest: Captain James Blair and Lieutenant Robert Blair were cousins, and they won their VCs within a month of each other. Many of their relatives were killed during the mutiny, most of them at the Cawnpore massacre.
Captain Samuel Browne, who lost an arm during the mutiny, would be the inventor of the Sam Browne Belt that hooked into his waist belt before running diagonally over his right shoulder to steady his scabbard. For practical reasons, the waist belt securely carried his pistol in a flap-holster on his right hip and a neck strap for his binocular case. The belt would eventually become a uniform standard. The Indian Army would continue to be worn by officers and junior COs until the 1980s, and remains part of the uniform for officers in the Indian police force.

William BradshawRobert BlairWilliam BankesDesanges, Louis William; Lieutenant Thomas Adair Butler (1836-1901), 1st (Bengal) European Fusiliers, Winning the Victoria Cross NamePlace of ActionDate of ActionLinkBaker, Charles George (Lt) Bengal Military Police BattalionSahejani  Bhojpur27 September 1858 Bambrick, Valentine (Pte) 60th RiflesBareilly6 May 1858 Bankes, William (Lt) 7th HussarsLucknow19 March 1858The Valorous Twelve – Part IVBlair, James (Capt) 2nd Bombay Light CavalryNeemuch; Jeerum12 Aug. 1857, 23 Oct. 1857Most Effectual Charges—James Blair, VCBlair, Robert (Lt) 2nd Dragoon GuardsBulandshahr28 September 1857The Seven VCs of BulandshahrBogle, Andrew (Lt)   78th HighlandersOonao29 July 1857The Path of Duty is the Way to Glory IIIBoulger, Abraham (L/Cpl) 84th FootLucknow12 July 1857 to 25 Sept. 1857The Path of Duty is the Way to Glory IIBradshaw, William (Asst. Surg.) 90th FootLucknow26 September 1857The Path of Duty is the Way to Glory IIIBrennan, Joseph (Bdr) Royal ArtilleryJhansi3 April 1858Holding the Course and Saving Lives – the Jhansi VCsBrown, Francis (Lt) 1st Bengal European FusiliersNarnaul16 November 1857Francis David Millet Brown                              The Browns of IndiaBrowne, Samuel (Capt) 46th BNI, 2nd Punjab Irreg. CavalrySeerporah31 August 1858 Buckley, John (DAC) Comm. Dept.Delhi11 May 1857God Shall Wipe All Tears from their Eyes Butler, Thomas (Lt) 1st Bengal European FusiliersLucknow9 March 1858The Valorous Twelve – Part IByrne, James, (Pte) 86th FootJhansi3 April 1858Holding the Course and Saving Lives – the Jhansi VCsC.

Some Points of Interest: Lieutenant Thomas Cadell was the cousin of another VC winner, Samuel Hill Lawrence.
Lieutenant William Cubitt was the brother-in-law of Lieutenant James Hills (VC) and the uncle of another VC recipient, Brigadier-General Lewis Pugh Evans, who gained his at Zonnebeke, Belgium in October 1917.

Hugh CochraneWilliam CubittHerbert ClougstounThomas CadellCornelius CoughlanVolunteer George Chicken Winning the Victoria CrossNamePlace of ActionDate of ActionLinkCadell, Thomas (Lt) 2nd Bengal European FusiliersDelhi12 June 1857For Valour – The Delhi VCsCafe, William (Capt) 56th BNI, 2nd Punjab InfantryFort Ruiya15 April 1858The Brave and the DeadCameron, Aylmer (Lt) 72nd HighlandersKotah30 March 1858A Legacy in WarCarlin, Patrick (Pte) 13th FootAzimgarh6 April 1858 Champion, James (TSM) 8th HussarsBeejapore8 September 1858 Chicken, George (Volunt.) Naval Brigade, Bengal Military Police BattalionSuhejnee27 September 1858 Clogstoun, Herbert (Capt) 19th Madras NIChichumbah15 January 1859 Cochrane, Hugh (Lt) 86th FootBetwa1 April 1858Taking the Gun – Hugh Stewart Cochrane VCConnolly, William (Gnr) Bengal Horse ArtiileryJhelum7 July 1857No Sir, I’ll Not GoCook, Walter (Pte) 42nd HighlandersMaylah Ghat15 January 1859 Coughlan, Cornelius (C/Sgt)Badli-ki-Serai8 June 1857The VCs of Badli-ki-SeraiCrowe, Joseph (Lt) 78th HighlandersBoursekee Chowkee12 August 1857The Path of Duty is the Way to Glory IIICubitt, William (Lt) 13th BNIChinhut30 June 1857The Path of Duty is the Way to Glory D. John DauntJohn DivaneBernard DiamondNamePlace of ActionDate of ActionLinkDaunt, John (Lt) 11th BNIChatra2 October 1857The Chatra VCsDavis, James (Pte) 42nd HighlandersFort Ruiya15 April 1858The Brave and the DeadDempsey, Denis (Pte) 10th FootArrah; Lucknow12 August 1857, 14 March 1858Quo Fata Vocant
The Valorous Twelve  – Part IIIDiamond, Bernard (Sgt) Bengal Horse ArtilleryBulandshahr28 September 1857The Seven VCs of BulandshahrDivane, John (Pte) 60th RiflesDelhi10 September 1857Acts of BraveryDonohoe, Patrick (Pte) 9th LancersBulandshahr28 September 1857The Seven VCs of BulandshahrDowling, William (Pte) 32nd Foot Lucknow4 July 1857, 27 Sept. 1857 The Path of Duty is the Way to GloryDuffy, Thomas (Pte) 1st Madras European FusiliersLucknow26 September 1857The Path of Duty is the Way to Glory IVDunlay, John (L/Cpl) 93rd HighlandersLucknow16 November 1857Courage in ChaosDynon, Denis (Sgt) 53rd FootChatra2 October 1857The Chatra VCs

Abbreviations:

ADC – Aide de CampAsst. Surg. – Assistant SurgeonBdr – BombardierBglr – BuglerC/Sergt – Colour SergeantCapt – CaptainCpl – CorporalD – DrummerDAC – Deputy Assistant CommissaryDAQMG – Deputy Assistant Quarter Master GeneralEns – EnsignGnr – GunnerL/Cpl – Lance CorporalLt – LieutenantLt Adjt – Lieutenant AdjutantMaj – MajorPte – PrivateSgt – SergeantSgt Maj – Sergeant MajorQMS- Quartermaster SergeantSurg – SurgeonTptr – TrumpeterTSM – Troop Sergeant MajorVolunt. – Volunteer

F-IF. Thomas FlynnAlfred FfrenchThe Defence of Delhi Magazine, May 1857NamePlace of ActionDate of ActionLinkFarquharson, Francis (Lt) 42nd HighlandersLucknow9 March 1858The Valorous Twelve – Part IFfrench, Alfred (Lt) 53rd FootLucknow16 November 1857Courage in ChaosFitzgerald, Richard (Gnr) Bengal Horse ArtilleryBulandshahr28 September 1857The Seven VCs of BulandshahrFlynn, Thomas (D) 64th FootCawnpore28 November 1857Thomas Flynn of H.M.’s 64thForrest George (Lt) Bengal Veterans EstablishmentDelhi11 May 1857God Shall Wipe All Tears from their Eyes IFraser, Charles (Maj) 7th HussarsRiver Raptee31 December 1858 Freeman, John (Pte) 9th LancersAgra10 October 1857Four Extraordinary MenG.

Some Points of Interest:
Major John Guise was already missing an arm when he fought in the Indian Mutiny
Major Charles Gough and Lieutenant Hugh Gough were brothers, and one of Charles’ exploits was saving Hugh’s life. Charles’ son, John, would receive a VC for actions in Somaliland in 1903.
George Chicken was one of the five civilians to be awarded a VC.

John GuiseCharles GoodfellowWilliam GoatStephen GarvinHugh GoughColour Sergeant William Gardner Rescuing Lt. Col. Cameron at BareillyNamePlace of ActionDate of ActionLinkGardner, William (C/Sgt) 42nd HighlandersBareilly5 May 1858 Garvin, Stephen (C/Sgt) 60th RiflesDelhi23 June 1857For Valour – The Delhi VCsGill, Peter (Sgt-Maj) Loodiana RegimentBenares4 June 1857Humble Beginnings – The Three VCs of BenaresGoat, William (L/Cpl) 9th LancersLucknow6 March 1858The Valorous Twelve – Part IVGoodfellow, Charles (Lt) Bombay EngineersKathiawar6 October 1859 Gore-Browne, Henry (Capt) 32nd FootLucknow21 August 1857The Path of Duty is the Way to GloryGough, Charles (Maj) 5th Bengal European Cavalry, Guides CorpsKhurkowdah, Sumshabad; Meanganj15 – 18 August; 27 Jan. 1858; 3 Feb. 1858Spirited DaringGough, Hugh (Lt) 1st Bengal European Light Cavalry, Hodson’s HorseAlambagh; Jelalabad Fort12 Nov. 1857, 25 Feb. 1858Four Extraordinary MenGraham, Patrick (Pte) 90th FootLucknow17 November 1857Courage in ChaosGrant, Peter (Pte) )3rd HighlandersLucknow16 November 1857Courage in Chaos IIGrant, Robert (Cpl) 5th FootAlambagh24 September 1857The Path of Duty is the Way to Glory IIIGreen, Patrick (Pte) 75th FootDelhi11 September 1857Acts of BraveryGuise, Guise (Maj) 90th FootLucknow17 November 1857Courage in ChaosH.Alfred HeathcoateHastings HaringtonClement HeneageNamePlace of ActionDate of ActionLinkHackett, Thomas (Lt) 23rd FootLucknow18 November 1857Courage in Chaos IVHall, William (Capt.of the Foretop) Naval BrigadeLucknow16 November 1857Courage in Chaos IIIHancock, Thomas (Pte) 9th LancersDelhi, 19 June 1857For Valour – The Delhi VCsHarington, Hastings (Lt) Bengal Horse ArtilleryLucknow14-22 November 1857Courage in ChaosHarrison, John (Leading Seaman) Naval BrigadeLucknow16 November 1857Courage in Chaos IIIHartigan, Henry (Sgt) 9th LancersBadli-ki-Serai; Agra8 June 1857, 10 October 1857The VCs of Badli-ki-Serai
Four Extraordinary MenHavelock-Allan, Henry (Lt) 10th Foot, ADC to Sir H. HavelockCawnpore16 July 1857The Path of Duty is the Way to Glory IIIHawkes, David (Pte) Rifle BrigadeLucknow11 March 1858The Valorous Twelve – Part IIHawthorne, Robert (Bglr), 52nd FootDelhi14 September 1857Acts of BraveryHeathcote, Alfred (Lt) 60th RiflesDelhiJune to September 1857Spirited DaringHeneage, Clement (Capt) 8th HussarsGwalior17 June 1858A Few Astonishing Men Part IIHill, Samuel (Sgt) 90th FootLucknow17 November 1857Courage in ChaosHills, James (2nd Lt) Bengal Horse ArtilleryDelhi9 July 1857Spirited DaringHollis, George (Farrier) 8th HussarsGwalior17 June 1858A Few Astonishing Men Part IIHollowell, James (Pte) 78th HighlandersLucknow26 September 1857The Path of Duty is the Way to Glory IIHolmes, Joel (Pte) 84th FootLucknow25 September 1857The Path of Duty is the Way to Glory IVHome, Anthony (Surg) 90th FootLucknow26 September 1857The Path of Duty is the Way to Glory IIHome, Duncan (Lt) Bengal Sappers and MinersDelhi14 September 1857The 14th of SeptemberThe funeral of William HallI. James McLeod InnesCharles IrwinNamePlace of ActionDate of ActionLinkInnes, James McLeod (Lt) Bengal EngineersBengal Sappers and MinersSultanpore A Gallant ManIrwin, Charles (Pte) 53rd Foot53rd Regiment of FootLucknowCourage in ChaosDesanges, Louis William; Surgeon (later Surgeon General) Anthony Dickson Home (1826-1914), VC, KCB, and Assistant Surgeon William Bradshaw (1830-1861), VC, 90th Regiment of Foot (Perthshire Volunteers) (Light Infantry), Lucknow, 1857

Abbreviations

ADC – Aide de CampAsst. Surg. – Assistant SurgeonBdr – BombardierBglr – BuglerC/Sergt – Colour SergeantCapt – CaptainCpl – CorporalD – DrummerDAC – Deputy Assistant CommissaryDAQMG – Deputy Assistant Quarter Master GeneralEns – EnsignGnr – GunnerL/Cpl – Lance CorporalLt – LieutenantLt Adjt – Lieutenant AdjutantMaj – MajorPte – PrivateQMS – Quartermaster SergeantSgt – SergeantSgt Maj – Sergeant MajorSurg – SurgeonTptr – TrumpeterTSM – Troop Sergeant MajorVolunt. – Volunteer

J-MAlfred JonesJoseph JeeHenry JeromeSurgeon Jee at Lucknow J.NamePlace of ActionDate of ActionLinkJarrett, Hanson (Lt) 26th BNIBaroun14 October 1858 Jee, Joseph (Surg) 78th HighlandersLucknow25 September 1857The Path of Duty is the Way to Glory IVJennings, Edward (Rough Rider) Bengal Horse ArtilleryLucknow14-22 November 1857Courage in ChaosJerome, Henry (Capt) 86th FootJhansi3 April 1858Holding the Course and Saving Lives – the Jhansi VCsJones, Alfred (Lt) 9th LancersBadli-ki-Serai8 June 1857The VCs of Badli-ki-SeraiK. Richard KeatingeRobert KellsWilliam KerrNamePlace of ActionDate of ActionLinkKavanagh, Thomas Bengal Civil ServiceLucknow9 November 1857A Civilian in the MutinyKeatinge, Richard (Maj) Bombay ArtilleryChanderi17 March 1858Richard Harte Keating, VCKells, Robert (L/Cpl) 9th LancersBulandshahr28 September 1857The Seven VCs of BulandshahrKenny, James (Pte)Lucknow16 November 1857Courage in Chaos IIKerr, William (Lt) 24th Bombay NIKolapore10 July 1857Dashing BraveryKirk, John (Pte) 10th FootBenares4 June 1857Humble Beginnings – The Three VCs of BenaresL.James LeithSamuel Hill LawrenceHarry LysterLieutenant Leith Winning the Victoria CrossNamePlace of ActionDate of ActionLinkLambert, George (Sgt Maj) 84th FootOonao, Bithur; Lucknow29 June 1857, 16 August, 25 SeptemberThe Path of Duty is the Way to Glory IIILaughnan, Thomas (Gnr) Bengal Horse ArtilleryLucknow14-22 November 1857Courage in ChaosLawrence, Samuel (Lt) 32nd FootLucknow7 July 1857, 26 SeptemberThe Path of Duty is the Way to GloryLeith, James (Lt) 14th Light DragoonsBetwa1 April 1858He Knows Little Care – James Leith VCLyster, Harry (Lt) 72nd BNIKalpi23 May 1858 M.Herbert MacpherssonRoss ManglesValentine McMasterGeorge MongerArthur MayoPatrick McHaleJames MillerNamePlace of ActionDate of ActionLinkMacKay, David (Pte)  93rd HighlandersLucknow16 November 1857Courage in Chaos IIMacpherson, Herbert (Lt) 78th HighlandersLucknow25 September 1857The Path of Duty is the Way to Glory IVMahoney, Patrick (Sgt) 1st Madras European FusiliersMangalwar21 September 1857The Path of Duty is the Way to Glory IIIMangles, Ross (Civilian) Bengal Civil ServiceArrah30 July 1857Quo Fata VocantMaude, Francis (Capt) Royal ArtilleryLucknow25 September 1857The Path of Duty is the Way to Glory IVMayo, Arthur (Midshipman) Naval BrigadeDacca22 November 1857Midshipman Arthur Mayo, VC
The Abor Expedition of 1859McBean, William (Lt) 93rd HighlandersLucknow11 March 1858The Valorous Twelve – Part IIMcDonell, William (Civilian) Bengal Civil ServiceArrah30 July 1857Quo Fata VocantMcGovern, John (Pte) 1st Bengal European FusiliersDelhi23 June 1857For Valour – The Delhi VCs
The Legion LostMcGuire, James (Sgt) 1st Bengal European FusiliersDelhi14 September 1857Acts of BraveryMcHale, Patrick (Pte) 5th FootLucknow2 October 1857, 22 December 1857The Path of Duty is the Way to Glory IVMcInnes, Hugh (Gnr) Bengal ArtilleryLucknow14-22 November 1857Courage in ChaosMcManus, Peter (Pte) 5th FootLucknow26 September 1857The Path of Duty is the Way to Glory IIMcMaster, Valentine (Asst.Surg.) 78th HighlandersLucknow25 September 1857The Path of Duty is the Way to Glory IVMcPherson, Stewart  (C/Sgt) 78th HighlandersLucknow26 September 1857The Path of Duty is the Way to Glory IVMcQuirt, Bernard (Pte) 95th FootRowa6 January 1858Rajputana, 1858Millar, Duncan (Pte) 42nd HighlandersMaylah Ghat15 January 1859 Miller, James (Conductor) Bengal Ordnance DepotFatehpur Sikri (Agra)28 October 1857Saving Lieutenant GlubbMonaghan, Thomas (Tptr) 2nd Dragoon GuardsJamo8 October 1858 Monger, George (Pte) 23rd FootLucknow18 November 1857Courage in Chaos IVMorley, Samuel (Pte) Military TrainAzimgarh15 April 1858 Munro, James (C/Sgt) 93rd FootLucknow16 November 1857Courage in Chaos IIMurphy, Michael  (Pte) Military TrainAzimgarh15 April 1858 Mylott, Patrick (Pte) 84th FootLucknow12 July 1857 to 25 SeptemberThe Path of Duty is the Way to Glory IIIFrancis Maude, sighting his gun, Lucknow 1858

