Status Updates From Meditation on Emptiness

‘If one thinks that it is merely polemic to put down an opponent, a great source of subtle distinctions will be lost. After holding one’s nose for awhile, the points - devoid of the polemic - become fascinating.’

‘It would be a mistake to assume that Gelukpas are somehow satisfied with a mere verbal layout of intricate philosophy. There is a basic recognition that we are controlled by our ideas, and thus reformation of ideas in a harrowing process of analytical meditation - involving one’s feelings in the most intimate sense - is of central importance.’

...self-contradictions that are entailed without it, one is considered to be beyond the pale of sensible discourse; as Tsongkhapa says, "We do not debate with the insane."
😆

'The four alternatives [as previously outlined], therefore, are all - inclusive only in the sense of including all possibilities of inherently existent phenomena-when these are refuted, it can be decided that phenomena do not inherently exist. They do not include all possibilities whatsoever. If one does not agree that such qualification is needed upon being shown the self-contradictions...

‘Ridiculing the instruction manuals on the view of emptiness, even one of our own logicians propounds that there is no innate conception of the self and aggregates as different. These assertions are the bad talk of those with partial vision much like the way a one-eyed yak eats grass.’

From Jamyang Shêpa Ngawang Tsöndrü's text

'Therefore, asserting that the ultimate
Is able to set itself up is like wanting
To eat up space; no one takes 'validly established'
And 'able to set itself up' as synonyms.'

...This view contrasts sharply with the Gelukpa interpretation. That Prasangikas have no system is refuted by Tsongkhapa in his Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path.’

‘Many, both in the East and in the West, have interpreted Prasangika-Madhyamika to be a systemless system that, based on the realization that words are incapable of generating an experience of objects like that of direct perception, uses reasoning merely to refute other views while propounding a meditation that is solely a withdrawal from conceptuality. This view contrasts sharply with the Gelukpa interpretation....

‘The Gelugpa view is indeed subtle. It attempts to describe what nominal existence is: the non-identification of the imputed object as its basis of imputation and yet the coordination of these two as determined by whether the object so designated can perform its functions.’

‘Gendun chöpel often refers to scholars who pressed him with their debates, and it appears that his objections are not to a philosophical incorrectness in Tsongkhapa’s teaching but to a pedagogical fault...Gendun chöpel essentially is accusing the Gelugpas of being too subtle for their own good.’

‘...it is necessary [according to the Gelugpas in particular] first to realize the existence of phenomena before meditating on their emptiness...The cognition of emptiness is not the eradication of phenomena but a thorough understanding of their mode of existence.’

‘Chandrakirti’s reliance on the world’s renown or what is established in the world is not a turning away from philosophy, study, or analysis but a refined view of an analytical philosophy.’

... It is Bhavaviveka and not Buddhapalita who has the questionable autonomous syllogism with a vague predicate of the thesis...and a vague reason.’

‘Chandrakirti is saying that Bhavaviveka misread Buddhapalita’s text, for aside from positing a general thesis that things are not produced from self...Buddhapalita did not express a syllogism...The fallacies which Bhavaviveka imputed to Buddhapalita are flung back at him by Chandrakirti. It is Bhavaviveka and not Buddhapalita who...

‘The most difficult point in the Prasangika system is this: the utter unfindability of phenomena in their bases of designation and yet their ability to perform functions.’

‘When Shantideva says that “the ultimate is not an object of the mind”, he means that it is not an object of direct perception by a dualistic mind.’

‘The conventional existence of objects is certified by valid cognizers and never eradicated by ultimate analysis, which refutes only the inherent existence of objects, both conventionally and ultimately.’

‘Beings are called to identify a mistaken aspect in all ordinary perceptions, the appearance of objects as if they exist right there in their bases of imputation; such objects are called ‘imaginaries’ in order to show their unfounded character and the necessity of ridding oneself of the misperceptions and misconceptions of inherent existence.’

That sounds just like what my therapist says!...well, sort of... ;)