Status Updates From An Introduction to the Theo...

analytisk syntetisk distinktion

The Problem of the Criterion, Roderick Chisholm identifies two main questions in the theory of knowledge:
A What do we know? What is the extent of our knowledge?
B How are we to decide whether we know? What are the criteria of
knowledge?

skeptikism: (1) One cannot be certain about what the external world is like. (2) One knows that p only if one is certain that p.
(3) Therefore, one cannot know what the external world is like.

ccording to Sosa, the justification of a belief is a matter of its coherence with other beliefs, including coherence with one’s principles about what it is reasonable or permissible to believe. In contrast, the aptness of a belief is a matter of the intellectual virtue that yields it. Apt beliefs are reliably formed beliefs.

Reliabilism holds, roughly, that whether a belief is epistemically justified is a function of its being the product of a reliable cognitive process. Virtue epistemologists hold, roughly, that a belief enjoys the positive epistemic status of being ‘‘apt’’ if it is the product of a truth conducive intellectual virtue.

Perhaps we might formulate the preceding line of thought as follows:
(1) Beliefs are the only things we can appeal to in order to justify our beliefs. (2) If beliefs are the only things we can appeal to in order to justify our
beliefs, then beliefs are the only sources of justification. (3) Therefore, beliefs are the only sources of justification.

Coherentists deny that there are any justified basic beliefs and deny that nondoxastic experiences can be sources of epistemic justifi- cation. In the last chapter, we considered one argument against the view that nondoxastic experiences can be sources of justification.

nondoxastic experience

foundationalism
(3)All justificational chains must either: (i) terminate in a belief that is not justified, (ii) be infinitely long, (iii) be circular, or (iv) terminate in a justified basic belief.
(4) Options (i), (ii), and (iii) are impossible.
(5) Therefore, option (iv) is true — some justificational chains terminate in
justified basic beliefs.

Gettier

Third, a proposition can be justified and not true. One can be justified in believing a proposition that is false. Suppose, for example, you are justified in believing that it is noon. You are justified because you have just looked at your watch around midday and it says that it is noon.

Second, a proposition can be true and not justified. Consider the prop- ositions: (i) the number of stars is even, and (ii) the number of stars is not even. Either (i) or (ii) is true. But clearly neither (i) nor (ii) is justified for us. We have no evidence for either. So, a proposition can be true without being justified for us.

pragmatism, bra förklaring

Mere belief, then, is not sufficient for knowledge. Knowledge requires that one’s belief be true.
D2 S knows that p 1⁄4Df. (1) S believes that p and (2) p is true.
D2 tells us that one knows that p if and only if one has a true belief that p. D2 says that having a true belief that p is sufficient for one’s knowing that p. But this, too, is clearly mistaken. One might have a true belief that is not knowledge.

According 2 1 traditional view, to have propositional knowledge that p is to have epistemically justified true belief that p. Before we consider this traditional view, let us begin by considering the following clearly mistaken view:
D1 S knows that p = Df. S believes that p.
According to D1, believing something is sufficient for knowing it. If D1 were true, then someone who believed a false proposition would know it.

Among the three most significant are (1) propositional knowledge, (2) acquaintance knowledge, and (3) ‘‘how to’’ knowledge.

(5) John knows how to play a piano sonata implies
(6) John has the ability to play a piano sonata.

It is important to distinguish between sentences and propositions. Paul would say, ‘‘The sky is blue,’’ and Pierre would say, ‘‘Le ciel est bleu.’’ Though each expresses his belief by a different sentence, each believes the same proposition.

Propositional knowledge is knowledge of facts or true propositions. So, consider the following examples of propositional knowledge:
(1) John knows that Caesar was assassinated. (2) John knows that the sky is blue.
In these examples, the objects of knowledge, or what is known, are, respectively, the true propositions that Caesar was assassinated and that the sky is blue.