Abbreviations:

ADC – Aide de CampAsst. Surg. – Assistant SurgeonBdr – BombardierBglr – BuglerC/Sergt – Colour SergeantCapt – CaptainCpl – CorporalD – DrummerDAC – Deputy Assistant CommissaryDAQMG – Deputy Assistant Quarter Master GeneralEns – EnsignGnr – GunnerL/Cpl – Lance CorporalLS – Leading SeamanLt – LieutenantLt Adjt – Lieutenant Adjutant2nd Lt – Second LieutenantMaj – MajorPte – PrivateQMS – Quartermaster SergeantSgt – SergeantSgt Maj – Sergeant MajorSurg – SurgeonTptr – TrumpeterTSM – Troop Sergeant MajorVolunt. – Volunteer

N-RWilliam NapierN.NamePlace of ActionDate of actionLinkNapier, William (Sgt)13th FootAzimgarh6 April 1858 Nash, William (Cpl) Rifle BrigadeLucknow11 March 1858The Valorous Twelve – Part IINewell, Robert (Pte) 9th LancersLucknow19 March 1858The Valorous Twelve – Part IVO.William OlphertsWilliam OxenhamNamePlace of ActionDate of actionLinkOlpherts, William (Capt) Bengal ArtilleryLucknow25 September 1857The Path of Duty is the Way to Glory IVOxenham, William (Pte) 32nd FootLucknow30 June 1857The Path of Duty is the Way to GloryP.Harry PrendergastEverard PhilipsDesanges, Louis William; Captain (later General Sir) Dighton MacNaghten Probyn, 2nd Punjab Cavalry, at the Battle of Agra NamePlace of ActionDate of actionLinkPark, James (Gnr) Bengal ArtilleryLucknow14-22 November 1857Courage in ChaosPaton, John (Sgt) 93rd HighlandersLucknow16 November 1857Courage in Chaos IIIPearson, James (Pte) 86th FootJhansi3 April 1858Holding the Course and Saving Lives – the Jhansi VCsPearson, John (Pte) 8th HussarsGwalior17 June 1858A Few Astonishing Men Part IIPhillipps, Everard (Ens) 11 BNIDelhi30 May 1857 to 18 September 1857Returns for Delhi 15th – 22nd of SeptemberPrendergast, Harry (Lt) Madras EngineersMandsaur21 November 1857The Path Before Him Always BrightProbyn, Dighton (Capt) 2nd Punjab CavalryAgra1857 to 1858For Distinguished Gallantry, Captain Dighton Probyn, VCPurcell, John (Pte) 9th LancersDelhi19 June 1857For Valour – The Delhi VCsPye, Charles (Sgt Maj) 53rd FootLucknow17 November 1857Courage in Chaos IVR.Frederick RobertsWilliam RennieGeorge RennySurgeon Herbert Reade at DelhiNamePlace of ActionDate of actionLinkRaynor, William (Lt) Bengal Veterans EstablishmentDelhi11 May 1857And God Shall Wipe All Tears from their Eyes IReade, Herbert (Surg) 61st FootDelhi14 September 1857Acts of BraveryRennie, William (Lt Adjt) 90th FootLucknow21-25 September 1857The Path of Duty is the Way to Glory IIIRenny, George (Lt) Bengal Horse ArtilleryDelhi16 September 1857Acts of BraveryRichardson, George (Pte) 34th FootKewane  (Trans-Gogra)27 April 1859 Roberts, Frederick (Lt, DAQMG, ADC) Bengal Horse ArtilleryKhodagunge2 January 1858The Long Life of Lord Roberts, VCRoberts, James (Pte) 9th LancersBulandshahr28 September 1857The Seven VCs of BulandshahrRobinson, Edward (Able Seaman) Naval BrigadeLucknow13 March 1858The Valorous Twelve  – Part IIIRoddy, Patrick (Ens) Bengal Army, unattachedKuthirga27 September 1858 Rodgers, George (Pte) 71st FootMarar16 June 1858A Few Astonishing Men Part IRosamund, Matthew (Sgt Maj) 37th BNIBenares4 June 1857Humble Beginnings – The Three VCs of BenaresRushe, David (TSM) 9th LancersLucknow19 March 1858The Valorous Twelve – Part IVRyan, John (Pte) 1st Madras European FusiliersLucknow26 September 1857The Path of Duty is the Way to Glory IIRyan, Miles (D) 1st Bengal European FusiliersDelhi14 September 1857Acts of Bravery

The Passing of Lord Roberts

Abbreviations:

ADC – Aide de CampAsst. Surg. – Assistant SurgeonBdr – BombardierBglr – BuglerC/Sergt – Colour SergeantCapt – CaptainCpl – CorporalD – DrummerDAC – Deputy Assistant CommissaryDAQMG – Deputy Assistant Quarter Master GeneralEns – EnsignGnr – GunnerL/Cpl – Lance CorporalLt – LieutenantLt Adjt – Lieutenant AdjutantMaj – MajorPte – PrivateQMS- Quartermaster SergeantSgt – SergeantSgt Maj – Sergeant MajorSurg – SurgeonTptr – TrumpeterTSM – Troop Sergeant MajorVolunt. – Volunteer

S-YRobert ShebbeareJohn SinnottWilliam SuttonRobert Shebbeare (seated, 2nd right) with officers of the 15th Punjab Regiment (Felice Beato, ca 1858)SNamePlace of ActionDate of actionLinkSalkeld, Philip  (Lt) Bengal Sappers and MinersDelhi14 September 1857The 14th of SeptemberSalmon, Nowell (Lt) Naval BrigadeLucknow16 November 1857Courage in Chaos IIIShaw, Same (Pte) Rifle BrigadeLucknow13 June 1858 Shebbeare, Robert (Lt) 60th BNI, 15th Punjab RegimentDelhi14 September 1857Acts of BraverySimpson, John (QMS) 42nd HighlandersFort Ruiya15 April 1858The Brave and the DeadSinnott, John  (L/Cpl) 84th FootLucknow6 October 1857The Path of Duty is the Way to Glory IVSleavon, Michael (Cpl) Royal EngineersJhansi3 April 1858Holding the Course and Saving Lives – the Jhansi VCsSmith, Henry (L/Cpl) 52nd FootDelhi14 September 1857Acts of BraverySmith, John (Sgt) Bengal Sappers & MinersDelhi14 September 1857Acts of BraverySmith, John (Pte) 1st Madras European FusiliersLucknow16 November 1857Courage in ChaosSpence, David (TSM) 9th LancersShumsabad17 January 1858David Spence, VCSpence, Edward (Pte) 42nd HighlandersFort Ruiya15 April 1858The Brave and the DeadStewart, William (Capt) 93rd HighlandersLucknow16 November 1857Courage in Chaos IISutton, William (Bglr) 60th RiflesDelhi2 August 1857 to 13 September 1857Acts of BraveryTEdward ThackerayJames ThompsonJohn TytlerMajor Tombs Saving Lieutenant Hills at DelhiNamePlace of ActionDate of actionLinkThackeray, Edward (2nd Lt) Bengal Sappers & MinersDelhi16 September 1857Acts of BraveryThomas, Jacob (Bdr) Bengal ArtilleryLucknow27 September 1857The Path of Duty is the Way to Glory IVThompson, Alexander (L/Cpl) 42nd HighlandersFort Ruiya15 April 1858The Brave and the DeadThompson, William (Pte) 60th RiflesDelhi9 July 1857Spirited DaringTombs, Henry (Maj) Bengal Horse ArtilleryDelhi9 July 1857Spirited DaringTravers, James (Col) 2nd Bengal Native Infantry; Bhopal ContingentIndoreJuly 1857Not One Shall StandTurner, Samuel (Pte) 60th RiflesDelhi19 June 1857For Valour – The Delhi VCsTytler, John (Lt) 66th BNIChoorpoorah10 February 1858In the Hills of KumaonW-YJohn WatsonRichard WadesonThomas YoungPrivate Ward Saving Lieutenant Havelock, LucknowNamePlace of ActionDate of actionLinkWadeson, Richard (Lt) 75th FootDelhi17 July 1857Spirited DaringWaller, George (C/Sgt) 60th RiflesDelhi14 September 1857, 18 September 1857Acts of BraveryWaller, William (Lt) 25th Bombay Light InfantryGwalior20 June 1858A Few Astonishing Men Part IIIWard, Henry (Pte) 78th HighlandersLucknow25 September 1857The Path of Duty is the Way to Glory IIWard, Joseph (Sgt) 8th HussarsGwalior17 June 1858A Few Astonishing Men Part IIWatson, John (Lt) 1st Punjab CavalryLucknow14 November 1857Four Extraordinary MenWilmot, Henry (Capt) Rifle BrigadeLucknow11 March 1858The Valorous Twelve – Part IIWhirlpool, Frederick (Pte) 3rd Bombay European RegimentJhansi; Lohari3 April 1858, 2 May 1858The Man Without a Past, Frederick Whirlpool, VCWood, Evelyn (Lt) 17th LancersSinwaho19 October 1858 Young, Thomas (Lt) Naval BrigadeLucknow16 November 1857Courage in Chaos IIIBengal Horse Artillery

Abbreviations

ADC – Aide de CampAsst. Surg. – Assistant SurgeonBdr – BombardierBglr – BuglerC/Sergt – Colour SergeantCapt – CaptainCpl – CorporalD – DrummerDAC – Deputy Assistant CommissaryDAQMG – Deputy Assistant Quarter Master GeneralEns – EnsignGnr – GunnerL/Cpl – Lance CorporalLt – LieutenantLt Adjt – Lieutenant AdjutantMaj – MajorPte – PrivateQMS – Quartermaster SergeantSgt – SergeantSgt Maj – Sergeant MajorSurg – SurgeonTptr – TrumpeterTSM – Troop Sergeant MajorVolunt. – Volunteer

For the failed action at Ruiya, four Victoria Crosses were awarded. A fifth recipient, killed on that day, would eventually receive the recognition he deserved, half a century later. No posthumous VCs were awarded during the Indian Mutiny – due to the regulations surrounding the Victoria Cross at the time of the mutiny that insisted the Cross could only be given to living recipients, entries in the London Gazette stated simply “would have been recommended to Her Majesty for the decoration of the Victoria Cross, had he survived.” When King Edward VII, in 1907, changed the Royal Warrant to permit posthumous awards, 50 years after the Indian Mutiny, four such VCs were presented and an amended entry was published in the London Gazette for not only Ensign Everard Aloysius Lisle Phillips (Delhi), Lieutenant Duncan Charles Home (Bengal Engineers, Delhi), Lieutenant Philip Salkeld (Bengal Engineers, Delhi) but also Private Edward Spence (Fort Ruiya). The only VC to escape the posthumous clause was awarded to Cornet Bankes at Lucknow, although Bankes never wore his Cross – the recommendation was made when Bankes was still alive and provisionally conferred by Sir Colin Campbell; Queen Victoria personally ensured it was confirmed, and Bankes’ mother would subsequently receive the VC in the mail. As the recommendation was processed before Bankes died, it could not be blocked by stipulations of the Warrant current at the time.

For Ruiya, the five men singled out for the Victoria Cross were:

Captain William Cafe – 4th Punjab Rifles
Quartermaster-Sergeant John Simpson – 42nd Regiment of Foot
Lance-Corporal Alexander Thompson – 42nd Regiment of Foot
Private James Davis – 42nd Regiment of Foot
Private Edward Spence – 42nd Regiment of Foot

Three of the crosses were awarded for what adds up to being the same action, and that was rescuing not Lieutenant Edward Cotgrave Parr Willoughby, but the attempt to retrieve his lifeless body. The action would see one man seriously wounded and cost the other his life.

A Life in Pictures – Lieutenant Edward Cotgrave Parr Willoughby

Lieutenant Edward Cotgrave Parr Willoughby was the second son of the illustrious Major-General Michael Francklin Willoughby (CB), who had served in India with the Royal Artillery, mostly in Gujarat and the Southern Maratha Country in the 1820s. He was present at the Capture of Aden in 1839 and then later commanded an artillery battery at Hyderabad. He ended his career on a less war-like path, as Principal Commissary of Ordnance and Inspector General of Ordnance at Bombay. During the Mutiny, he was appointed to the Staff of the India Office as Deputy-Inspector General of Stores and, in 1858, as Inspector. All his sons who survived to adulthood (three out of seven) would serve in India, and while it is tempting to think that one of them was responsible for the blowing up of the Delhi Magazine, this is a fallacy. George Willoughby was the son of a solicitor and not the major-general. However, George Willoughby too served in the artillery, and like the Major-General, had attended Addiscombe. If similarities must continue, both George and Edward would die in the Indian Mutiny holding the rank of lieutenant. We now return to the Major-General’s son.
Lieutenant Edward Willoughby was born in Pune in 1834. He was sent to England for his education and arrived in India in 1855 with a posting to the Bombay Army. The London Illustrated News for July 17, 1858, published a detailed obituary, detailing a young man’s very short but very active life.

Six illustrations were recently sold at auction and titled, “Six scenes in the life of Lieutenant Edward Cotgrave Parr Willoughby, 4th Punjab Rifles (killed during the Indian Mutiny 1858) aged 23. 2nd Son of Major General Michael Franklin Willoughby C.B., Inspector General of Military Stores for India.” It is unclear who the illustrator was but it is presumed it was a member of his family.

Willoughby was well-liked by his adopted regiment, the 4th Punjabis, although he had only joined on 7 November 1857, shortly before the Relief of Lucknow. He would temporarily be left in charge of the regiment when the senior officers were wounded, firstly at Lucknow and then at the Battle of Cawnpore. There is no doubt about the fight in the young man. Although suffering from a sore throat and obliged to be carried in a doolie on the march to Ruiya, with the battle imminent, he insisted on joining his regiment, much against his own presentiments. Wrote Fairweather:
“Curiously enough, although as cool as anything in action, he was despondent when ill and that morning, particularly so. When he heard there was the prospect of a fight, he jumped out of his doolie in the highest spirits… So he went to fight in his slippers just as he had come out of his doolie. However, he remarked to me, ‘ I wish I could get a flesh wound, for I feel almost sure that when I do get a wound, it will be mortal.’ ” It was the last time Fairweather would speak to Willoughby.
So Willoughby joined the 4th Punjabis in front of Ruiya Fort.

Early on in the fight, Willoughby was shot across the collarbone (other accounts say he was shot in the throat -as it was Fairweather who dressed his body for his funeral, we can take Fairweather at his word regarding the nature of the injury, and the shot was not in the throat directly). He sat down on the glacis, where Captain Cafe passed him and ordered him to retire to the field hospital. Unfortunately, Willoughby never regained his feet and bled to death where he sat. Here, Cafe passed him when the 4th Punjabis retreated.
Cafe called to his men to pick up Willoughby’s body and bring it back with them – it was very much the honour of the Punjabis to never leave their wounded and dead behind, so the order was not unusual in the circumstances; however, still being under heavy fire from the fort, they were unable to pick him up. Cafe now called on volunteers – immediately, two men of the 42nd, Lance-Corporal Thompson and Private Spence, and three Punjabis stepped up and together “they all went towards the body and dragged it back by its feet into cover.”
“In doing this one of the 4th Punjabi Infantry sepoys was killed and one of the Highlanders had his thigh bone broken; as he was lying on the ground, he called out, ‘ You are surely not going to leave me here,’ and Cafe again went out and helped the man in but not before his left arm was smashed above the elbow by a bullet.”

Willoughby’s body was not the only one retrieved from the field that fatal day.
Quartermaster Simpson of the 42nd, on hearing the retreat, immediately rushed back to the ditch and brought back Lieutenant Douglas; he then returned and brought out a wounded private of the 42nd. The story of Simpson’s bravery has, in part, been embellished in certain accounts ( according to Malleson, he saved seven men from the ditch – Malleson also gave him credit for saving Lieutenant Bramley – this can be taken as a mutiny exaggeration and considering the circumstances, while nobly intended, rather fanciful).

The two Punjabis who survived recovering Willoughby’s body received the Order of Merit.

