Status Updates From The Politics of Authoritari...

What even is this cover and what do I even study anymore. I have no idea.

In 1971, Saddam Hussain boasted in reference to the three-year process of establishing the Baath party's control over all major organised sectors of the Iraqi state and society:
"With our party methods, there is no chance for anyone who disagrees with us to jump on a couple of tanks and overthrow the government."

The logic of political party-based authoritarian regimes lies in the sunk-cost fallacy of a hierarchal system wherein those at the bottom work more for less whilst those at the top enjoy more benefits, individuals recruited & subsumed into the party are reluctant to turn on the regime after investing years hoping to climb the ladder or enjoying unfair privileges if already at the top; they need the regime to survive.

On the rise of Idi Amin:
"The government needed the army for its survival & security more than the army needed the government... By giving Amin the power that went beyond his ability to provide military support... Obote let a genie out the bottle... it was a genie which grew so much that by about 1969 it was too big to be forced back."

From the military's pov, overt intervention in politics is costly bc it "1) may fail-resulting in imprisonment or death of participants 2) successful interventions highlight political differences within the armed forces & often necessitate purges of officers who are opposed to intervention, undermining the military's cohesion as the right political loyalties become more important than professional accomplishments."

The hazard for dictatorships in their use of the military lies in the Faustian deal that is the military gaining independence & pushing for more benefits as it becomes more indispensable in quelling mass opposition. The very instruments which enable the military to protect the dictator empower it to then threaten and depose of the latter.

"The soldan of Egypt, or the emperor of Rome, might drive his harmless subjects, like brute beasts, against their sentiments and inclination: but he must, at least, have led his mamelukes or praetorian bands, like men, by their opinions."
Hume
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"Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the party."
Mao Zedong

Whilst institutions place limits on the dictator's power, they also strengthen his regime by reinforcing it from the inside, increasing transparency between the elites and reducing the risk of conspiracy or sudden attacks-both coups and uprisings. Institutions in authoritarian countries therefore fittingly operate in an authoritarian manner.

Even though Deng Xiaoping had put rules in place to restrict the future leadership of China, these rules were unable to be imposed on him nor eclipse his immense influence and authority even after leaving office due to the large personality cult he had cultivated and the fact that he was credited with opening China up to the world. The same applies to Mao and his personality cult which could not be contained.

2) The second way political institutions contribute to authoritarian stability is by making it easier to survey the dictator & keep him in check should he ignore agreements between him & the ruling elite (this is only possible if the latter's threat of rebellion is credible). Formal rules on jurisdiction, decision-making etc... create clear lines, if the dictator crosses them it can be observed & raise the alarm.

Political institutions contribute to authoritarian stability in two ways:
1) By increasing transparency amongst authoritarian elites & the dictator there's less secrecy or suspicion which could lead to mistrust & miscalculation of the dictator's intentions by the allies who may attempt to usurp him, causing destabilising ripple effects for the regime & country. Revenue & major policy changes are also reviewed.

"When an artful & bold man is placed at the head of an army or faction [...] he allows no such open communication that his enemies can know, with certainty, their number and force. Even those, who are the instruments of his usurpation, may wish his fall; but their ignorance of each other's intentions keeps them in awe, and is the sole cause of his security."
David Hume, Of the Original Contract

Personality cults a consequence-rather than cause-of established autocracy. Unlike propaganda, the aim of which is to spread ideology, a personality cult aims to reinforce a dictator's paramount political standing. Stalin's image as a leader wasn't projected until one was created for him; Hafez Al Asad was the 20th century's Saladin, Saddam the new Nebuchadnezzar & Mao "could swim 4 times the world record" (lmao).

Finally finished it & now have over 100 pages to summarise in a few notes if I'm not to keep this on my shelf here forever 😄

Although established autocrats still rely on their administrators as a collective, they ensure that the latter are reminded of their dispensability & vulnerability as individuals. Thus a pattern of demoting & imprisoning figures in both low & high positions as well as removing gifts & concessions after providing them becomes a common occurrence, to reiterate that "they are all creatures of the president."

