Status Updates From The Two Truths Debate: Tson...

As I read, Gorampa's position becomes less and less convincing. If we take all of the metaphysical implications of his philosophy into consideration, it's quite clear that he falls into the trap of nihilism, which Madhyamaka theory explicitly prohibits in the search for emptiness

This book is so well-written and enlightening. In my opinion, of the two thinkers, Gorampa is much less convincing than Tsongkhapa. Some of his phenomenological claims have no precedent in Buddhist canon, whereas Tsongkhapa's views are always backed up by scripture, whether they're from Nagarjuna or from somewhere in the Pali canon

Samsara and nirvana are both states of consciousness, as Tsongkhapa would agree, and for Gorampa all states of consciousness have their root in the alaya. Gorampas’ point is that the samsara-nirvana dichotomy is a duality, and from that perspective both are transcended in ultimate truth— clinging to the dif­ference is an obstacle to the nondual realization.

Gorampas account of enlightened wisdom— metaphysically absolute, non­ dual, and transcendent—arises from his efforts to graft the ālāyavijñāna, the foundation consciousness of Yogacara idealism, onto the Prasangika Madhyamaka system.

...success on the path, and that is why Tsongkhapa creates no hierarchy between them. One cannot eliminate negativity with­ out a proper appreciation for empirical cause and effect, and one cannot eliminate the root delusion about an essential self without penetrating the ultimate truth.

Tsongkhapas main purpose in attaining nondual knowledge is not to eschew the subject-object dichotomy. The purpose, as he sees it, is rather to purify deluded cognitive states and destroy ego-tainted emotions in the service of bodhicitta—the goal of attaining full enlightenment in order to free all beings from suffering and its causes. Both the dual and nondual per­spectives are required for...

Nondual transcendent wisdom is itself an empiri­cal phenomenon, and it is not therefore an empirically transcendent truth, as Gorampa would have it.

From his critics’ point of view, Tsongkhapa stands accused of advocating the doctrine of Madhyamaka nihilism. Gorampa, in the (Eliminating the Erroneous View), accuses Tsongkhapa of being “seized by demons” and in the (Distinguishing Views) decries him as a “nihilistic Madhyamika” who is spreading “demonic words”.

Tsongkhapa, on the other hand, does not equate emptiness with nothingness— yet he insists that it is possible, nev­ertheless, to achieve nondual awareness.

Mipham Rinpoche brands Gorampas view as nothing short of quietism—a view, also attributed to the Chinese Hva Shang, that takes cognitive disengagement to be a matter of ceasing all cog­nitive activities. To take the validity of meditative equipoise as consisting in seeing nothingness is equivalent, in Mipham Rinpoche’s view, to endors­ ing Hva Shang’s insistence on stilling thoughts and becoming almost zom­bie-like.

Modern scholars working on Madhyamaka philosophy tend to set aside anything related to meditative experiences. In my view, such an approach does a serious injustice to the epistemological systems of the Madhyamikas in general, and Tsongkhapa and Gorampa in particular.

Tsongkhapa argues for eradicating both the underlying reifying tenden­cies—the defilements—and the conceptually reified essence. Gorampa argues for eradicating not only the underlying reifying tendencies, but also the entire matrix of the conventional world. This disagreement about the scope of the objects of negation, as we will see, informs their disagreements on epistemology and soteriology.

...thus seen as a leap or as a spontaneous unfolding rather than as a gradual progression.

An aryas wisdom in meditative equipoise arises without any traceable prior causal event, such as a deluded cognitive state of an ordi­nary being. Direct nonconceptual realization of ultimate truth arises from nowhere.

For Gorampa...realization [of ultimate truth] must have no prior causal link with the conceptual experience of the ordinary being. Since conceptual knowledge contributes nothing to the eventual realization of the nonconceptual ultimate reality, nothing whatsoever is required to bridge the gap between the conventional knowl­ edge of an ordinary being and the ultimate knowledge of an arya. The tran­sition is...

...Hence, for Tsongkhapa, the conceptual understanding of ultimate truth is absolutely required for the possibility of such enlightenment.

...since ultimate truth is not entirely ineffable, and not entirely incomprehensible, explanations can lead to a conceptual view of ultimate reality.

...an inferential understanding of ultimate truth is not only possible, but is, in fact, essential as a step on the path to the direct realization of ultimate truth.

Hence, for Tsongkhapa, the conceptual understanding of ultimate truth is absolutely required for...

As we have already noted, for Tsongkhapa, if inferential knowledge of ultimate truth is based on valid empirical premises rather than mere fictions or imag­inations, then inferential knowledge of ultimate truth provides the scaffold­ing that enables direct nonconceptual access to ultimate truth.

Thus Nagarjuna writes: “Without relying upon empirical (truth), the meaning of the ultimate cannot be disclosed. Without realizing the meaning of the ultimate, nirvana is not attained,” and he adds: “Samsara and nirvana do not exist as two [individuals]. The exhaustive knowledge of samsara is itself defined as nirvana.”

...and therefore, as empty. Gorampa on the other hand moblizes the principle of dependent arising and emptiness to argue that ultimate truth is not dependently arisen and therefore not empty.

Although Tsongkhapa and Gorampa both apply the principle o f depend­ent arising, and therefore of emptiness, to the most crucial issues— the com­patibility between emptiness and dependent arising— the differences between their two positions are irreconcilable. Tsongkhapa mobilizes the principle of dependent arising, and so of emptiness, to establish the ulti­mate truth of all phenomena as dependently arisen, and...

...Gorampas commitment to the absolute characterization of ultimate truth is nowhere expressed so overtly as here, where he uses Nagarjunas definition of essence as a means to define ultimate truth.

...the real nature of phenomena is disclosed as the apprehended domain of the uncontaminated wisdom. Its nature has three defining character-istics: namely, it is not created by causes and conditions; it exists independently of conventions and of other phenomena; and it does not change. The reality of the transcendence of conceptual elaboration is its example.

Gorampas commitment to the absolute is...

In his commentary on the Mulamadhyamakakarika, in the chap­ter on the Analysis of Essence, Gorampa contentiously identifies ulti­mate truth with the defining characteristics of essence:

[Question]: But what is the nature of the reality of phenomena? [Reply]: It is not possible to reveal its exact nature. However, to facilitate its understanding by the disciples, the real nature of phenomena is disclosed as the...