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So much language of thought.

Strawson's entire argument seems to collapse once we take the view that we can always conceive of the physical substrate without experience because our P-concepts don't link with physical concepts a priori.

I have to admit that Strawson makes a compelling case for micropsychism. But I'm still hung up on the over-use of intuition for the argument to really work.

On my second read through, I'm noticing some ambiguity in the author's chapter on causation. He never explicitly endorses determinism or indeterminism, so his view on where exactly the causal nexus ends for particular mental events is obscure. Also, he gestures to any particular causal event being identified for pragmatic reasons. But does this apply to the mental causal nexus? I assume yes, but he never clarifies.

McDowell seems to be working with a different interpretation of the myth of the given. For him, the stimulus does not carry with it normative import such that having an experience forces you (normatively) to believe one thing over another. McDowell wants to introduce the idea of concept-laden stimuli which in fact can do such a thing, and can allow experience to be the ultimate tribunal for knowledge claims.

Churchland presents a pretty powerful case against Davidsonian translation; we are aiming at maximally understanding them, not maximizing the extent to which they agree with us. So in translation, the inferential structure must be preserved, and the intellectual behavior must be interpreted such that there is an overall coherence. But they can still be coherently wrong.

The author makes a good point when he says that even if the mind-body problem is a special case of the problem of one over many and our acquaintance with universals, it may just follow that the mind-body problem just IS a special case of a perennial philosophical problem , contrary to Rorty's view. Tracing the pedigree of a problem via historiography doesn't entail that it isn't a problem.

The A-version of the transcendental deduction seems to really be a description of the pure concepts of the understanding, and the process of the synthesis of the manifold under the unity of apperception. There's no argument showing why those categories are necessary for experiencing & cognizing the world as we do.

Pretty interesting take on the spheres of existence. Rather than seeing the spheres as static modes of being, a person constantly shifts between the aesthetic and the ethical, for instance, because of the ability of people to make choices. This interpretation is also in line with Kierkegaard's view of being as becoming; there is no static mode of being-in-the-world, so one isn't permanently in one sphere.

Pretty interesting take on the spheres of existence. Rather than seeing the spheres as static modes of being, a person constantly shifts between the aesthetic and the ethical, for instance, because of the ability of people to make choices. This interpretation is also in line with Kierkegaard's view of being as becoming; there is no static mode of being-in-the-world, so one isn't permanently in one sphere.

After re-reading the first three sections over four times each, I've come to the realization that K. is too profound a thinker to try and squeeze into the box of *merely another Christian theologian* that I have implicitly created for him. I have a newly found respect for his genius and profundity.

After re-reading the first three sections over four times each, I've come to the realization that K. is too profound a thinker to try and squeeze into the box of *merely another Christian theologian* that I have attempted to do. I have a newly found respect for his genius and profundity.

Fantastic so far. I'm glad these novels were assigned; they've reminded me why I love existentialist literature. An obvious, and very familiar symbol is that of Todd's heart condition. The fact that he may suffer a heart attack at any given moment is a fantastic representation of our essential finitude, and the fact that we all face possible death at every moment of our lives.

The level of Kant's antisemitism is extremely surprising. The author's swipe at Frege for introducing a 'taint' into modern academic philosophy by writing favorably of an article expressing admiration of Hitler seems a bit much. Frege recognized a division between academic and personal life. His remarks were in a private journal, and there is no evidence to suggest that they influenced his work on logic & language.

Nagel is tacitly assuming that a naturalist who embraces neo-darwinian evolution must also believe in some sort of massive modularity. His argument against the possibility of evolutionary epistemology assumes modularity, since introducing the idea of plasticity completely undermines his argument.

I'm starting to see a trend developing: Nagel's incredulity is directly correlated with the falsehood of a thesis.

I'm seeing a lot of 'common sense' talk being thrown around, which is also problematic in itself, since common sense isn't a homogenous set of unassailable truths.

I'm starting to see a bit of a trend developing. Nagel's incredulity is directly proportional to the falsehood of a thesis.

Very good case for embodied cognition so far. He seems to assume direct realism is an entailment of his thesis, though, and that may be problematic.

It's also quite low on jargon, so it can be understood with minimal background knowledge in cog/sci.

Good to see somebody finally discussing Descartes' moral theory. Most books on the rationalists almost always overlook Descartes' contribution to ethics & moral psychology.

Glad to see an anti-representationalist critique of Rorty's metaphilosophy. Rorty made the mistake of thinking progress was necessarily tied to a representational view of what it is that philosophers do. Progress is totally compatible with anti-representational takes on metaphilosophy.

So. Much. Psychoanalysis.

Can't stop reading William Lane Craig's chapters in his voice.