Michal

“Ever since Roberta Wohlstetter’s pathbreaking study of why the United States was taken by surprise at Pearl Harbor 50 years ago, both academics and members of the Intelligence Community (IC) have made significant progress in understanding intelligence failures. About how to correct these errors and do better we know much less, however, and it is to this subject that this volume makes a major contribution. --Foreword to Cases in Intelligence Analysis: Structured Analytic Techniques in Action”
― Robert Jervis

“If you have to plan for a future beyond the forecasting horizon, plan for surprise. That means, as Danzig advises, planning for adaptability and resilience.”
― Philip Tetlock, Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction

“When the facts change, I change my mind - what do you do, sir?”
― John Maynard Keynes

“The common saying is “I’ll believe it when I see it,” but human perception is more accurately characterized as “I’ll see it when I believe it.” In international politics where expectations of hostility are common, the results are often unfortunate.”
― Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics