Analytic Philosophy Quotes

“I don't have any friends in English Departments.”
― Jerry A. Fodor, Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong

“وفوق ذلك، وجدت أنه لولا دراستي للطب لما كان لي أن أستطيع التعاطي مع الفلسفة الحديثة خصوصا الأنجلوسكسونية، فلولا معرفتي بالبيولوجيا وعلوم الأعصاب والفسيولوجيا لما كان لي أن أتعامل نقديا مع فلسفة العقل، وأن أفهم كثيرا من قضايا فلسفة العلوم .. وصرت مقتنعا أن تعلق العرب بالفلسفة القارية، الألمانية والفرنسية تحديدا، يعود في جزء كبير منه إلى ضعف الخلفية العلمية لمهتمين بالفلسفة أو لانعدامها، ولذا فهم لا يقتربون من الفلسفة الأنجلوسكسونية التي استفادت كثيرا من العلم الحديث ولا يكاد يمكن التعاطي معها لمن لا يمتلك معرفة علمية جيدة ..”
― همام يحيى

“For Frege, an account of what it is for a purely logical power to be in act suffices to allow us to achieve a proper philosophical appreciation of what “content,” “object,” “thought,” “judgment,” and “truth,” as such, are. These notions come to be fully in place through an elucidation of that power, considered apart from our capacity to arrive at kinds of knowledge that are not purely logical in content. Our capacity for empirical judgment, when it comes into view, will come into view as a comparatively complex joint exercise of a variety of faculties, in which the logically fundamental notions that figure in its explication (“content,” “object,” thought,” “judgment,” “truth”) are still supposed to retain the specific sense originally conferred upon them in our explication of the purely logical case, while allowing for their extension to logically impure cases of thought and proposition.
A certain picture of the role of reflection on the purely logical case, inthe order of explication of kinds of knowledge, is at work here—a picture that has been enormously influential on the subsequent development of analytic philosophy. On this picture, only if we are armed with a prior account of the case of purely logical thought, supplementing it as we go along, can we come to understand what empirically contentful theoretical thought (or practical thought) is. On this picture, the spatiotemporal bearing and the self-consciousness of the thinking subject do not belong to the form of thought (and hence their treatment does not belong, as Kant held, to a suitably capacious conception of philosophical logic); rather, all such further details among various species of thought are to be subsequently specified, if at all, through the introduction of further indices figuring within the content of thought. (Thoughts are simply conceived of as occurring at a time or at a person.) These consequences of the Fregean picture are not, on the whole, something for which post-Fregean analytic philosophers argue. Rather, it involves an entire philosophical picture that is simply tacitly, and largely unwittingly, assumed—a picture that is already under attack, albeit in very different ways, in both Kant and early Wittgenstein. According to this post-Fregean picture, we can furnish an account of the wider reaches of our capacity for finite theoretical cognition only by assuming the prior intelligibility of some self- standing account of how one of the ingredient capacities in empirical cognition—the capacity for logical thought—off its own bat is able to yield a delimitable sphere of truth-evaluable, object-related thoughts with judgable content, without its yet having entered into any form of co- operation with our other cognitive capacities.”
― James Conant, The Logical Alien: Conant and His Critics

“Although knowledge and action are central to mind, mind is not central to world.”
― Timothy Williamson, WILLIAMSON:KNOWLEDGE & ITS LIMITS PAPER

“Many truths are never known by anyone.”
― Timothy Williamson, WILLIAMSON:KNOWLEDGE & ITS LIMITS PAPER