Status Updates From The Eagle and the Lion: The...

"Seldom at any U.S. diplomatic post have so many known so few so well." This concise sentence by Ambassador MacArthur II's aide summarized well the state of contacts with Iranians.

Bill extrapolates this to a splendid cultural isolation of the American community in the 70s.

By focusing on the superpower threat, Khomeini called attention away from many of Iran's domestic problems and towards "East and West".

Thus up to the present, even if it's now the Eagle and the (Israeli) Lion.

It's important to note that during this period of relative technocratic liberalization, there was little violence in the streets. The guerilla leaders were watching, along with the nation, to see how serious the reforms would be. Their verdict was negative. The liberalization was partial, the reforms superficial. The political system was to remain fundamentally the same.

The last two US ambassadors were men of military background with intelligence experience and strong proshah proclivities.

Middle class Iranians nodded knowingly; to them, it was a blatant admission that the CIA had been covertly in control since the fall of Mossadeq and now intended to call the plays formally.
"Could your country not have the decency to stay out of sight while you help the Shah pull the strings? "

Kissinger, Nixon and Ford encouraged "the seemier side of US capitalism" in seeking to wed their national interest to the Shah's. They never stopped to ponder his actual strength. They ignored the domestic forces brewing within Iran and failed to question the result of their policies on Iranian society itself.

Neither the U.S nor Iran were anxious to see a Kurdish victory, which would encourage autonomy movements elsewhere. The Shah was of course especially concerned about his own Kurdish minority. The goal was to keep Soviet supported Iraq occupied on the defensive with CIA funding; Barzani & his troops were expendable.
A House Committee later said "even in the context of covert action, ours was a cynical enterprise.

The Iranian press was free to criticise Vietnam & Western oil companies because it helped the Shah's independent imago while he made overtures to the USSR & maximised oil production to buy US arms. Uncritical businessmen

The White Revolution was greeted sceptically by all major opposition forces. The old aristocracy opposed the land reform. The clerics & lower middle classes resented the attack on their power bases. The middle class professionals critized the reforms for failing to deal with the central issue of political participation.

Bill doesn't specify the stands on literacy or the vote for women.

Bill identifies a revolving triumvirate of courtiers who shaped political policy in Iran from the 50s to the 70s as royal troubleshootes , moving in and out of university chancellorships, (prime) ministerships, National Iranian Oil Company chairman or the finances of the Pahlavi Foundation:
- Asadollah Alam, doctor.
- Manucher Eqbal, engineer.
- Jafar Sharif, landowner aristocrat [do not picture that snake staff]