Larry’s Reviews > Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts > Status Update

Larry
Larry is on page 7 of 229
Even though it’s impossible to have a red phenomenal experience, but be aware of it as of green. Yet if the can’t be any mismatch, then the self-representational content is empty!
Sep 06, 2025 10:54AM
Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts (Representation and Mind)

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Larry
Larry is on page 110 of 229
Sep 09, 2025 05:54AM
Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts (Representation and Mind)


Larry
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Sep 06, 2025 12:28PM
Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts (Representation and Mind)


Larry
Larry is on page 7 of 229
Self-representationalism is a 2-level theory of content: an experience of something red (t) represents that it is reddish, so t involves focal awareness of something red, and peripheral awareness of a reddish experience. Tye contends that it’s not ruled out that there be a mismatch between the phenomenal content of the experience, and the self-representational content
Sep 06, 2025 10:51AM
Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts (Representation and Mind)


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