Karthikeyan’s Reviews > Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science > Status Update

Karthikeyan
Karthikeyan is on page 74 of 304
Incommensurability
Meaning no common measure. highest common divisor concept in Greek

Three forms of incommensurability
Topic, dissociation and meaning commensurability

Meaning incommensurability is the one most people focus as it received the most resistance and it's the most novel.

Daudeley shapere - enough commonality exists to make comparisons possible. Such are done without invoking meaning.
Feb 12, 2026 04:10PM
Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science

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Karthikeyan’s Previous Updates

Karthikeyan
Karthikeyan is on page 91 of 304
Putnam defined meaning on 4 notions : syntactic (grammar), semantic (category), stereotype, reference and extension

The reference-extension inclusion allows two competing, successive theories differ by stereotype, but maintain the same reference, allowing comparison, circumventing Kuhn's meaning-incommensurability

Doesn't apply to branching of meaning, meaning of non-real entities
Feb 13, 2026 03:28AM
Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science


Karthikeyan
Karthikeyan is on page 65 of 304
pragmatism:

replacement of truth by method

2 branches.

peirce: truth as table conclusions reached by a community
putnam: both different reasons and conclusions accumulate and converge

james, dewey, rorty: whatever answers to present needs
no stable conclusions. no notion more/less reasonable
instrumentalism

positivism denies causality while pragmatism accepts it as long as it's useful
Feb 12, 2026 08:37AM
Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science


Karthikeyan
Karthikeyan is on page 57 of 304
original positivism p and logical positivism lp of the Vienna circle
p's six ingredients
Comte coined term p. Had links to french revolution Condorcet
Feb 12, 2026 01:31AM
Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science


Karthikeyan
Karthikeyan is on page 40 of 304
Smart's materialism and Nancy Cartwright's causalism
Both care about the entity realism.

Interesting: regards flux lines I am more of a materialist than causalist.

Materialist's is for building while it is for causing for causalists
Feb 11, 2026 01:05PM
Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science


Karthikeyan
Karthikeyan is on page 31 of 304
Millikan exp for e charge. similar exp to detect the charge of quarks
Realism as a movement and not a doctrine: different forms of realism: literary, artistic and then scientific
realism about entities (real) and theory (truth) are independent from one another
3 ingredients of sc. realism: ontological, causal, epistemological by newton smith
realism != materialism, forces don't come into the latter
Feb 11, 2026 03:52AM
Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science


Karthikeyan
Karthikeyan is on page 20 of 304
separation of reason and reality

Carnap-Popper view in postivism. Former based things on induction and verification while the latter based things on deduction and falsifiability.

Both insufficient as read in Adam Becker's book. Confirmation and falsification makes sense only with an assumed context.

a good summary of Kuhn's work. More or less the forward he wrote for Structure.

Book will focus on reality.
Feb 10, 2026 02:06AM
Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science


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