Captain William Martin Cafe – 4th Punjab Rifles

William Martin Cafe was born in London on 23 March 1826 to Henry Smith Cafe, an auctioneer and his wife Sarah (née Waine). It would appear the army held some appeal to the young man, for on 11 June 1842, he was already in India, serving as an ensign to the 56th Bengal Native Infantry. Promotion was rather swift, at least at the start, for by 12 April 1843, Cafe was a lieutenant. However, he had already seen war, for 1843 was the same year of the Gwalior Campaign, and he served at the action at Maharajpur for which he received a Gwalior Star.
As Captain Cafe, in 1849, he then served throughout the Punjab Campaign, including Sadulapur, Chillianwala, and Gujerat. Where Cafe was when his regiment, the 56th BNI, mutinied at Cawnpore is unclear, as quite obviously, he was not with them. The next time we hear of Captain Cafe, he had joined the 4th Punjab Rifles. He fought not only at Delhi but also at Lucknow at the Relief in 1857 and the retaking of the city in March 1858.
His citation in the London Gazette is as follows:
 For bearing away, under a heavy fire, with the assistance of Privates Thompson, Crowie, Spence, and Cook, the body of Lieutenant Willoughby, lying near the ditch of the Fort of Ruhya, and for running to the rescue of Private Spence, who had been severely wounded in the attempt. (The London Gazette of 17 February 1860, Numb. 22357, p. 557)
Ruiya put an end to Cafe’s association with India for quite some time – the wound was so severe that he was obliged to return home on sick certificate from July 1858 until 1860. Cafe was gazetted quite late and received his VC at a private investiture in India in December the same year.
When Cafe returned to India, he joined the Adjutant General’s Department and would spend the rest of his career on the Staff before retiring in 1894, with his final rank of general. He died in 1906 at his home in Kensington and is buried in Brompton Cemetery. His medals, including his VC (Gwalior Star ‘Maharajpoor’, Punjab Medal 1848-49 with clasps Chilianwala, Goojerat; Indian Mutiny Medal 1857-58 with clasps Delhi, Relief of Lucknow, Lucknow), are held by the National Army Museum in Chelsea.

QUARTERMASTER-SERGEANT John Simpson, 42nd Regiment of Foot

John Simpson was born on 29 January 1826 at West Church Parish Edinburgh, the son of James Simpson a general grocer and his wife, Mary. He enlisted in the 42nd Regiment on 8 June 1843 and served with his regiment in Crimea. Simpson was present at the Battle of the Alma, Balaclava and the assaults on the Redan at Sebastopol on both 18 June and 8 September. As Quartermaster-Sergeant (7 Sept, 1855), Simpson served through the Indian Mutiny (Mutiny Medal, one clasp, ‘Lucknow’). Following the mutiny, he received a commission as Quartermaster of the 42nd in India in 1859.
When Brigade Depots were formed in 1873, Simpson was appointed Quartermaster of the 55th Brigade Depot at Fort George, Madras. He also served in the 2nd Ashanti War. In 1874, Simpson transferred to the 58th Brigade Depot at Stirling and in 1879, to the Perth Militia, returning to the Black Watch in 1881 as Quartermaster of the 3rd Battalion.
Simpson was made an honorary Captain in 1883 and retired as an honorary Major in 1883, the same year he was gazetted as Quartermaster for the 2nd Perth Highland Volunteers. Upon his retirement, his Good Service Pension amounted to £ 50. As for his Victoria Cross, it must have been with mixed feelings, for it was presented to him by Brigadier General Robert Walpole at Bareilly in 1860. Major John Simpson died on 27 October 1884, aged just 58, and was buried with full military honours by the 2nd Perthshire and the 3rd Battalion Black Watch in attendance. His grave is at Balbeggie Churchyard, St. Martin’s, near Perth, Scotland. The question is, what happened to his medals? The site, http://www.blackwatch.50megs.com/ offers the following explanation:

According to the Red Hackle of July 1924, Simpson’s medals formed a prize centre piece in the collection of Medals of the Black Watch formed by Captain John Stewart and which was then in the Officers’ Mess of the 1st Btn at Aldershot. Now, according to one of the major VC websites, the medal is located in the County Museum of Natural History in Los Angeles. However, no one can explain how it ended up in the United States and why the VC remains outside his native land.

Lance-Corporal Alexander Thompson – 42nd Regiment of Foot

Unfortunately, we know little of the early life of Alexander Thompson – he was born in 1824 in Tolbooth Parish, Edinburgh, Scotland; his father, John, was a mason by profession. In 1842, Alexander enlisted in the 42nd Regiment at Stirling, citing his profession as a weaver. Like Simpson, he served in the Crimean War and in 1855 was promoted to corporal. This, however, was short-lived, for seven months later, in May 1856, he was demoted to private. It would seem Thompson was determined to turn himself around, and by the time Ruiya came about, he was Lance Corporal. His career is a series of promotions and a short demotion:
Corporal – 21 July 1858
Lance-Sergeant – 24 September 1859
Reduced to Corporal – 10 February 1860
VC investiture at Bareilly, 7 April 1860, under the auspices of Brigadier-General Robert Walpole
Lance-Sergeant – 26 January 1861
Sergeant – 3 February 1861
Sergeant Thompson was discharged on medical grounds in July, 1863 at Netley Military Hospital. For the remainder of his life, he worked as a twister, a grocer, a timekeeper and a labourer. He died in 1880 in Perth, Scotland. Besides his Victoria Cross, at the time of his death, he had an impressive set of medals that resides at the Black Watch Museum – Crimea Medal 1854-56 with clasps Alma, Balaklava, Sebastopol; Indian Mutiny Medal 1857-58 with clasp Lucknow; Turkish Crimea Medal 1854-55.

Private James Davis – 42nd Regiment of Foot

James Davis was born James Davis Kelly in Canongate Parish, Edinburgh in February 1835 to William Kelly, a labourer and his wife, Bridget. James’ career as a shoemaker was likely not quite as interesting as enlisting in the Black Watch in 1852, but he did so as James Davis, dropping his last name, Kelly. It does not appear that promotion was written on his cards for when he was discharged at Portsmouth in 1873, it was as a private. What became of him after is not known, but James Davis is the only man who left his own account of the Ruiya affair, as related to the Strand Magazine, in March 1891.

“I belonged to the Light Company under the command of Captain MacLeod. We got orders to lie down under some trees for a short time. Two Engineer officers came up and asked for some men to come with them to see where they could make a breach with artillery. I was one who went. There was a small garden ditch under the walls of the fort, not high enough to cover our heads. After a short time, the officers left. I was on the right of the ditch with Lieutenant Alfred Jennings Bramley of Tunbridge Wells, as brave a young officer as ever drew a sword, and saw a large force coming out to cut us off. He said, ‘Try and shoot the leader. I will run down and tell McLeod.’ The leader was shot, by whom I do not know. I never took credit for shooting anyone. Before poor Bramley got down, he was shot in the temple, but not dead. He died during the night.
The captain said, ‘ We can’t leave him. Who will take him out?’ I said, ‘I will.’

“I ran across the open space.”

The fort was firing hard all the time. I said, ‘Eadie, give me a hand. Put him on my back.’ As he was doing so, he was shot in the back of the head, knocking me down, his blood running down my back. A man crawled over and pulled Eadie off. At the time, I thought I was shot. The captain said, ‘We can’t lose anymore lives. Are you wounded?’ I said, ‘I don’t think I am.’ He said, ‘Will you still take him out?’ I said, ‘Yes.’
He was such a brave young fellow that the company loved him. I got him on my back again and told him to take tight around the neck. I ran across the open space. During the time, his watch fell out; I did not like to leave it, so I sat down and picked it up, all the time under a heavy fire. There was a man named Dods, who came and took him off my back. I went back through the same fire and helped to take up the man Eadie. I returned from my rifle, and firing a volley, we all left. It was a badly managed affair altogether.”

Like Simpson and Thompson, Davis received his VC from the man who cost Bramley his life. Davis died in 1893 and lies buried at North Merchiston Cemetery in Edinburgh in an unmarked grave. His VC resides in the Lord Ashcroft Collection. His medals, besides the VC, included:

Turkish Crimea Medal ( 1855-56 )
Crimea Medal ( 1854-56 ) – 3 clasps: “Alma” – “Balaclava” – “Sebastopol”
Indian Mutiny Medal ( 1857-58 ) – 1 clasp: “Lucknow”

Lieutenant Colonel Sir John Chetham McLeod, GCB; The Black Watch Castle & MuseumPrivate Edward Spence – 42nd Regiment of Foot

 “Private Edward Spence, 42nd Regiment, would have been recommended to Her Majesty for the decoration of the Victoria Cross, had he survived. He and Lance-Corporal Thompson, of that Regiment, volunteered, at the attack of the Fort of Ruhya, on the 15th April, 1858, to assist Captain Groves, commanding the 4th Punjab Rifles, in bringing in the body of Lieutenant Willoughby from the top of the Glacis. Private Spence dauntlessly placed himself in an exposed position, so as to cover the party bearing away the body. He died on the 17th of the same month, from the effects of the wound which he received on the occasion. (The London Gazette of 27 May 1859, Numb. 22268, p. 2106)
VICTORIA CROSS. Errata in the London Gazette of Friday, May 27, 1859.
In the notifications of the Acts of Bravery performed by Lance Corporal Alexander Thompson and the late Private Edward Spence, of the 42nd Regiment, For Captain Groves, commanding the 4th Punjaub Rifles, Read Captain Cafe, commanding the 4th Punjaub Rifles. (The London Gazette of 21 October 1859, Numb. 22318, p. 3793) War Office, January 15, 1907.
The King has been graciously pleased to approve of the Decoration of the Victoria Cross being delivered to the representatives of the undermentioned Officers and men who fell in the performance of acts of valour, and with reference to whom it was notified in the London Gazette that they would have been recommended to Her late Majesty for the Victoria Cross had they survived:– London Gazette, 27th May, 1859. “Private Edward Spence, 42nd Regiment, would have been recommended to Her Majesty for the decoration of the Victoria Cross had he survived. He and Lance-Corporal Thompson, of that Regiment, volunteered at the attack of the Fort of Ruhya, on the 15th April, 1858, to assist Captain Cafe, commanding the 4th Punjab Rifles, in bringing in the body of Lieutenant Willoughby from the top of the Glacis. Private Spence dauntlessly placed himself in an exposed position so as to cover the party bearing away the body. He died on the 17th of the same month from the effects of the wound which he received on the occasion.” (The London Gazette of 15 January 1907, Numb. 27986, p. 325)

Born in Dumfries, Scotland, on 28 December 1830, and, after enlisting in the Black Watch, like his colleagues, would serve in the Crimean War. As we know so little about Spence, I have included his citation not only from 1859 but 1907. The Victoria Cross, after a six-month hunt for relations, was finally handed over to the son of his father’s cousin – it now resides in the Black Watch Museum in Perth, to whom it was anonymously donated. Spence lies buried at Ruiya.

“As the four men were nearing the edge of the jungle with the body (of Willoughby) Captain Cafe turned to see if Spens (Spence) was safe and following, but saw him kneeling on the edge of the ditch and beckoning with his hand. Desiring Thompson to go on to the dhoolie with the body, Cafe turned and went back to Spens, and found that he was wounded through the thigh and unable to get up. While standing beside him and encouraging him to make an effort to rise, Captain Cafe saw one of the enemy preparing to take a shot either at himself or Spens through an embrasure, so quickly stooping down, he picked up Spens’ rifle and shot the man. At last Spens, making an effort, got upon his feet, when Captain Cafe, giving him the support of his left arm, and carrying the rifle and the feather bonnet in his right hand, retired slowly with the wounded man. Before they could reach the shelter of the jungle, a bullet passed through Cafe’s arm above the elbow, the arm upon which Spens was leaning, but he continued to give the support of his wounded arm until he put Spens in a place of safety. Spens was morally wounded (the femoral artery cut through) and died in a few minutes, and Captain (now General) Cafe has almost lost the use of his left arm, the result of the wound received that day.” (Munro)

And all this misery for a man who refused to reconnoitre.

Sources:
Gordon-Alexander, Lieut. Col. W. – Recollections of a Highland Subaltern (London: Edward Arnold, 1898)
Malleson, Col. G.B. – History of the Indian Mutiny, Vol. II (London: William H. Allen & Co., 1879)
Munro, Surgeon-General – Reminiscences of Military Service with the 93rd Highlanders ( London: Hurst & Blackett Publishers, 1883)
Munro, Surgeon General – Records of Service and Campaigning in Many Lands, Vol II (London: Hurst & Blackett Ltd., 1887)
Russell, William Howard– My Diary in India, Vol. I (London: Routledge, Warne & Routledge, 1860)
Wright, William – Through the Indian Mutiny – The Memoirs of James Fairweather, 4th Punjab Native Infantry, 1857-58 (Spellmount Military Memoirs, 2011)

Links:
https://vcgca.org/
https://www.victoriacross.org.uk/
https://www.victoriacross.org.uk/
http://www.blackwatch.50megs.com/
Strand Magazine, Volume 1, Issue 3, March 1891
https://auctionet.com/en/events/705-militaria-medals-coins/163-a-fascinating-set-of-six-studies-of-scenes-in-the-life-of-lt-edward-cotgrave-parr-willoughby-whose-career-though-short-was-brilliant-and-whose-death-resulted-in-the-award-of-three-victoria-crosses – Six scenes in the life of Lieutenant Edward Cotgrave Parr Willoughby, 4th Punjab Rifles (killed during the Indian Mutiny 1858) aged 23. 2nd Son of Major General Michael Franklin Willoughby C.B. Inspector General of Military Stores for India.

Sir Robert Walpole

Walpole’s defeat at Ruiya did not go unnoticed. His account of the affair raised eyebrows throughout the military establishment. It garnered a cold response from Sir Colin Campbell and an even colder one from the office of Lord Canning, who heaped honour on Adrian Hope and carefully avoided any praise of Walpole.

No. 38.
No. 102 of 1858.
THE Right Honorable the Governor-General of India is pleased to direct the publication of the following despatch, from the Deputy Adjutant- General of the Army, No. 257 A, dated 20th April, 1858, forwarding copy of a report from Brigadier-General R. Walpole, Commanding Field Force, detailing his operations against and capture of the fort of Rooya, on the 15th instant.
His Lordship participates in the grief expressed by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief at the heavy loss which the British army has sustained in the death of that most admirable officer, Brigadier the Honourable A. Hope, whose very brilliant services he had had the gratification of publicly recognizing in all the operations for the relief and the final capture of Lucknow. No more mournful duty has fallen upon the Governor-General in the course of the present contest than that of recording the premature death of this distinguished young commander.
The Governor-General shares also in the regret of the Commander-in-Chief at the severe loss of valuable lives which has attended the operations against the fort of Rooya.
R.J H. BIRCH, Colonel, Secretary, Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor-General.