Machiavelli's distinction between the two ways in which principalities can be governed is mirrored by the distinction between contested & established autocracies; in the former, the dictators' allies are genuine political players who share his power & constrain him, in the latter, they are subservient administrators. Once an autocrat's position makes the leap from the first to the second, there is no going back.

Stalin executed more generals than would be killed in World War II, Khrushchev would later lament how "all of us around Stalin were temporary people. As long as he trusted us to a certain degree, we were allowed to go on living and working."

"Saddam was not content with the comfortable majority he enjoyed in the state's ruling institutions... He was at once far more powerful than all his comrades put together, and far more vulnerable to attack from them."
Efraim Karsh
As the dictator gains influence & rises up the ladder, his comrades' boldness & desire to curb his appetite also increases, and the path to established autocracy becomes more slippery.

In most dictatorships politics is informal & transition into established autocracy is signified through the loyalty of those in the bureaucracy instead of changes to the bureaucratic hierarchy/structure itself. Hafez Al Assad relied on alawite elites for support, Saddam Hussein entrenched individuals from his city Tikrit into the govt so much that he had to conceal it by abolishing surnames based on place of origin.

A dictator's transition from contested to established autocrat can occur in varying ways-both obvious & discreet. Stalin's manoeuvres to accumulate authority & influence for example went unnoticed by most powerful figures excluding Lenin. In dictatorships that rely heavily on bureaucracy, a dictator's 'transition' takes the form of the ruling coalition members' loss of influence within these structures.

To deter the dictator, he must be kept wary under the shadow of his allies' possible rebellion should he attempt to shift the balances of power. But to be successful, the threat itself has to be credible. This is complicated by two factors: 1) Lack of transparency & an atmosphere of fear+betrayal that makes allies too mistrustful to confide & plot anything. 2) Misinterpreting signals of the dictator's next move.

The dictator & his allies both have a uniting desire for power that is complicated by the way this power is eventually divided, as allies are under the threat of the dictator slowly subjugating institutions & individuals of the state instead of fulfilling his promise of sharing the spoils of dictatorship, whilst the dictator is under threat of his allies' betrayal & rebellion if he reneges.

Organising and summarising authoritarian regimes is difficult because they do not follow a set of pre-outlined structures or institutional blueprints the way democracy usually does, but are rather instead a "residual category", defined as something democracy is not, and so there are no limits to their institutional diversity.

"Popular accounts of authoritarian politics get easily carried away by the eccentricities, longevity, and brutality of a few dictators and their regimes. Thus the crowds in Tahrir or Tiananmen are presented as a dictator's greatest concern; the likes of Saddam Hussein and Kim Jong Il are taken to be the archetypes of authoritarian leadership."

I like political science with a technical writing style that involves a lot of data & research etc.. but this first chapter has been repeating the same convoluted sentence multiple times. Rush Doshi's The Long Game was a masterclass in compelling political writing.

The challenge in organising the world of authoritarian politics stems from the questionable relevance of formal institutions under dictatorship. Hence whether and which ones actually matter is far from apparent and neither is who matters. As a wisecrack during the Maximato when Plutarco Calles was continuing to exert influence goes: "The President lives here, but the man who gives orders lives across the street."

"Tyranny is a kind of monarchy which has in view the interest of the monarch only; oligarchy has in view the interest of the wealthy; democracy of the needy. None of them the common good of all."
Aristotle, Politics, Book III

"As far as authoritarian leadership dynamics are concerned, an overwhelming majority of dictators lose power to those inside the gates of the presidential palace rather than to the masses outside."

"Still democracy appears to be safer and less liable to revolution than oligarchy. For in oligarchies there is the double danger of the oligarchs falling out among themselves and also with the people..."
Aristotle, The Politics, Book V