Truls Ljungström’s Reviews > An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge > Status Update
Truls Ljungström
is on page 60 of 239
foundationalism
(3)All justificational chains must either: (i) terminate in a belief that is not justified, (ii) be infinitely long, (iii) be circular, or (iv) terminate in a justified basic belief.
(4) Options (i), (ii), and (iii) are impossible.
(5) Therefore, option (iv) is true — some justificational chains terminate in
justified basic beliefs.
— May 19, 2026 01:04AM
(3)All justificational chains must either: (i) terminate in a belief that is not justified, (ii) be infinitely long, (iii) be circular, or (iv) terminate in a justified basic belief.
(4) Options (i), (ii), and (iii) are impossible.
(5) Therefore, option (iv) is true — some justificational chains terminate in
justified basic beliefs.
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Truls’s Previous Updates
Truls Ljungström
is on page 170 of 239
The Problem of the Criterion, Roderick Chisholm identifies two main questions in the theory of knowledge:
A What do we know? What is the extent of our knowledge?
B How are we to decide whether we know? What are the criteria of
knowledge?
— May 20, 2026 05:38AM
A What do we know? What is the extent of our knowledge?
B How are we to decide whether we know? What are the criteria of
knowledge?
Truls Ljungström
is on page 146 of 239
skeptikism: (1) One cannot be certain about what the external world is like. (2) One knows that p only if one is certain that p.
(3) Therefore, one cannot know what the external world is like.
— May 20, 2026 05:36AM
(3) Therefore, one cannot know what the external world is like.
Truls Ljungström
is on page 113 of 239
ccording to Sosa, the justification of a belief is a matter of its coherence with other beliefs, including coherence with one’s principles about what it is reasonable or permissible to believe. In contrast, the aptness of a belief is a matter of the intellectual virtue that yields it. Apt beliefs are reliably formed beliefs.
— May 19, 2026 02:20AM
Truls Ljungström
is on page 97 of 239
Reliabilism holds, roughly, that whether a belief is epistemically justified is a function of its being the product of a reliable cognitive process. Virtue epistemologists hold, roughly, that a belief enjoys the positive epistemic status of being ‘‘apt’’ if it is the product of a truth conducive intellectual virtue.
— May 19, 2026 01:26AM
Truls Ljungström
is on page 86 of 239
Perhaps we might formulate the preceding line of thought as follows:
(1) Beliefs are the only things we can appeal to in order to justify our beliefs. (2) If beliefs are the only things we can appeal to in order to justify our
beliefs, then beliefs are the only sources of justification. (3) Therefore, beliefs are the only sources of justification.
— May 19, 2026 01:24AM
(1) Beliefs are the only things we can appeal to in order to justify our beliefs. (2) If beliefs are the only things we can appeal to in order to justify our
beliefs, then beliefs are the only sources of justification. (3) Therefore, beliefs are the only sources of justification.
Truls Ljungström
is on page 85 of 239
Coherentists deny that there are any justified basic beliefs and deny that nondoxastic experiences can be sources of epistemic justifi- cation. In the last chapter, we considered one argument against the view that nondoxastic experiences can be sources of justification.
— May 19, 2026 01:24AM
Truls Ljungström
is on page 26 of 239
Third, a proposition can be justified and not true. One can be justified in believing a proposition that is false. Suppose, for example, you are justified in believing that it is noon. You are justified because you have just looked at your watch around midday and it says that it is noon.
— May 19, 2026 12:42AM