Walpole’s dispatch was rightly seen by many as suspicious, neglecting outright to mention he had been strenuously advised to reconnoitre by not only Brind but Haggart and Hope. He had dismissed outright the information given to him by the trooper of Hodson’s Horse, who had no reason to lie, in favour of two guides who most likely had every reason to lead him astray. To make matters worse, Walpole had not made use of his artillery, his engineers or his sappers. When under fire, he had been unable to make clear decisions, had acted irrationally and with anger, and, above all, had failed to listen to the very men who could have won him an astonishingly easy victory.
As it turned out, the next morning, when the British entered Ruiya Fort, it was even clear to the regimental surgeon of the 93rd, Munro, just how simple the task would have been. The south side of the fort had no defences at all except for a narrow grove of trees, a shallow and practically empty ditch, and a low, broken wall. It was, in fact, so open that the cavalry could have ridden in and taken care of the operation themselves. To make matters worse, James Hills-Jones (VC), who happened to be present with Tombs’ battery, had seen Nirpat Singh’s horsemen riding in and out of the place during the entire battle. This was corroborated by another officer, Sam Browne (later General Sir Samuel James Browne, VC, GCB, KCSI). He had taken it on himself to reconnoitre the fort early the next morning with his cavalry and found a breach in the wall so wide his regiment could have ridden in “three abreast.” Adrian Hope and the others had lost their lives for nothing. As William Russell, the Times correspondent, accurately pointed out, “Walpole seems to have made the attack in a very careless, unsoldierly way…”
The condemnation was severe, and although this particular passage was written 20 years after the fact, it reflected the thoughts and feelings of many who served under Robert Walpole. The campaign, as Malleson rightly pointed out, was not a difficult one and very little was asked of Walpole. “To carry it to a successful issue, then, demanded no more than the exercise of vigilance, of energy, of daring—qualities the absence of which from a man’s character would stamp him as unfit to be a soldier.
Walpole, unhappily, possessed none of these qualities. Of his personal courage, no one ever doubted, but as a commander, he was slow, hesitating, and timid. With some men, the power to command an army is innate. Others can never gain it. To this last class belonged Walpole.
He never was, he never could have been, a general more than in name. Not understanding war, and yet having to wage it, he carried it on in a blundering and haphazard manner, galling to the real soldiers who served under him, detrimental to the interests committed to his charge. If the campaign offered no difficulties, it may be urged, surely any man, even a Walpole, might have carried it to a successful issue. Thus, to brand a commander with incapacity when the occasion did not require capacity is as unnecessary as ungenerous!
It might be so, indeed, if the campaign, devoid of difficulty as it was, had not been productive to of disaster. But the course of this history will show that, that though there ought to have been no difficulties, Walpole, by his blundering and obstinacy, created them, and, worse than all, he, by a most unnecessary — I might justly say by a wanton — display of those qualities sacrificed the life of one of the noblest soldiers in the British army — sent to his last home, in the prime of his splendid manhood, in the enjoyment of the devotion of his men, of the love of his friends, of the admiration and well-placed confidence of the army serving in India, the noble, the chivalrous, the high-minded Adrian Hope.“

The censure of Robert Walpole was loudest in his own camp. The dispatch had been humiliating for the 4th Punjabis, who, having fought valiantly at Delhi and the Lucknow campaign, now stood accused of being unwilling to follow orders. Besides this, their well-respected captain, William Cafe, was severely wounded, and young Edward Willoughby, whose brother had blown up the Delhi Magazine in May 1857, was dead. The retreat had been so sudden the Punjabis had been unable to collect all their dead and wounded from the field, which was strongly against their principles. To make matters worse, the next morning, just before the Punjabis returned to Ruiya, one of the men, who had been left for dead, crawled into camp and told them a ghastly story. As soon as Walpole had vanished, Singh’s men had poured out of the fort, carrying lanterns, intent on plundering the dead and killing anyone who was still alive. He had tried to play dead, but “when a man was trying to turn him over, he suddenly grappled him, wrenched the sword from him and killed him. Then, with much difficulty, for he was wounded in the thigh, managed to get out of the ditch and crawled painfully after the Regiment. The story had the worst effect on the men for it was a maxim of Wilde’s never to leave a wounded man to be cut up by the enemy, even at the sacrifice of many lives.” When they returned, they found the dead had been horribly and insultingly mutilated. They had also lost their favourite and highly respected Indian officer, Subedar Major Hira Singh. While the Europeans buried their dead, the Sikhs cremated his remains with every military and religious honour they could. Like Hope, Singh had been shot through the neck by a man sitting in a tree.
The 4th Punjabis lost all of their most senior officers in the affair at Ruiya and would continue their march commanded by Lieutenant Stewart with Lieutenant Stafford and Hawkins under him – the latter had but recently joined. It seemed to Surgeon Fairweather, who had seen his Regiment suffer so much for so little gain, that their once proud spirit was broken. The men confided in Fairweather that they felt they were being expended for no good reason, and they would never see their homes in the Punjab again. They had marched to the siege of Delhi in 1857 with twelve officers and eight hundred men, and now there were only 109 of the original contingent left.
In the ranks of the 42nd and the 93rd, dislike of Walpole boiled over into pure hatred. For these same regiments that had climbed the Alma together (and the 93rd that formed Campbell’s Thin Red Line) had been ordered to retire, a humiliation they were hardly likely to forgive Walpole for. At the funeral on the 16th, the atmosphere was so bad that the officers were worried they would have a mutiny on their hands. To make matters worse, when the 93rd’s sentries reported that Nirpat Singh was leaving the fort, and indeed had passed only a few hundred yards in front of them, General Walpole ignored their reports, and they were told to desist from disturbing the camp any further. An enraged Lieutenant Gordon-Alexander had to be prevented by clearer heads than his from ordering his picket of 60 men, two guns and a few Sikh horsemen to march straight back to Ruiya and take the fort that very night themselves. Out of sheer insolence, the saying “Tull ye tak’ Ruiya” for any order that was issued in haste was prevalent in camp, and the men took to calling the fort “Walpole’s Castle”. Wisely, Walpole avoided direct confrontation with the rank and file as much as possible. Surgeon Fairweather believed the Highlanders would have liked nothing better than to shoot Walpole dead, and rightly surmised Hope and the others had been done to death by the “mismanagement of an arrogant nincompoop.” At Hope’s funeral, the officers had even expected the troops to rise in mutiny.

The problem was, they would have to fight for him again.

Sirsa, 22 April 1858

The force marched on 18 April, and much to the immense irritation of the surgeons, it looked like camping on open plains was once again on the menu. After a few more men collapsed from the heat, Munro ignored Walpole’s directive and ordered the 93rd to set up their tents in a grove of trees; they were quickly followed by the other regiments. Walpole decided this was not the time to object, and he let this piece of obvious insubordination pass by without a word. At this point, no one really cared if he boiled his head.
After five marches, on 22 April, they reached a strong village on the right side of the Ramganga, named Sirsa, only seven miles from Aliganj. The cavalry of the advanced guard reported back that they had made contact with a rebel picket that was in the process of retreating. Walpole was loath at this point to make any attack on the rebels retreating or otherwise, but after some persuasion for Haggart and Brind convinced him that an attack could be carried out with little loss, provided they were allowed to manage it.

Major General Sir Henry Tombs VC KCB

“The column was halted, in order that the heavy gun might be brought to the front and the infantry close up. The horse artillery and the cavalry, however, went ahead. When about a thousand yards from the largest village, the enemy opened fire with their six guns and sent their shot and shell among them. On they galloped together, for it was Tombs’ proud boast that his light guns could go wherever the cavalry could go. Six hundred yards from the village, they drew rein. The 6 – pounders quickly came into action, and the rebel fire slackened. The troop of 9 -pounders, retarded by the broken and difficult ground, came up, and soon silenced the united tearing fire of the enemy’s guns, and drove their infantry from the village and the shelter of the trees. Their cavalry showed a bold front, in the hope of saving their guns, which were being slowly dragged away by bullocks, but a flank movement and the advance of the infantry disconcerted them, and they fled. The pursuit was conducted with such vigour by the cavalry and artillery that the enemy’s camp was captured.“

This time, Walpole was prudent with the use of his infantry, whom he kept well in reserve, ensuring this time, they did not fight at all. While Sirsa was seen as a small victory, the men in his camp were cognisant of the fact that Walpole did not carry it through, and most of the rebels escaped to join their compatriots at Bareilly.

“The infantry was formed up accordingly, with the 79th Highlanders leading in line, supported by the 4th Panjabis , the 42nd and 93rd Highlanders following in line of contiguous columns in reserve. Walpole’s bad generalship showed itself again by allowing the infantry brigade to be hurried across the ploughed fields for nearly four miles at a run, in a foolish endeavour to keep up with the cavalry, under that awful sun…It was reported in camp that evening that it was only on the urgent representations of Brigadier Haggart, 9th Lancers, commanding the cavalry, that our pig- headed General allowed him to follow the retreating foe up, with the result that the Horse Artillery and cavalry captured the village before we of the infantry could overtake them.”

The only satisfaction that the infantry had after this was when the cavalry reported that many of the men they had cut up had belonged to Nirpat Singh, so in a sense, it was a vengeful victory after all. The remainder of the rebel force left their baggage behind, and the cavalry captured four guns. They retreated on this occasion in such a hurry that they neglected to destroy the bridge over the river, and Walpole could now move his guns and column closer to Aliganj without worry. The same day as he took Sirsa, the force continued its march towards Aliganj and encamped one mile outside the town. Here they remained until 27 April, when they were joined by Sir Colin Campbell.

Colonel Walpole is not censured

If the Highland Regiments expected Sir Colin Campbell to tar and feather Walpole, in this instance, his famous temper let them down. Instead, he let Walpole off, and much of this had to do with Walpole’s dispatch. He had stated officially that the infantry “had gone much nearer to the fort than I wished or intended them to go,” and Sir Colin Campbell concurred that his difficulty was not so much down to poor leadership and bad management but the temper of the Highlanders.
“The difficulty with these troops … is to keep them back; that’s the danger with them. They will get too far forward.” Sir Colin would later allude to the Ruiya affair and to the“rashness of officers in a subordinate position attempting to blame or judge the act of their superiors, of the strength of those mud forts, and of the difficulty of restraining their Highlanders.” He did not take into account either the reports of Brind or Haggart, and above all, he disregarded the Highlanders themselves.

“As was Sir Colin’s wont, especially since he had been gazetted to the Colonelcy of the 93rd Highlanders, he visited our lines in the evening, commencing with a stroll amongst the men’s tents, addressing men he knew by name, and asking how they were; but he received short and rather surly answers, such as, ‘Nane the better for being awa frae you, Sir Colin; or, ‘As weel as maun be wi’ a chiel like Walpole,’ till, the news spreading that Sir Colin was among the tents, all the men turned out and fairly shouted at him, ‘Hoo about Walpole?’ – meaning, what was he going to do with Walpole after that terrible Ruiya business. Sir Colin was evidently much disconcerted (for the commotion in camp brought me to my tent – door, and I myself saw and heard what I have above described), and, instead of going on to the mess tent, went straight back to his own camp, and until after the battle of Bareli not only did not come near our lines again, but took no notice of the regiment when riding past us with his staff on the line of march .” (Alexander)

This certainly matches what William Russell had to say about Walpole, when writing on the 27th – “His manners are unpleasant, and he has managed to make himself unpopular. It would be impossible to give an idea of the violent way in which some officers spoke of him today.” Even Russell expected Walpole would at least receive a dressing down, but nothing of the sort happened. Sir Colin Campbell interceded on Walpole’s behalf, not only with the officers under his command but with Lord Canning, who was fretting about what to do with the man and lamenting the loss of Adrian Hope. His words must have been soothing, for Walpole was recommended for, and received a C.B. and later a K.C.B., and from Sir Colin Campbell, the command of the Bareilly division. It was seemingly enough that Sir Colin Campbell trusted and believed in Walpole as a leader for those who had authority, to overlook the senseless slaughter at Ruiya. That Sir Colin Campbell could not look his favoured 93rd in the eye, however, tells another story in itself.

As Malleson writes:
“It is a curious commentary on the principle then, now in fashion, of conferring honours on men, for the deeds they achieve, but for the high positions they occupy, that the general who lost more than one hundred men and Adrian Hope, in failing to take this petty fort, was made a KCB. Though he failed to take the fort, he was yet a divisional commander.”
Malleson was alluding here to Walpole’s influential background – his mother was the youngest daughter of the 2nd Earl of Egmont and sister of Prime Minister Spencer Perceval – the only British prime minister ever to be assassinated. His grandfather was Thomas Walpole, who himself was the son of an eminent diplomat, Horatio Walpole, 1st Baron Walpole, who happened to be the younger brother of Robert Walpole, the first Prime Minister of Great Britain. It is no wonder that no one was willing to give this Robert Walpole a rebuke, not even Sir Colin Campbell.

Following Bareilly, Walpole was left in command of the Rohilkhand division until 1860. Before the mutiny was completely extinguished, he would have one more fight, on the Sarda River, where he did shine through as a leader of a small force in a skirmish. For his mutiny services, Walpole received the Mutiny Medal with one clasp for Lucknow; by the home authorities, he was first made Companion and then Knight Companion of the Order of the Bath (military division) and received thanks from Parliament. In 1861, he took command of the Lucknow Division, but it was a short posting, for in the same year, Walpole was transferred to Gibraltar to command the infantry division. Promoted to major general in 1862, he returned to England two years later to command the Chatham Military District, a position he stepped down from in 1866, upon being given a colonelcy of HM’s 65th Regiment of Foot. Promoted to Lieutenant-General in 1871, Sir Robert Walpole died on 12 July 1876 at the Grove, West Molesey, Surrey.

The Dictionary of National Biography very carefully worded its assessment of Walpole, disregarding quite blatantly what was known about Ruiya:

“Walpole’s conduct of this operation has been severely censured, and Malleson, in his ‘History of the Indian Mutiny,’ not only asserts that the second in command, Brigadier Adrian Hope, who was killed in the attack, had no confidence in his chief, but that Walpole was altogether incompetent as a general in command. There is no evidence for either of these assertions; Walpole was not a great commander, but the strictures passed upon him were undeserved. On the occasion in question, Walpole undervalued his enemy, and in consequence many valuable lives were lost; but the commander-in-chief was fully cognisant of all that took place, and, so far from withdrawing from Walpole his confidence, he continued to employ him in positions of trust and in important commands.”

We shall now turn away from Sir Robert Walpole and give our attention to the heroes of Ruiya, who justly deserve their honours.

Sources:
Behan, T. L. – Bulletins & Other State Intelligence for the Year 1858 – Part III (London Gazette Office, Harrison & Sons, 1860)
Gordon-Alexander, Lieut. Col. W. – Recollections of a Highland Subaltern (London: Edward Arnold, 1898)
Malleson, Col. G.B. – History of the Indian Mutiny, Vol. II (London: William H. Allen & Co., 1879)
Munro, Surgeon-General – Reminiscences of Military Service with the 93rd Highlanders ( London: Hurst & Blackett Publishers, 1883)
Munro, Surgeon General – Records of Service and Campaigning in Many Lands, Vol II (London: Hurst & Blackett Ltd., 1887)
Russell, William Howard– My Diary in India, Vol. I (London: Routledge, Warne & Routledge, 1860)
Walford, Edward (1864). The County Families of the United Kingdom, Or Royal Manual of the Titled and Untitled Aristocracy of Great Britain and Ireland. 2. Ed. Greatly Enl. Hardwicke.
Vetch, Robert (1899). “Walpole, Robert (1808-1876)”. Lee, Sidney (ed.). Dictionary of National Biography. Vol. 59. (London: Smith, Elder & Co.) p. 207.
Wright, William – Through the Indian Mutiny – The Memoirs of James Fairweather, 4th Punjab Native Infantry, 1857-58 (Spellmount Military Memoirs, 2011)

The “mixed stars” mentioned in the previous post, “The Lay of Land”, would begin to show their bad disposition early on in Sir Colin Campbell’s Rohilkhand Campaign. Like with the appointment of Windham for the defence of Cawnpore, and Mansfield during the final battle to retake the city on 6 December 1857, Sir Colin once again placed his trust in a man who, though showing much promise at first, had little business leading a column.

Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Walpole, KCB 

Robert Walpole was born in 1808, the son of Thomas Walpole, a British diplomat and his wife, Lady Margaret Perceval, the eighth daughter of the 2nd Earl of Egmont. Educated at Dr Goodenough’s school in Ealing and at Eaton College, Robert received a commission in the Rifle Brigade in 1825 – his first posting, however, was not India, for his regiment at the time was in Nova Scotia. His career, indeed, had no connection with India at all – Walpole served with his regiment in England, Ireland, Jersey and Malta. Rising through the ranks, Walpole was promoted to lieutenant-colonel in 1847 and to the staff of the deputy adjutant and quartermaster general while in Corfu. In 1854, he was promoted to colonel and remained in Corfu for another two years.
In 1857, Walpole and the Rifle Brigade set sail for India, arriving in Cawnpore in early November. He would not participate in the evacuation of Lucknow but would remain behind with Brigadier Windham to follow Campbell’s orders of ostensibly keeping Cawnpore safe. As we have seen, things did not go quite to plan; however, it was Windham whom Campbell censured for the near-disaster at Cawnpore. Walpole, who, on 28 November, had indeed defeated an attack of the Gwalior Contingent and captured two 18-pounder guns, was rightly praised for his work. On 6 December, Walpole commanded a brigade during the Battle of Cawnpore; then on 18 December, he led a detached corps through the Doab, capturing Etawah on the 29th. On 3 January 1858, they had reached Bewar, where Walpole took command of Colonel Thomas Seaton’s force, joining Campbell at Fatehgarh the next day. Upon the formation of the Army of Oudh, Walpole was once again at the forefront, commanding the third division (5th and 6th Brigades). With the Dilkusha taken on 6 March, Brigadier General Walpole, together with Sir James Outram, crossed the Gomti to take the rebel positions in the reverse.
Until now, Walpole had not given anyone cause for concern. He followed orders, was neither overly loved nor universally despised and a steady officer.

Walpole marches

On 7 April 1858, Colonel Walpole left Lucknow in command of his own division. It was certainly an illustrious one, consisting of 4000 fighting men:

Cavalry
9th Lancers
2nd Punjab Cavalry
Brigadier Haggart, 9th, commanding

Infantry
42nd Highlanders
79th Highlanders
93rd Highlanders
4th Punjab Rifles
Brigadier Adrian Hope, 93rd, commanding

Artillery
2/1 Bengal Horse Artillery (Capt. & Brev.-Lt. Col. H. Tombs, VC)
3/3 Bengal Horse Artillery (Capt. ( Brev.- Lt. Col. F. F. Remmington)
Detachment 1/5 Bengal Artillery (Lt. E.W.E. Walker)
4/1 Bengal Artillery (Captain H. Francis)
Two 18-pounders
Two 8-inch howitzers
Two 8-inch mortars
Two 5 1/2 -inch mortars
Major J. Brind, Bengal Artillery, commanding

23rd Company, Royal Engineers, detachment of Bengal Sappers and Miners

The task before Walpole, though difficult, was not considered one that would severely test the qualities of a commander. While he might need to dismantle a fort or two and disperse handfuls of disorganised rebels or quell a recalcitrant talukdar and his band of matchlock men, Sir Colin Campbell was quite sure a man of Walpole’s abilities would be able to tackle such problems. He had no major rebel force in his path, and his orders were simply to “advance up the left bank of the Ganges, and so to penetrate into Rohilkhand.” He was, according to his orders, to march to Aliganj, and there wait for Sir Colin Campbell and on “no account to seek the enemy, or turn to the right or left to undertake any operation.” While the march itself would take some three weeks to accomplish, Sir Colin Campbell did not anticipate that Walpole would face any resistance, and his orders were very clear.

The men of the 93rd Highlanders were tossed out of their beds in Lucknow at 3 am on 7 April, for a 5 am march; however, they only moved 9 miles from the Dilkusha to the Musa Bagh, where they were ordered to halt at 8 in the morning. For some unexplainable reason, their baggage did not arrive for another five hours, when, for reasons again unknown to anyone, they were ordered to move another two miles down the road, “and, although there was enough shade in the neighbourhood to shelter an army of 10,000 men, we had to pitch our tents out in the open, under a sun with which you could cook a beefsteak on a flat stone! The tents were not pitched till past two o’clock, when we retired to their shade with the thermometer at 140 °!”
While Alexander and the 93rd grumbled, the plain slowly filled up with the other corps who were joining them in Walpole’s division – until late in the day, they marched in, one after the other, from their various posts around Lucknow and early on 9 April, the division moved out.

There were no prepared or metalled roads to speak of between Lucknow and Aliganj, and the division moved cross-country over sandy tracks, often intersected by dry water courses. They moved on in a north-westerly direction through a land bereft of both shade and mutineers. For the next seven days, they marched in what could only be described as the bowels of hell, for Walpole now showed himself as a most terrible manager.
Instead of taking advantage of the night hours, as most experienced, sensible commanders were wont to do in Indian summers, he never managed to issue his orders for the next day before midnight, and the marches commenced, not at any regular time but whenever it seemed to appeal to Walpole. It was 3 am one day, but 5 am the next, and perhaps 4 on the day after that, but by the time everything was packed and ready, there were hardly any night hours left and the force, though Walpole kept their marches short to no more than 9 miles a day, by the time they reached their camping ground, it was in the full blaze of an Indian sun and hours to wait until they could crawl under canvas. Walpole appeared to have fostered a particular fear of trees for his force was inevitably ordered to encamp on the open plain, “under a sun which generally registered on the thermometer 140 ° or more whilst we were pitching our tents, and never less than 108° for the day, when we got into them, whilst we were surrounded by magnificent groves of mango-trees capable of sheltering five times as large a force as ours, and there were no military reasons for our not taking advantage of them.”
The heat made sleep impossible during the day and the night was no better; the tents were pitched close next to each other, surrounded by the sounds and smells of camp life – “for the shrill trumpeting of elephants, the infernal noise made by the camels which were kneeling close round our tents in scores, the horrible effluvium emitted from their bodies, the constant monotonous crunching, grind noise made by them as they chewed the cud…” The heat verily radiated off the ground, leaving the army sleepless, restless and after a few days of this treatment, exhausted. The next day, at whatever time Walpole chose, they would stagger to their feet and face another gruelling march. It was no surprise that the first casualties in Walpole’s force did not fall to the bullet, but to sunstroke and heat apoplexy.
The Highlanders were possibly worse off than anyone else, for no one had considered that their heavy dress (full Highland dress) was unsuitable for an Indian summer. There would have been enough time in Lucknow to fit them up in lighter clothing, but here they were, marching on a grilling plain, wearing wool. “Their cries for water were incessant – no jest or laughter was heard, they were too weary and life at the time too uncertain, for every now and then, as we moved silently and listlessly along, a comrade would stumble in the ranks, and, without further warning, fall to the ground, smitten down by heat apoplexy.”
At the latest, after the third day of such misery, Walpole should have realised he was marching his army to their deaths, but he continued on with his strange ideas, and camping out in the open, oblivious not only to the protests of tried India hands from the Bengal artillery and the cavalry, but the regimental surgeons.
While this certainly pointed to poor leadership, the men would soon see worse.

93rd (Sutherland Highlanders), NCOs, in India 1864, with more suitable uniformsThe Battle That Should Not Have Been – RUiya

Situated two miles from Madhoganj, fifty miles from Lucknow, (or more accurately, fifty-one
miles west by north from Lakhnao, and ten miles east of the Ganges– Malleson) stood the fort of Ruiya, the ancestral holding of a petty landowner, Nirpat Singh.
Singh was a rebel, “as long as rebellion seemed profitable,” but he had never taken an active stand against the British. Loot and plunder were more his style, and he took advantage of the surrounding chaos to start arguments with his neighbours. In April 1858, he was neither amassing an army nor actively picking a fight with the British. It would be Walpole, however, who would bring the contest to him.

The Council of War – of Sorts

Colonel James Brind

On 14 April, Walpole’s spies informed the general that Ruiya was not only occupied by rebels, but Nirpat Singh was planning to attack the column; they further exaggerated the numbers of his supposed force, driving it up from the actual 300 to the fantastical figure of 1500. No attempt was made to confirm that this was actually true, and being an officer with little Indian experience, Walpole did not feel inclined to question the veracity of the statement. Among his advisors, accompanying the force as civilian magistrate, was Captain Thurburn, a man of considerable experience (as we have already seen), who felt disinclined to accept such vague information; he further wanted Walpole to listen to what another informant had to say.
A trooper of Hodson’s Horse had, some weeks back, been captured by Nirpat Singh’s men and held in Ruiya Fort – the very morning Walpole arrived at Madhoganj, the trooper had managed his escape and had made his way straight to Walpole’s camp – it is unclear whether his escape was by design or by chance, but at any rate, his information was certainly worthy of mention. He informed Walpole, through Thurburn, that Nirpat Singh had no intention of fighting the British, yet he needed to save face in front of his people. He would oblige them by making a show of resistance, just sufficient to save his honour and then, when this was accomplished, he would evacuate Ruiya and leave the gate open for the British to walk in. Thurburn should have, at this point, insisted that Walpole listen to the trooper; he could have intervened and explained that this was not an unusual way of doing business in India; had he had any powers of persuasion, he might have prevented Walpole from attacking Ruiya at all. Instead, Walpole appears to have only half-listened to what Thurburn said. Information was abroad that Begum Hazrat Mahal had indeed been in touch with Nirpat Singh, and there was certainly a possibility he was hostile to the Government, but the statement of the trooper should have been given careful consideration. Besides this, after the Oudh Proclamation, Singh stood more to lose from an encounter with the British than Walpole stood to gain.

Captain Thurburn

Walpole, however, refused give the trooper’s story any credit, nor did he bother to set up any communication with Nirpat Singh. In Walpole’s mind, the thought of winning his spurs against a fort of 1500 heavily armed rebels in a jungle fort was more appealing than using common sense. Then came the problem of sound military practices.

“The slightest examination would have shown him that whilst the northern and eastern faces were strong, covered by dense underwood and trees, the western and southern were weak and incapable of offering defence. These faces were approached by a large sheet of water, everywhere very shallow, and in many places dried into the ground, and the walls here were so low that an active man could jump over them…”

On the evening of the 14th, Walpole, after some persuasion by his DAAG Captain Carey, agreed to summon Brigadiers Hope and Haggart and Colonel Brind to his tent for something that could have been called a Council of War, had Walpole not already made up his mind. Without any ceremony, he informed them he intended to attack Ruiya Fort the next morning – the information he had received was sound regarding not only the fort but the road leading to it, as related by the native guides, whom he believed were honest and trustworthy. At daylight, the force would advance along a road leading to the left of Ruiya; this road split a couple of miles from the camp into two – one road then ran through supposed open country in the direction of the fort and the other to the village of Rowdamow. On reaching the junction in the road, Colonel James Brind was instructed to advance with the whole of the artillery and take up a position to fire at the fort, while the cavalry and infantry brigadiers were to follow and “act as circumstances might require.” Brind, a man of considerable experience and who had fought not just at Lucknow but through the Siege of Delhi, asked Walpole if his information was absolutely reliable and the country was indeed open as the guides intimated. Otherwise, he advised mounting a reconnaissance to the point where the road divided, before attempting to attack Ruiya. He further told Walpole that “under any circumstances his duty duty to his own Command, to the Force, to the General himself, to the Commander-in-Chief, and to the Government of India, made it imperative to a draw the General’s attention to the danger of advancing with the whole of the artillery without the support of the infantry, and without first reconnoitring the ground over which he was to move.”
Annoyed with Brind, Walpole turned on Haggart and Hope, asking if they held the same opinion – both men concurred. Seeing he had no choice, Walpole half-heartedly agreed that a reconnaissance would be carried out the following morning, by Captains Lennox and Maunsell of the Engineers.

The 15th of April

Fort Ruiya

The next day, however, unprepared and completely convinced of his own self, Walpole ordered the men to march, under arms, toward Ruiya. The force began to move forward, and suddenly, contrary to Walpole’s belief of “open country,” they were faced with a wall of thick jungle. To the surprise of Brind, Hope and Haggart, Walpole determined to ignore any talk of reconnaissance at all, despite what had been agreed upon the night before, and ordered the whole of the artillery, with spare ammunition, to advance through the jungle towards the fort, the infantry following. The cavalry was to make a detour to the right and try to get around the rear of the fort – Brind immediately objected. He pointed out that the danger of taking the heavy guns and spare ammunition through an unknown jungle was not advisable and suggested instead to advance with the light guns instead, preceded and supported by the infantry; he also said the guides had already proved false and trusting them any further was folly. Brind suggested a method of ensuring the guides were not misled a second time – they should be, “induced to lead, with a bag of gold tied to their waists and a halter round their necks, and soldiers with loaded rifles on either side of them; explaining to them they should have the gold if faithful, be hanged if faithless and shot if they attempted to escape.”
For reasons known only to himself, Walpole refused to doubt the guides but “desired Colonel Brind to do what he pleased with his heavy guns, and to arrange with the Brigadier commanding the infantry for an escort to accompany his light guns through the jungle.” Accordingly, the heavy guns, baggage and spare ammunition were left parked in Madhoganj, as was Walpole’s fashion, on an open plain but at least under a guard of cavalry and infantry. Hope and Brind now proceeded with their arrangements.
Four Horse Artillery guns under Lieutenant-Colonel Harry Tombs would precede the skirmishers of the 42nd, to be followed by the main body of the regiment. Colonel Brind would lead, followed by a small detachment of breaching artillery, supported by the 93rd with the 79th and 4th Punjabis held in reserve. At the same time, the cavalry with one troop of Horse Artillery under Haggart would sweep around to the right to get as close to the fort as possible from the north-west.
After a considerable struggle to get through the jungle, the advance suddenly came to a halt, for quite unexpectedly, heavy firing opened from several small guns and matchlocks in the fort. If Walpole had listened to the trooper of Hodson’s Horse, he would have known this was Nirpat Singh making a show of things. It was still not too late to stop what would happen next, but as the artillery did not know Singh was making a sham attack and Walpole didn’t tell anyone, it looked like there would be a stiff fight ahead. He was also on the strongest side of the fort, and this would ultimately be his undoing. In his official report, Walpole states,
“The fort on the east and north side is almost surrounded with jungle, and at these two sides, the only two gates were stated to be, which information proved correct. It is a large oblong, with numerous circular bastions all round it, pierced for guns, and loopholed for musketry…” While he noted did cast a cursory glance at the west and south side, all he saw was “a piece of water, which was partially dried up.”
The southern wall, too, had a gate, scarcely defended, but this did not appear to shine in Walpole’s senses.
He continues, “A tolerable view of the fort having been obtained from the road which leads into it from the north, the heavy guns were brought up; the two 18-pounders were placed on it; the two 8-inch mortars behind a wood still further to the right.” He then ordered the infantry, in skirmishing order, to advance straight to the fort. The 42nd took up a position at the north-east angle of the fort on the slope of the glacis, not far from the ditch; two companies of the 93rd were sent to the right of the 42nd, and when the attack commenced, the 4th Punjabis to their left.

One can only imagine Nirpat Singh’s surprise when Walpole attacked him. He had intended to shoot off a few rounds and then, as promised, retreat, leaving Ruiya abandoned for Walpole’s taking. Instead, he saw the British general, who was obviously devoid of reason, sending his infantry in skirmishing order against the only defendable face of the fort. Nirpat Singh slammed the gates shut and was now determined to put up a fight, and the infantry would soon bear the brunt of Walpole’s folly.

Walpole sent two companies of the 42nd in skirmishing order, with no support, directly to the front. Nirpat Singh ordered his men to man the walls, and he further sent skirmishers to climb the numerous trees in the fort. Well hidden in their boughs, they were practically invisible to the advancing infantry and at considerable leisure to pick off their targets. When the infantry reached the fort they suddenly realised there was a ditch and they had no means of crossing it; meanwhile the fire from the loopholes increased in intensity –“The skirmishers still persevered, some of them even penetrated into the ditch; but their valour was useless, the enemy remained unseen, there was no breach, there were no ladders, and the hostile fire continued.” Captain Ross-Grove of the 42nd vainly called for scaling ladders; he received, instead, the 4th Punjabis. Captain Cafe quickly led his gallant regiment of five officers including the regimental surgeon and 105 men down through the jungle and across the glacis, taking up a position to the left of the 42nd only to find he had taken them directly into the line of fire – there was no cover for his men and the only sensible solution was to take them down into the ditch, as close to the walls as possible to escape at least the fire from the bastions. He could see there was no breach, not even a gap in the wall by which they could enter the fort and the only way they could reach the top of the wall (which was only nine feet high from the bottom of the ditch) would be “by pushing and helping each other up one at a time.” The Subadar Major and Captain Cafe managed to get up using this method and looked over the parapet of the wall – they quickly came to the conclusion that under such a heavy fire from the Singh’s men, in their tower, their trees and behind their loopholes, it would be impossible, without vigorous support, to assault the fort in such a manner. Cafe ordered the Punjabis to remain in the ditch while he sent back his report to Walpole, for which he never received an answer. After thirty of his men were killed or wounded, Cafe led the remainder out of the ditch and back to the original position behind the counterscarp, the 42nd on his left and a group of bewildered, orderless sappers on his right. Of the gallant deeds of the 4th Punjabis, we shall return later. However, Walpole mentions none of this in his official report, but to add a little salt into their wounds, would write,

“After a short time, a great many of the infantry were killed and wounded from having crept up too near the fort, from which the fire of rifles and matchlocks was heavy. These men had gone much nearer to the fort than I wished or intended, and some of the Punjab Rifles, with great courage but without orders, jumped into the ditch and were killed, endeavouring to get up the scarp.”

Alexander, of the 93rd, has his version, related to him by survivors of the horrible slaughter at the ditch:

“Walpole ordered two companies of the 42nd Highlanders to the front; they advanced through the brushwood in skirmishing order close up to the ditch, losing many men. Presently, Walpole ordered up the 4th Panjab Rifles to reinforce them; these aligned themselves on the left of the 42nd, and with the 42nd presently threw themselves into the ditch to escape, if possible, the biting fire from the loopholed walls, and they found no shelter, and being without ladders, could effect nothing against the enemy. In this death -trap the 42nd Highlanders lost 2 officers and 7 men killed, and 2 officers and 31 men wounded; and the 4th Panjabis 1 officer and 46 men killed and wounded, all shot down like dogs at 20 or 30 paces distance.“

Colonel Brind at least had not taken leave of his senses and, realising what was happening, ordered the Horse Artillery guns to an exposed position on the edge of the jungle, to fire over the heads of the advancing infantry, and “sweep with shot and shell the bastion and curtain opposite or rather under which the 42nd and the other corps lay, so as, if possible, to keep down the heavy and destructive matchlock fire of the enemy; at the same time, he directed Lieutenant Harrington (VC) to bring up two 18-pounders and two 8-inch howitzers and place them in a position on the eminence to the south-west of the Fort and to confine the fire of the heavy guns on one spot and open a breach as quickly as possible, believing it was the General’s intention to storm the place.”

Bengal Horse Artillery, riding into action, drawing, Lt. Lawson

We must remember, Walpole, despite losses to sunstroke, still had upwards of 3’800 fighting men – some were guarding the baggage, but where were the rest? According to Alexander, they were about to have a meal.

“I myself, in command of No. 6 Company of the 93rd, was, with the headquarters of the regiment, the
remainder of the 42nd and the 79th Highlanders, in line a little beyond the brow of a hill overlooking the fort, in the direction whence we had come. About half-past twelve, we received orders to form in columns of battalions still further to the rear, pile arms, and let the men have their dinners.
Accordingly, the men’s cooking utensils were unloaded, and the native cooks proceeded to cook the men’s dinner and serve it out to them about half past one. All this time, we knew nothing of the tragedy that was being enacted in that ditch, not a quarter of a mile off. When attempts were then made by the 42nd to send their two companies their dinners, however, it began to be whispered about that they and the 4th Panjabis were losing heavily, in fact, being shot down like rabbits.”

Just as Alexander and the 93rd were settling down to their dinners, an order came up that he and his company were to escort two howitzers to the opposite side of one of the gates on the south side of the fort and batter it down. Alexander would write:
“This setting us all down to cook dinners in the middle of a serious attack on a fort, had seemed to us all, officers and men, so totally incomprehensible, that I received my orders, as pointing to some sort of action, with delight, and as the fire from the fort was too hot to trust to the bullocks, my men, when called upon to help the artillerymen to drag the two howitzers, being equally pleased to do something, started off with them at a run over very rough ground and through thick brushwood, never stopping till the artillery officer directed us to do so on the spot where he intended to bring the guns into action. The gate was protected by a high earthwork, but when the guns opened fire, it seemed to me that the shells were beautifully pitched, and they certainly knocked about the archway over the gate.
We had not, however, fired more than two or three rounds a gun, when a staff officer arrived with orders to cease firing and join headquarters. I pointed out to him what the artillery had already effected, but he reiterated his orders for me to escort the artillery back at once, which elicited the remark from one of my men, ‘ The man ‘ (meaning Walpole) doesna seem to ken his ain mind!’ The bullocks for the guns having followed us, we reluctantly obeyed orders, but as leisurely as we could, giving no hand in hauling the guns back again.”

It was General Walpole who ordered the guns to stop firing. As for the 93rd, they saw no action at all at Ruiya – the 79th and the remainder of the 4th Punjab Rifles were held in reserve in open ground behind the jungle, facing, of all things, the eastern side of the fort. Around to the rear of the fort, the cavalry with one troop of Remmington’s Horse Artillery had taken up their position on the edge of the jungle facing an open plain to intercept anyone fleeing Ruiya, once Walpole’s front and flank attack were successful, as this was the only route by which they could escape. As such, they would wait, and then wait a little longer until it became clear something was terribly wrong. Meanwhile, Brigadier Haggart of the cavalry was sending messages, repeatedly, to Walpole that the Ruiya was accessible and would be easy to capture if he moved his force from the north to the south and west flanks; Walpole blundered onwards prevented the artillery from opening a breach and“desired the officer commanding the artillery to keep up a dropping fire on the Fort from both the heavy and light guns in answer to, and to keep down that of, the enemy to which part of our infantry and several of our light guns were completely exposed.”

Colonel Brind was very aware that this whole affair at Ruiya was what he had suspected, considering the behaviour of the guides by leading them to the strongest side of the fort, base treachery. The day was passing by, and he was rapidly running out of ammunition. Brigadier Hope informed him that the 42nd were hopelessly caught in the ditch and they should either be allowed to assault by any means or retreat. Brind, on his part, decided to present Walpole with two courses of action – the artillery should be allowed to concentrate their fire at one point only, either on the north or the east, to breach the wall, preparatory for an assault; he would then use his light guns to provide cover for the storming party. The other course was that the engineers be allowed to proceed to the south side of the fort and find a position for the heavy guns to effect a breach in the curtain. Walpole agreed to the second proposal, and accordingly, Brind with Lennox and Maunsell proceeded to the south side – they had hardly reached when several things happened, seemingly all at once, that completely befuddled Walpole.
Firstly, his trusty guides disappeared, just as Brind had expected them to; then a company of the 42nd under Captain John Cheetham McLeod, ordered to advance close to the fort and examine the gate in the north wall were suddenly recalled, and the only man who appeared to still have any desire to knock sense into Walpole’s head was shot dead. This man was Adrian Hope. In this “state of perplexity and confusion,” Walpole utterly forgot he had sent Brind and the engineers to the south wall, and without sending any orders to either the artillery or the engineer officers, he ordered the infantry to retire.

Meanwhile, Brind and the engineers continued their reconnaissance of not only the south but also the west of the fort and selected a sheltered position for the heavy guns. They then decided on a spot where a breach could be made in the western wall, which was neither loopholed nor defended by bastions. Before returning with their report to Walpole, Lennox and Maunsell climbed up a small hill to make note of the best approach for the guns and the assaulting column, when to their surprise they saw the whole column moving off, away from Ruiya towards Rowdamow. Brind, convinced now that Walpole had indeed lost his mind, galloped to the head of the column to stop the retreat; he told Walpole he had found the perfect spot for a breach, and if he waited just a little longer, he could take Ruiya before nightfall. Walpole declined. The fort could wait for the next day, when another attack could be made “more thoroughly and safely”. Haggart quickly asked Brind what measures they should put in place to prevent Singh and his men from escaping during the night. Walpole did not consider this measure even moderately necessary and ordered the cavalry to return to camp.
The order to retire was greeted with just as much surprise from the troops who, having been apprised of Hope’s death, were now more eager than ever to tear Ruiya to pieces, with their bare hands if they had to, to avenge their beloved commander. Instead, as they marched away, they received a salute from Nirpat Singh’s garrison, who then proceeded to line the walls to jeer and laugh at them until they were out of sight.

Just as Haggart had surmised, during the night, Nirpat Singh and his men disappeared, swallowed up in the darkness of the vast Oudh country side – the next morning Walpole entered the empty fort and “looking down from the parapet of the wall to the spot where the men lay exposed all the previous day, and where Hope had fallen, remarked, ‘No wonder he was killed.’

The Death of Adrian Hope

Brigadier, the Honourable Adrian Hope

Justly concerned after the advance of the 42nd and the Punjabis Adrian Hope hastily rode up to Walpole – although no one can say for sure what he said to him as Walpole certainly did not mention it in his report, by all accounts, he held a long and apparently, strained conversation with Walpole who in his finite wisdom did not listen to a single thing Hope said.
Hope then dismounted his horse and proceeded on foot, with his ADC, Lieutenant Archibald Butter, intent on “making himself personally acquainted, at every risk, with the situation.” He advanced with Butter to the part of the counterscarp where Captain Ross-Grove was stationed to see what could possibly be done to put an end to this abominable situation. While considering whether Ruiya could be stormed or not, Hope stood up to get a better view of the position when a bullet fired by a man hidden in a tree hit him in left side of his neck, and passed downwards to his chest towards his heart. He fell backwards against Ross-Grove, who laid him on the ground. Lieutenant Butter, horrified, knelt next to Hope, shouting out for someone to bring a doctor. Holding Butter’s hand, Hope whispered, “Say a prayer for me,” closed his eyes and died. Butter would write a letter to Hope’s brother, Charles, a few days later, presenting a suitably heroic version of his death with many more last words; the version he told Munro when he brought Hope’s body to him seems, when considered in the clear light of time, the most accurate. Curiously, the press received their own version, and a suitably heroic portrait of his death was soon in circulation. It would also be captioned, “Death of Brigadier Adrian Hope in the attack on the Fort of Roodmow, April 15th 1858”, and would appear in various publications of the day.

The son of General John Hope, 4th Earl of Hopetoun, Adrian Hope served with the 60th Rifles between 1838 and 1851. He fought in the Kaffir War and at Crimea, notably at the battles of Alma and Inkerman. He exchanged to the 93rd Highlanders, who would be one of the first regiments to arrive in India at the outbreak of the mutiny. Hope fought under Sir Colin Campbell at the relief of Lucknow and at the subsequent retaking of the city. During the mutiny, he was promoted to Colonel and received the cross of Companion of the Order of the Bath (CB). He was also universally liked, not only by the men of his regiment who revered him, but by everyone fortunate to meet him.

“Of all the leaders of men whom I have served under, he was the calmest and coolest under fire, and the most gentle and courteous in his manner to all with whom he was associated. He never uttered harsh or unkind words, but was generous in thought, speech, and act. He seldom found fault, yet, when he did so, his reproof was conveyed in the fewest words, and with the most refined consideration for the feelings of the offender; so that all, from the highest to the humblest, who served under his orders felt that he was a leader in whom they could trust, and a friend to whom they could willingly and unreservedly give respect and love. No position of danger ever seemed to move him in the least; no one ever saw him hurried, or knew from his demeanour if he was anxious under difficulties or not. He spoke to those around him in the hottest fire of battle in his usual gentle, courteous manner. Nothing escaped his notice; what had to be done by himself or at his order was done without hurry, at the right time and in the right way. One great peculiarity of his was that he often seemed to be asking advice while giving it.” (Surgeon Munro)

Being a large man with red hair, Hope was instantly recognisable; while he might not have had the same nearly magnetic power as a Nicholson, everyone agreed, “A gentler, braver spirit never breathed – a true soldier, a kind, courteous, noble gentleman in word and deed, devoted to his profession, beloved by his men, adored by his friends.” (Russell) Sir Colin Campbell trusted Hope, and the command of the division, many believed, should have been his. However, Hope was only 37 and a colonel, and Walpole, a general, outranked him. Hope should have gone on to greater things, a leader of men, a shining example of everything manly and good – it was just unfortunate that he would be the first star to fall out of Sir Colin Campbell’s tainted sky.

The funeral of Hope, Lieutenants Bramley and Douglas of the 42nd, and Lieutenant Willoughby of the 4th Punjab Rifles took place in the early evening of 16 April. They were laid to rest together with seven men of the 42nd in a double row of graves dug in a grove of mango trees.

Hope’s grave stone at Ruiya

I have seen and assisted at many military funerals, but I never saw one more impressive than this. Brigadier Hope was accorded the funeral of a General Officer, the whole division being present on foot – Engineers, artillery, cavalry and infantry—and even the sick and wounded who could walk stole away from the field hospitals to be present.
The massed bands of the three Highland regiments played the Dead March, being relieved by the whole of the pipers of the three regiments, playing ‘Lochaber no more, ‘ and ‘The Flowers of the Forest .’ Viewed from my grove of trees, whence the camp could be seen half a mile off, the procession was very imposing, and the wail of the bagpipes, alternating with the solemn strains of the Dead March, was most impressive.
Each Highland regiment having its own Presbyterian Chaplain, the Rev. Mr Ross, Presbyterian Chaplain of the 42nd Highlanders, read the 90th Psalm, and the Rev. Mr Cowie, Episcopalian Chaplain to the division, the Church of England Service. There was hardly a dry eye in that large assemblage.“

For Surgeon Munro, it was not only the saddest, but the most touching military funeral he had ever witnessed – “for the lives of the brave men had been so full of promise and their deaths humanly speaking, so unnecessary.”

Back in Scotland, a memorial would be erected the following year that stands on a ridge between Linlithgow and Bo’ness, called the Hope Monument, and bears the following inscription:

“To the glory of God and in memory of Brigadier the Hon’ble. Adrian Hope C.B. Lieutenant Colonel 93rd Highlanders, youngest son of General John, Fourth Earl of Hopetoun. Born March 3rd 1821 killed before the Fort of Rohya in Oude April 15th 1858.”

Airngath Hill, Hope Monument – licenced image, © Crown Copyright: HES (Records of the Scottish National Buildings Record, Edinburgh, Scotland)

In the west aisle of the north transept of Westminster Abbey, there is also a memorial stone to Brigadier the Honourable Adrian Hope.

Returns for Ruiya

Staff
Lieutenant-Colonel Adrian Hope, 93rd Royal Highlanders – killed in action.

4th Punjab Rifles
1 officer killed, two wounded, forty-six men killed and wounded (out of 105 men and six officers)
Captain William Martin Cafe – severely wounded
Lieutenant F. V. H. Sperling – slightly wounded
Lieutenant Edward C. O. Willoughby – killed in action (attached, 10th BNI)

The 42nd, India, 1860

42nd Royal Highlanders
Two officers, seven men killed, one officer and thirty-seven men wounded

Lieutenants
Bramley, Alfred Jennings – killed in action. Aged 22. Son of Reverend Thomas Jennings Bramley of Tunbridge Wells, Kent.
Cockburn, C. W. – severely wounded
Douglas, Charles – dangerously wounded. Died of wounds, 16 April.

Colour Sergeants
Ridley, Thomas – dangerously wounded. Died of wounds
Stephens, John – slightly wounded

Sergeant James Fraser – killed in action

Corporals
Hartley, Joseph – severely wounded
Ritchie, Archibald – killed in action
Thompson, Thomas – killed in action

Drummer Andrew Morris – severely wounded

Privates
Bates, Joseph – dangerously wounded. Died of wounds
Brodie, Adam – killed in action
Corbet, Samuel – slightly wounded
Crosson Robert – severely wounded
Dixon, Alfred – severely wounded in the arm
Duncan, William – mortally wounded. Died 16 April
Dunn, James – dangerously wounded. Died the same day
Eadie, James – killed in action
Forrester, William – slightly wounded
Fraser, Charles – killed in action
Gilderthorpe, Charles – dangerously wounded
Grimwood, David – severely wounded in the right groin
Hennessey, Dennis – dangerously wounded
McIntosh, William – severely wounded
McKay, Andrew – killed in action
Mackie, Alexander – dangerously wounded. Died of wounds
Sibbalds, Robert – slightly wounded
Spence, Edward – dangerously wounded, died of wounds
Wagstaff, Charles – killed in action
Wright, Robert – dangerously wounded. Died of wounds 5 May

79th Royal Highlanders
The Cameron Highlanders had two men wounded, one of whom died of his wounds

1 private mortally wounded by round shot.

93rd Royal Highlanders
Sergeant David Sim – severely wounded
Privates
Davidson, Robert – severely wounded
Harris, Alexander – slightly wounded
Lennant, James – slightly wounded
McKay, Hugh – slightly wounded

Bengal Artillery
2 horses killed; 1 European officer, 3 non-commissioned officers, 3 drummers, rank and file, wounded; 1 native rank and file, 2 horses, 5 bullocks, wounded.
1st Lieutenant H. E. Harington (VC) – severely wounded
Sergeant John Knox – severely wounded

2nd Punjab Cavalry
1 Native Rank & File wounded

Bengal Sappers and Miners
2 native NCOs wounded, 1 rank & file, wounded

Punjab Pioneers
1 European NCO wounded

Total—2 European officers, 1 non-commissioned officer, 6 drummers, rank and file; 1 native officer, 1 non-commissioned officer, 7 drummers, rank and file, killed; 6 European officers, 8 non-commissioned officers, 36 drummers, rank and file, 5 native non-commissioned officers, 34 drummers, rank and file, wounded.
Grand Total—18 European and native officers and men, and 2 horses, killed; 89 European and native officers and men, 2 horses, and 5 bullocks, wounded.

Walpole was quick to mention everyone he possibly could in his despatch.

“I have received the most willing support from all under my command during this operation; and I beg particularly to offer my best thanks to Brigadier Haggart, commanding the cavalry, and to Major Brind, commanding the artillery, for their most able and valuable assistance; also to Captain Lennox, the senior engineer officer, to Lieutenant- Colonel Hay, commanding the 93rd Regiment, who succeeded to the command of the infantry brigade on the death of Brigadier Hope, to Lieutenant- Colonel Cameron, commanding 42nd Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, commanding 79th Regiment; to Captain Cafe, commanding 4th Punjaub Infantry, who, I regret to say, was severely wounded; to Lieutenant-Colonel Tombs, and Major Remmington, commanding troops of horse artillery; to Captain Francis, commanding heavy guns; to Captain Coles, commanding 9th Lancers, and Captain Browne, commanding 2nd Punjaub Cavalry.
I beg also to return my best thanks to the officers of my staff, Captain Barwell, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General; Captain Carey, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General; Captain Warner, aide-de-camp, and Lieutenant Eccles, Rifle Brigade, my extra aide-de-camp.
Enclosed, I beg to forward a list of the casualties, and likewise a sketch of the fort, which has been made in a hurry, but will afford information of the nature of the work.
I have, &c.,
R. WALPOLE, Brigadier-General, Commanding Field Force.

The fort at Ruiya was destroyed. With it should have gone Walpole’s reputation.

Sources:
Behan, T. L. – Bulletins & Other State Intelligence for the Year 1858 – Part III (London Gazette Office, Harrison & Sons, 1860)
Burgoyne, Roderick Hamilton – Historical Records of the 93rd Sutherland Highlanders (London: Richard Bentley & Son, 1883)
Bush, June – The Warner Letters (New Delhi: Rupa & Co., 2008)
Gordon-Alexander, Lieut. Col. W. – Recollections of a Highland Subaltern (London: Edward Arnold, 1898)
Groves, Lt.-Col. Percy – History of the 42nd Royal Highlanders – “The Black Watch” (Edinburgh & London, W. & A.K. Johnston, 1893)
Mackenzie, Capt. T.A., Lt. &Adjt. Ewart, J. S., Lt. Findlay, C. – Historical Records of the 79th Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders (London: Hamilton, Adams & Co., Devonport: A.H. Swiss, 1887)
Malleson, Col. G.B. – History of the Indian Mutiny, Vol. II (London: William H. Allen & Co., 1879)
Munro, Surgeon-General – Reminiscences of Military Service with the 93rd Highlanders ( London: Hurst & Blackett Publishers, 1883)
Munro, Surgeon General – Records of Service and Campaigning in Many Lands, Vol II (London: Hurst & Blackett Ltd., 1887)
Russell, William Howard– My Diary in India, Vol. I (London: Routledge, Warne & Routledge, 1860)

It was hoped that March 1858 would be the end of the rebellion; however, this was far from the case. While Lucknow was back in British hands, the actual fall of the city had not solved their problems. Thousands of mutineers had been allowed to flee the city – injudicious minds believed Sir Colin Campbell had let them go to secure for himself some future glory – the Oudh Talukdars were reluctant to put down their swords, faced with choosing between rebellion and ruin. Canning’s proclamation was viewed by many as intolerable, and now, for the first time, many would rise in true rebellion. They would put to use their mud forts and jungle strongholds, and their armed followers would swell the ranks of the mutineers for months to come.
Some of the leaders of the mutiny, thus far, were facing mixed results. The Nana Sahib, for all of his posturing in 1857, was making sure he did not personally come in contact with the British and was spending an inordinate amount of time galloping hither and tither to avoid them. His brother, Bala Rao, had taken to the field with a sizeable army at his beck and call; Tantya Tope, after his singular defeat at Cawnpore in December, was now rumoured to be in Central India, attempting to rally up discontent and put to the test old friendships – he would shortly meet Sir Hugh Rose. The Moulvie of Fyzabad, too, was still on the move, surrounded by hordes of fanatics, and Begum Hazrat Mahal was trying to breathe new life into her chaotic army. While all of this was a cause for concern, the entire province of Rohilkhand had until now escaped British pacification, and rebellion still reigned triumphant. While Sir Colin Campbell was busy flattening Lucknow, flames of mutiny rekindled in Bihar with the reappearance of Kunwar Singh.

Sir Colin Campbell, of course, had a plan, but he had very much lost the entire winter season with his delay in Fatehgarh; Lucknow had taken the last two weeks of decent weather, and now, he was faced with pre-monsoon India when day temperatures, which could crawl over 40°C in the shade, would wreak havoc on his men and their constitutions. However, loath to take anyone’s advice but his own and utterly convinced of his actions, Sir Colin Campbell remained at Lucknow for nearly three weeks after the fall of the city, considering his next move. Lord Canning, for his part, refused to stay out of Campbell’s business, which he believed was the pacification of Oudh. Canning’s concern, however, was with Rohilkhand, a project Campbell had planned to undertake at the start of the next cold weather, in November. Canning saw in Rohilkhand two parties – on the one hand, fanatical Mohammedans who were mostly hostile and Hindus who were mostly friendly to the British. His worry was that those fragile friendships would be too sorely tried the longer Campbell kept his army in Oudh. Canning wanted decisive action from a man the press were now openly calling Sir Crawling Camel, and Canning believed the next blow Campbell should strike must be at Bareilly.

Bareilly and Rohilkhand: A Brief History

Bareilly, situated 152 miles east of Delhi in the North-Western Provinces, served not only as the district’s administrative headquarters but also for the entire Rohilkhand Division. Its history was certainly older than the legend of its founding – the Sultanate of Delhi had ruled the region until the 12th century from neighbouring Badaon, and had found, to their displeasure, the local chieftains, the Katheriyas, who ruled Bareilly’s forests, had little time for sultanates. In 1379, they decided they really had had quite enough of it and, to prove their point, murdered the local governor of Budaon. Firoz Shah Tughlaq did not have patience for their shenanigans and invaded, thrashing the Katheriyas and turning the rich forests into the favourite hunting grounds for the Delhi Sultans.
Located on the Ramganga river, the city was founded, according to legend, when a Katheriya chieftain established a village named Jagatpur in the 1500s, and shortly after, in 1537, his sons, in 1537, Bans Dev and Barel Dev, turned it from a village into a town, giving rise to Bareilly. Bareilly must have been prosperous enough for, in 1577, it was given as a gift by the Mughals to an Iranian nobleman. It would eventually become the last stronghold of the Mughals on the outer-extremities of their north-western frontier. In 1657, Raja Manik Chand, a Khatri noble and appointed by Shah Jahan as Governor of Bareilly, decided he would very much like a new city, so he found another, quaintly using the same name, Bareilly – but to do this, he ordered the forests west of the old town to be chopped down, and the Katheriyas were pushed out.
From here on, Rohilkhand was well known for being one of the most quarrelsome places in India. From 1660, the Mughals continued to rule over the land, but in 1707, on the death of Aurangzeb, the Rohillas, under their chief, Daud Khan, seized control. The Rohillas themselves were technically not native to the land but had migrated from their hilltop homes in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (Pakistan), bordering Afghanistan, during Mughal rule. They had set themselves up in the region (hence, Rohilkhand) and expanded their authority to include the Kumaon Hills. Their main city was not Bareilly, however, but Aonla, just some 20 miles to the south-west of it. The gradual dismantling of the Mughal Empire, however, saw now the rise of the Bareilly Hindus, who, fairly fed up with Rohillas, Muslims and just about everyone else, threw off the “imperial yoke,” refused to pay tribute or indeed fall for bribery and commenced quarrelling amongst each other as to who would rule the district. While they were thus occupied, in 1744, Ali Muhammad Khan, a Rohilla leader, defeated both the governors of Bareilly and Moradabad and declared himself the supreme leader of Rohilkhand. He was not satisfied with the plains and marched right up the Kumaon Hills – but Emperor Muhammad Shah decided this was really a little too much, so two years later, he marched against him, and Ali Muhammad Khan ended up in a prison in Delhi. However, his removal only made things worse in the district, so he was reinstated in 1750, just in time to die a year later. Then, as it goes, there was a problem with succession. Hafiz Rahmat Khan, the guardian of the dead leader’s sons, decided he liked the idea of ruling, so he seized the throne. Muhammad Shah sent the Nawab of Farrukhabad against him, but Hafiz not only defeated and killed the Nawab, but he also marched northwards and took Pilibhit and Terai. Of course, the Nawab of Oudh (and a Vizier of the Delhi court), Safdar Jung, could not keep his fingers out of the pie, and he promptly plundered the property of the deceased Farrukhabad Nawab, leading the Rohillas to unite with those in Farrukhabad. Hafiz wasn’t quite finished – he defeated the Oudh Nawab, besieged Allahabad and then took a sizeable part of Oudh as a trophy.
And we have to remember, the British had nothing to do with this, as yet.
To continue.

Shuja-ud-daula, Nawab of Oudh, painting by Tilly Kettle, 1735-1786

The Nawab, however, had friends, and he now called on them for a helping hand. The Marathas heard his pleas and defeated the Rohillas at Bisauli, near Aonla. Then, for four months, the Rohillas were besieged in the foothills by the Nawab, but his attention was suddenly called away by the invasion of Ahmad Shah Durani, who turned about and made Hafiz the governor of Pilibhit. This did not solve the problem, for Hafiz was not at all a follower of the new (third) Nawab of Oudh and Vizier of Delhi, Shuja-ud-Daula, and he promptly attacked him. Shuja decided it made more sense to pay a subsidy to Hafiz, who now made inroads into the Doab himself and made himself master of Etawah. Meanwhile, Shuja was having problems with the rise of British power and began strengthening his own strongholds and fortifying his towns.

Najib ad-Dawlah, from Itihāsa Saṁgraha (1908) by Dattatraya Balavant Parasanis

In 1770, things took another turn when Najib ad-Dawlah, an Afghan Yousafzai Rohilla (who was once a favourite of the Mughals before he deserted them to join in the plunder of Delhi and fight the Battle of Panipat), joined forces with Holkar and Scindia and the Maratha Army to defeat Hafiz once and for all, forcing the Rohillas to beg the Wazir of Oudh for help. Shuja became a surety for a bond of 40 lakhs to induce the Marathas to leave Rohilkhand – the Rohillas could not pay the bond, and Shuja, after ridding himself of the Marathas, attacked Rohilkhand with the help of an English force lent to him by Warren Hastings. The Rohillas admitted defeat; Hafiz was killed, but his son escaped to the north-west to take up the reins as the leader of the Rohillas. He finally managed to forge a treaty with Oudh through which he gave up most of Rohilkhand. Of course, this uncertain peace would not last, for the Oudh Nawab, heavily in debt to the British, who were not known to do things for free, agreed to accept Rohilkhand in lieu of hard cash in 1801 as payment.
The first President of the Board of Commissioners with his seat at Bareilly was Mr Henry Wellesley, brother of the Governor-General. Until the mutiny, the British would face a slew of disturbances by errant adventurers and recalcitrant Rohillas, but managed to somehow keep their hold over Rohilkhand. The last fight they had was in 1842, and until 1857, the district was relatively peaceful.
In 1857, after the sepoys mutinied and the British were kicked out of Bareilly, it would be Khan Bahadur Khan, a grandson of Hafiz Rahmat, who would declare himself Nawab Nazim of Rohilkhand.
He quickly organised a new government and paraded the streets of Bareilly mounted on a splendid elephant, with bands playing, banners flying and cheering followers. While all the pomp served to solidify the image of a nawab in front of the people, Khan Bahadur Khan was not a fool. He established a working administration and collected revenue in the name of the Emperor of Delhi. Reverting to the older laws of his ancestors, he thought he would bring peace to Rohilkhand. Unfortunately, he was wrong. Disorder and violence continued, and the problem was not the Rohillas but the Bengal sepoys. They had little interest in Khan Bahadur Khan as a leader and were keen to establish their own candidate in his place, one Mobarik Shah, who was supported by General Bakht Khan, who, in turn, was greatly admired by the sepoys as the man who had ousted the British from Bareilly. Khan Bahadur Khan realised early on that if the sepoys remained, he would eventually have to fight the general; instead, he opened up negotiations with Bakht Khan and persuaded him that he really had nothing to lose in Bareilly. If he wanted to fight, then he should go to Delhi and continue his quarrel with the British. Khan agreed, and the Bareilly Brigade marched to their doom while Khan Bahadur Khan took control of Rohilkhand. If that was not enough, he also wanted to retake Kumaon.
There are two very conflicting ideas regarding the government of Khan Bahadur Khan. Malleson asserts most vocally that it was “the sway of disorder” with murder and mayhem the order of the day. He further states Khan’s politics were abysmal at best.

“Nor was the political condition of the province more flourishing. Over the Thakurs, or barons, the authority of Khan Bahadur Khan was for a long time disputed. These Hindus were just as greedy of plunder as had been the sepoys, and they rejoiced for the moment at the sudden acquisition of power to
attack villages and towns. But from some cause or other, they and their followers were very badly armed—their weapons consisting mainly of bludgeons and matchlocks, antique in form, and rusty -from long disuse. Their power, then, was not equal to their will. Badaon, thrice threatened, successfully resisted them. They had no guns. They were, therefore, unable to combat the trained troops of the native viceroy. Whenever these trained levies marched against them and beat them, they, their relatives, and their followers experienced no mercy. Mutilation and murder followed defeat, and confiscation followed mutilation and murder. Sometimes stories of these atrocities induced several Thakurs to combine, but never successfully. Badly armed and untrained, the peasantry whom they led, even when they obtained a transient success, dispersed for plunder. In the end, they were always beaten.”

Kaye, however, is rather more objective. After the sepoys left the district, Khan Bahadur Khan did in fact establish a government – it was imperfect, but it worked. District officers were appointed, each one with their legion of assistants and subordinates to take up the work of collecting revenue and dispensing justice, but like the British, they could not reconcile the different religious factions in Rohilkhand, for everyone, it seems, had a grudge against everyone else. Khan Bahadur Khan decided, in a series of proclamations, to unite the people of Rohilkhand against one common enemy – the infidel Christian British. He promised the Hindus that if they joined in the fight, then the slaughter of cattle would be banned in Rohilkhand forever; however, if they decided this was not enough incitement, then any Hindu caught aiding and abetting the British would face heavy fines and imprisonment. The Muslims of Rohilkhand needed little encouragement to join his banner – they were far from being the dominant population in Rohilkhand, but having a decided boorishness about them and armed to the teeth, had little trouble in pressing the Hindus, who were mostly unarmed peasants, into any variety of agreements without fear of reprisal. In this respect, the old Indian proverb, “The bullock is owned by he who wields the bludgeon,” was very much a fact. Khan Bahadur Khan, however, did consider the British might not be above issuing promises and bestowing favours of their own, and he strongly urged the Hindus to desist from having truck with the British – they were well known to be liars, “deceitful impostors” who never kept their promises. This was not dissimilar to what the British had promised whole swathes of Indians – Mohammedan rule was rotten to the core; they would be far better off under the British. Khan Bahadur Khan reminded them that the British had done away with sati, allowed the remarriage of widows and had deprived many a raja of his estates by not recognising adoption – all the British wanted, ultimately, was to put an end to all religion except their own and butcher everyone in sight. For the benefit of the Mohammedans, Khan Bahadur Khan simply declared a jihad against the British. Yet somehow, the government ticked along, month after month, and while it could hardly be said Rohilkhand was peaceful, at least it was not all-out war.

As such, the British were hoping that the people of Rohilkhand, especially the Hindus, would turn to their favour; if they could play off the various factions against each other, if they could win the support of those leaders who were out of favour with Khan Bahadur Khan, then perhaps taking Bareilly and pacifying Rohilkhand would not be as complicated – this, however, was not Sir Colin Campbell’s problem. He had to march an army through the heat of an Indian summer to fight a war he had not planned for. The pacification of Oudh, in his estimation, would have been easier, and Rohilkhand could have waited until the winter. Lord Canning would, however, have his way, and Sir Colin was forced to redraw his plans and make himself ready to take Bareilly. Politics was not his strength, but he knew a thing or two about war.

The Army of Oudh is broken up

Sir Colin Campbell could not take the entire Army of Oudh with him to Bareilly as there were still other places of interest that required attention – as he could not personally attend to everything, all at once, he entrusted the clearing of Bihar to Brigadier Lugard; he ordered Lucknow to be put into order and stay on the defensive with Major-General Sir James Hope Grant in military charge, to not only garrison Lucknow but organise moveable columns for district operations. Sir Colin Campbell planned the advance on Rohilkhand in the following stages.

Brigadier Sir Robert Walpole

Brigadier Robert Walpole was to advance from Lucknow and “sweep the left bank of the Ganges up to the frontier of Rohilkhand.”
Major General N. Penny was to move his force from Meerut and form a juncture with Walpole.
The newly formed Roorkee Brigade under Brigadier J. Jones was to march from Roorkee into Rohilkhand.
At the same time, a siege train was to march from Cawnpore to Fatehgarh and take up a position at Aliganj.
All the troops that could be spared from not only Cawnpore but Lucknow were ordered to join Walpole near Aliganj and then march under his command into Rohilkhand from the south with Penny’s force and the siege train, while Jones would attack from the north.

There would also be changes in the Lucknow administration. Sir James Outram, understandably, no longer felt he could continue effectively in a civilian position as Chief Commissioner and requested to return to Calcutta. On April 3, 1858, Robert Montgomery arrived to take his place. Outram left the next day.
Having staid the crisis in the Punjab, Montgomery was more than equal to what lay ahead of him in Oudh. However, William Russell, that astute correspondent, was all in his favour.

“He is a man of particular smoothness of manner and appearance — a large vigorous head, a clear, good eye, and great firmness of mouth and lip. He is understood to have obtained permission from Lord Canning to modify the menaces of the Proclamation and to offer considerable concessions to the rebels in Oude. Indeed, it is felt by all who know anything of the country and of the circumstances of the case, that the zamindars of Oude require more consideration than the chiefs in other parts of India who have revolted against us. Mr Montgomery has a grand task before him, but he is believed to be suited to the work, and the glory of accomplishing it will be great as the labour.” (Russell)

Sir Robert Montgomery

Montgomery was no stranger to India nor to Indian politics, or the machinations of the company he served. Born in 1809 into an Ulster-Scots family, his early ambitions appear to have been military as he completed his education at Addiscombe Military Seminary in 1825; however, when he sailed for India in 1828, Montgomery was already destined for the Bengal Civil Service, working his way up from writer to magistrate collector at desultory posts all around the North-Western Provinces, including Azamgarh, Cawnpore and Mirzapore, until finally ending up in Allahabad, where he remained for two years. In 1839, he transferred to the Punjab. Here he remained – in 1851, Montgomery succeeded Mr C.G. Mansel as Member of the Punjab Board of Administration; in 1851, he was nominated Judicial Commissioner, the role he still maintained in 1857. It was due to Montgomery’s quick thinking and Lawrence’s definite action that prevented an all-out uprising in the Punjab; Montgomery was instrumental in not only the disarming of several of the Bengal regiments but for the warnings he sent to Kangra, Multan and Ferozepore, actions which secured him a knighthood.

On 8 April, Sir Colin Campbell made a flying visit to meet with Lord Canning, who had judiciously disentangled himself from his Calcutta advisors and set himself up in Allahabad, where he was closer to the scene of war and could view the situation with more clarity. For Campbell, it was a last-ditch effort to persuade Canning that Rohilkhand could wait. His efforts failed, and a general order issued just at Lucknow on 10 April directed the forces who would remain with his brigade to march to Cawnpore without delay. The same day, Hope Grant left Lucknow with his column, which was bound for Bitowli, one of his first expeditions into Oudh and mixed success. Robert Walpole, too, had set off from Lucknow towards his subsequent misfortune. Of Brigadier Lugard, we shall see later. Victory now would be mixed with disasters, and the Rohilkhand Campaign opened for Sir Colin Campbell, under very mixed stars.

Sources:
Campbell, Sir George – Memoirs of my Indian Career, Vol. I, edited by Sir Charles E. Bernard (London:Macmillan & Co., 1893)
Forrest, G. W. – A History of the Indian Mutiny, Vol. III (Edinburgh & London: William Blackwood & Co., 1912)
Hunter, W. W. – The Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol I, Abar to Benares (London: Trübner & Co., 1881)
Jocelyn, Col. Julian R. J. – The History of the Royal and Indian Artillery in the Mutiny of 1857 (London: John Murray, 1915)
Kaye, John William – A History of the Sepoy War in India, Vol. III (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1896)
Malleson, Col. G. B. – History of the Indian Mutiny, Vol. I (London: William H. Allen & Co., 1878)
Malleson, Col. G.B. – History of the Indian Mutiny, Vol. II (London: William H. Allen & Co., 1879)
Russell, William Howard – My Diary in India, Vol. I (London: Routledge, Warne & Routledge, 1860)
Links:
https://www.peepultree.world/livehistoryindia/story/places/bareilly-taming-a-provincial-capital

Although Lucknow was declared taken in March 1858, the mutiny was hardly over. Many rebels had escaped the battered city and made their way into the surrounding provinces, lighting new fires as they went and enflaming old ones with renewed vigour. It was not helped by Lord Canning’s ill-timed proclamation. Oudh had already undergone a massive land settlement following annexation in 1856, and was one of the key reasons for revolt in the province. What Canning did now fermented a long- standing distrust of the British and prolonged an already lengthy war.

The Land Settlements – What Happened Before 1857

The British had an idea that moving away from the Talukdari system that existed, not only in Oudh but through most of India, would impart a semblance of fair governance. The problem was that they did not take into consideration the very nature of the system in existence, nor could they resist using it to fuel their own greed. Although there were many points to consider, the main ones were as follows:

Direct Settlement with Villagers: The British aimed to establish direct revenue agreements with village communities and individual cultivators, bypassing any and all traditional intermediaries.Removal of Talukdars: The policy simply assumed that Talukdars were “interlopers” who had established their claims through force and fraud. As a result, Talukdari holdings plummeted from 67% of villages under the Nawabs to just 38% under this settlement.Assumption of “Illegitimate” Ownership: British officials believed Talukdars were not the rightful owners but recent impositions on the land. By removing them, the British hoped to restore what they viewed as the “original” village proprietors. For this, they opened a whole other kettle of fish as they set themselves the task of conducting “summary” land surveys in an attempt to establish who was the original owner of the land. This led to claims, counter-claims, counter-counter claims, illogical boundaries and tied up the system in petitions and endless wrangling. Increased Revenue Demands: The stated goal was to protect peasants from exploitation, but the settlement often increased the actual revenue burden, and it also threw many of the talukdars and their dependents into a state of poverty. While they may not have had great monetary assets to begin with, and their wealth was purely of a hereditary nature, losing their estates resulted in not only a loss of face and prestige but a significant loss of income. In some of the “settled” districts, the revenue demand rose from 30% to as much as 70% of gross assets, leaving, in reality, only one winner – the EICo.

This, of course, led to another brainchild of the EICo – Revenue Settlement. The British attempted to dismantle the Talukdari system in favour of direct settlement with village communities. Under the old system, Nawabs and Talukdars managed their vast estates, maintained law and order and held significant judicial powers within their territories. In 1856, the EICo effectively stripped them of all these roles, in favour of dispossession, decentralisation and a complete loss of judicial authority; private armies were disbanded and local courts disallowed. These measures left the villagers, whom the British thought they were protecting, in effect, defenceless and bewildered by the mountains of red tape the British unleashed on them, unable to comprehend a system that was not only foreign, but downright alien. They were also to pay their taxes directly to the British without the talukdars receiving their cut, something that was utterly unheard of and viewed with obvious horror. The British, we must remember, were not doing this from the goodness of their hearts, but to increase the size of their own pockets. Revenue estimates were often based on over-inflated figures, leaving the peasants worse off than before. Whereas a village, in the past, for example, suffering from drought, could apply to their talukdar for relief and consideration, the British left little room in their new management for just such emergencies. Small proprietors, now directly responsible for heavy revenue demands without the traditional “protection” or credit lines of the Talukdars, faced unjustifiable hardship. As for the talukdars themselves, having lost their power, their armies and in many cases their forts, which were razed to the ground, they had to undergo an equally humiliating assessment – estates that were in debt faced severe consequences, ultimately leading to their confiscation and the very loss of the talukdar’s land rights and authority.

It is no wonder, then, in 1857, Oudh was the scene of a popular revolt – the entire population had a grudge against the British.

However, even the greediest of companies will eventually realise that some compromise must be reached, as in the case of the EICo, if they are going to keep their very heads on their shoulders. As such, in 1857, a cry went up to pacify the talukdars, nawabs, zamindars and just about everyone else of influence, by any means possible. It was thought to be good policy to pacify ruffled feathers by issuing promises, and most of these were directed at Oudh.
During the Siege of Lucknow, Sir James Outram had tried to motivate the landowners, talukdars and petty Rajas of Oudh to side with the British, and as late as September 1857, it would appear Canning agreed with him. He authorised Outram to
“…promise to any Landed Proprietor who deserves well of the Government and who has suffered by the summary settlement, that his case shall be heard anew and that he shall certainly not be worse off than he was before our rule.” As such, a proclamation was issued to this effect, and some landowners were even singled out for special treatment. Man Singh, who had proved himself a reluctant rebel but an even more distant friend, was sent several letters, each asking him to continue showing “effective proof” of his fidelity to the Government to secure the restoration of his estates. Other talukdars received similar letters. However, Canning refused to offer a “general reversal of the settlement” as it would undermine the British position in cases where the settlements had indeed been just. By the end of 1857, however, things were not looking any better. The people of Oudh continued to exhibit universal hostility, and James Outram, now Chief Commissioner of the province, was more than eager to win over the talukdars to their previous state of merely disgruntled instead of downright murderous. In January 1858, he suggested to Canning that the talukdars be promised their original land holdings in full, whether they had been a part of the rebellion or not, provided they now cooperated with the British.
“I see no prospect of restoring tranquillity, except by having recourse for the next few years to the old Talukdari system.” He further maintained that the village proprietors simply did not carry enough weight or, for that matter, influence to be of much use in the current crisis. Unfortunately, while Sir James Outram was right, Lord Canning decided to follow a different path altogether. His proclamation was designed with very little thought, and its repercussions would further the waves of dissent.

Lord Canning, 1860Proclamation by the Right Hon’ble the Governor-General of India

To all the Chiefs, Landholders, and People of the Province of Oudh.

In the month of January last the army of the British Government, under the command of Sir Colin Campbell, rescued the city of Lucknow, and the garrison which had so long defended it, from the tyranny of the rebels. It then became the duty of the Governor-General to consider in what manner the Province of Oudh should henceforth be governed.

The Governor-General now announces to the Chiefs, the Landholders, and the People of Oudh, the principles by which the Government of Her Majesty the Queen of England will be guided in the disposal of their country.

1. The Proprietary Right in the Soil of the Province.
The right of proprietary in the soil of the Province of Oudh is confiscated to the British Government, which will dispose of that right in such manner as to it may seem fitting.

2. Exceptions to the General Rule of Confiscation.
To those among the Chiefs, Taluqdars, and Landholders of Oudh, who at once, or within twenty-one days after the issue of this Proclamation, shall plainly show their loyalty by coming in, and making their submission to the Chief Commissioner of Oudh, at his headquarters in Lucknow, the Governor-General promises that their lives shall be spared, provided that they are not already marked out by special crimes for exemplary punishment.
But with regard to the property in land of such persons, the Governor-General reserves to himself entire freedom of action. In many cases, it will be restored in whole or in part, but in some cases it may be wholly confiscated. The Governor-General will decide according to the conduct of each individual, and the position which he has held in the rebel army, or in the rebel Government.

3. To the Mass of the People.
To all others, besides the Chiefs, Taluqdars, and Landholders, in Oudh, who shall make immediate submission to the Chief Commissioner, the Governor-General promises protection of life, and a free pardon for rebellion, provided that their hands are not stained with English blood, murderously shed.

4. Treatment of the Rebel Army.
The Governor-General further notifies to the people of Oudh, that whenever the rebel army, which still keeps together under its worthless leaders, shall have dispersed, and shall have delivered up its guns, the Governor-General will be ready to consider the cases of those who have been compelled by that army to join its ranks, and will extend to them a free pardon for the rebellion, upon their submission.

5. A Warning.
But the Governor-General directs all to understand, that the British Army is now entering Oudh, not only to drive out the rebels, but also to destroy them. Therefore, all who are in arms against the Government, and who do not at once submit, must expect the utmost severity of war. Their blood will be upon their own heads.

6. A Final Chance.
Nevertheless, the Governor-General is willing to hold out one last offer of mercy even to those who have so long resisted the British power. If, within fifteen days from the date of this Proclamation, they shall lay down their arms, and shall deliver up the rebel leaders against whom special orders will be given, they shall, on making their submission as above, receive the promise of the Governor-General that their lives shall be spared, provided that they are not already marked out for special punishment.

Given under the hand and seal of the Governor-General, at Allahabad, this fifteenth day of March, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty-eight.

CANNING.

It is no wonder that when the Proclamation was issued in March 1858, just after the fall of Lucknow, it caused more than a stir in India and, above all, in Parliament back in England. The only man who seemed to be convinced of the just nature of it was Lord Canning. McLeod Innes, in his book, “The Sepoy Revolt – a Critical Narrative,” had this to say:

“By it all the chiefs, except some half dozen men of no importance, were declared to have been guilty of rebellion and of waging war against the Queen, and to have consequently forfeited all their proprietary rights. The chiefs at once realized that their position was desperate, and they rose en masse in active rebellion, which they certainly had not done before.
It was a singular act on Lord Canning’s part, because he seemed to stand almost alone as its author, and alone in his insistence on it. He was strenuously opposed by Outram, who prophesied of it precisely what happened. It was condemned by every authority and every class in India. It raised a storm of surprise and indignation in England and caused the severest crisis in the fate of the English Ministry. Its policy was defended with his utmost ability by Lord Canning; but, however just and sound theoretically, results showed that it was practically a blunder, and led to the very widespread increase which has been mentioned in the hostility of the country.”

Above all, it left the talukdars with nothing to lose, except their lives, forcing them further into desperate, last-ditch resistance. If Canning had believed his proclamation would stamp out the fire, he had actually just added another dose of fuel.

One man, among many, would argue the case for the talukdars, and that man was Sir James Outram. He protested vigorously against the proclamation, declaring it overly harsh and uncalled for; convinced that the summary confiscation of land would render his task of bringing wavering talukdars over to the British side by strategic incitements of favours, practically hopeless. Talukdars who had been unfairly treated in the first round of settlements in 1856 would hardly be inclined to take up any cause now but their own. He quickly drew up a list of men he believed should be exempt altogether from the proclamation –

Drigbijaye Singh, Raja of Bulrampore.Kushal Singh, Talookdar of Padnaha.Hurdeo Buksh, of Katriya.Kashi Pershad, Talukdar of Sissendi.Zubr Singh, Raja of Gopal Kheir.Chundi Lal, Talookdar of Purwa.Raja Drigbijaye Singh

Drigbijaye Singh accepted the terms, surrendered, and actively assisted British forces. As a reward, he was not only restored but later granted more territory than he originally held. The Maharaja of Balrampur became a pillar of loyalty in post-1858 Oudh.
Kushal Singh (Padnaha) & Hurdeo Baksh (Katriya): They also surrendered under these terms and were eventually restored to a significant portion of their estates after demonstrating loyalty.
Kashi Pershad (Sissendi), Zubr Singh (Gopal Kheir), & Chundi Lal (Purwa): Their cases were more complicated. They entered into negotiations or made initial submissions, but distrust ran deep. They were hesitant, fearing British betrayal or the loss of their status. Their surrender was less decisive, and their eventual restoration was slower and less complete. In some cases, parts of their lands were given to others as rewards.

Outram’s list included many others, but only a few names are of particular importance:

Raja Hanwant Singh of Kalakankar

Raja Hanwant Singh of Kalakankar: A very important and powerful Talukdar. Outram actively negotiated with him, and the Raja eventually surrendered. He became a classic example of the “settlement” policy, being restored to a substantial portion of his estate and becoming a loyal supporter.

Raja Lal Madho Singh of Majhora: Another major landholder who was seen as potentially detachable from the rebel cause. He was offered terms to surrender.

The Raja of Churda (or perhaps Charda): This chief’s territory was strategically located, and Outram was hoping to avoid any fights with him.

Beni Madho Singh (or Bani Madho), Rana of Shankarpur: A formidable rebel military leader, Outram and Canning specifically hoped to separate him from the Begum Hazrat Mahal. Extraordinary terms were hinted at—possibly even the restoration of all his lands—if he would abandon the rebel court in Lucknow. He ultimately refused, choosing to fight on.

Various Chiefs of the Baiswara Region: The fertile Baiswara region south of the Gomti River was a rebel stronghold. Outram’s list included several Baiswara chieftains whose submission would open up this area.

Canning slightly changes his mind

Then, on 29 March, barely two weeks after Canning had issued his proclamation, he added another paragraph. While it was titled the Explanatory Paragraph, in India it was widely known as the Mercy Paragraph, although for whom the mercy was intended was left very much open to debate, as it seemed Canning would soon be needing some. The initial backlash to the original proclamation was fierce from not only British officials in India but also from the press.

Explanatory Paragraph

“With regard to the landed tenures of Oudh, the Governor-General wishes it to be understood that the measure of confiscation announced in the Proclamation of the 15th instant is not intended to apply to the talukdars and landholders of the Province as a class, but only to those who are proved to have been in rebellion, and who are found at the time of the British re-occupation of their estates to have been still persistently resisting the authority of the Government.”

Canning now attempted to back out of his plans for universal confiscation, by stating it was only meant for those who were still actively participating in rebellion at the time of the fall of Lucknow; he was also trying a weak tea version of political damage control which in the end, made the original proclamation more ambiguous, as it did not address the following questions: Who was “proved to have been in rebellion”? What constituted “persistently resisting” at the exact moment of re-occupation? This vagueness left immense discretionary power in the hands of local British officers who would be examining rebellious talukdars if they came forward, and there was no accounting for their bias, which could very well be based on their own experiences in the mutiny.
While it was a step in some direction, the critics of the proclamation were hardly satisfied. It was simply too little, too late. For many of the talukdars, the shock and insult of the original proclamation could not be smoothed over by a vague paragraph, still leaving them with the horror of their impending ruin. They also saw the contradictory nature of it as a sign of a weak and confused British government. The talukdars had no reason to believe it was not merely intended as a ruse to get them to lay down their arms, after which they would still face arbitrary dispossession.
When the proclamation reached England, as indeed it did, the political firestorm it created would amount to months of debates; finally, on 1 November 1858, the Queen’s Proclamation, issued just after the British had assumed direct control over India from the defunct EICo, not only superseded but also reversed Canning’s proclamation.

The Queen’s proclamation famously promised a general amnesty to all (except those directly involved in the murder of British subjects). “We hereby announce to the Native Princes of India that all Treaties… will be scrupulously maintained…” “We desire no extension of our present Territorial Possessions.” A policy of non-interference in religious matters. Equal protection of the law and eligibility for public office for all subjects, irrespective of race or creed.

In line with this new conciliatory policy, most Talukdars in Oudh had their lands restored by 1859-60, turning them into a loyal aristocratic prop for British rule.

However, as we shall see, it was a long way until November.

Sources:
Kaye’s and Malleson’s History of the Indian Mutiny of 1857-58, edited by Colonel Malleson, Vol IV & Vol V (London: W. H. Allen & Co., 1889 & London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1907)
Metcalfe, Thomas R. – The Aftermath of Revolt (Princeton University Press, 1964)
McLeod, Lieutenant General Innes – The Sepoy Revolt, a Critical Narrative ( London: A. D. Innes, 1897)
Raj, J. (1957). British Land Policy in Oudh 1856-68. [PhD thesis, SOAS University of London]. https://doi.org/10.25501/SOAS.00033584
A compendium of the law specially relating to the Taluqdars of Oudh: being the Oudh Estates Act (I) of 1869, an act to amend the Oudh Estate Act, 1869, (Act X of 1885), the Oudh Sub-Settlement Act (XXVI) of 1866, the Oudh Taluqdars’ Relief Act (XXIV) of 1870, and parts of the Oudh Rent Act (XIX) of 1868, and the Oudh Land Revenue Act (XVII) of 1876 / with a full introduction, notes and appendices by John Gaskell Walker Sykes.
https://indianculture.gov.in/digital-district-repository/district-repository/taluqdars-oudh-participates-revolt-1857