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Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science
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Terry
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Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science

Terry
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Terry
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Terry
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Terry
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Terry
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Terry
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Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science

Karthikeyan
Karthikeyan is finished
engineering, not theorizing is the best proof of scientific realism
borrowing Marx's ideology: the point is not to understand but to change. quite iffy.
Feb 23, 2026 12:58PM Add a comment
Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science

Karthikeyan
Karthikeyan is on page 261 of 304
Francis Bacon surprisingly has a view that matches mine.
Bacon - exp. are sometimes are decisive on competing theories, in contrast with modern view where it is considered to be decisive
detailed history of michelson-morley (MM) exp. It's not one exp. A series of experiments 1881-1935
MM was a degenerating research programme by Lakatos's definition
Feb 23, 2026 12:24AM Add a comment
Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science

Karthikeyan
Karthikeyan is on page 246 of 304
Van Frassen, measurement as continuation of theory
Cavendish's measurement of G did not advance gravity
P Duhem - constants of nature as artifacts of mathematics
Popper - measurements to test theories
Kuhn - measurements accumulate anomalies that guide research even during crises
Feb 22, 2026 12:44AM Add a comment
Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science

Karthikeyan
Karthikeyan is on page 232 of 304
creation of phenomena
difference between phenomena and effect
phenomena involves just observing and not intervening
while effect seem to involve intervening and repeatability
phenomena are often created by articulation of theories. example: josephson effect which only came to be observable after the theory articulation
Feb 20, 2026 03:01AM Add a comment
Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science

Karthikeyan
Karthikeyan is on page 219 of 304
theory <=> speculation
calculation => Kuhn's articulation (both theory and exp) in normal science => mathematical alteration of a speculation to bring it closer to the world
calculation => semantic bridge between theory and observation
calculation <=> model
approximation is an example of model
approx can be away from and towards the truth
Cartwright - theory has no truth. approx do
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Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science

Terry
Terry is on page 102 of 304
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Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science

Karthikeyan
Karthikeyan is on page 209 of 304
are we seeing with/through a microscope (mu)
Ernst Abbe - works on resolution of mu by understanding the physics of diffraction
mu maps interaction of constituent stuffs. could be based light, electrons or anything
the confidence in the reality of the observed comes when you observe identical maps using different physics systems, combined with understanding
theory is needed to build a mu, not for using it
Feb 18, 2026 03:54AM Add a comment
Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science

Karthikeyan
Karthikeyan is on page 186 of 304
Trying to reduce observation to language. Talk about the way we talk about obs, and not obs itself
grover maxwell denies the distinction between theory and obs, as it's often a limitation in tech.
obs != exp
feyerabend: obs is theory loaded
sometimes the lack of theory encourages more obs. heat radiation and colours in Herschel's case
shapere: theory loaded obs to understand smthg else that is independant
Feb 17, 2026 12:46PM Add a comment
Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science

Karthikeyan
Karthikeyan is on page 166 of 304
theory does not have precede exp
glorification of theory over exp. originated from class differences dating back to greeks
interesting stories of Ampere being the Newton of electricity
steam engine history: Newcomen, Watt, Trevithick and Sadi Carnot
Feb 17, 2026 05:42AM Add a comment
Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science

Terry
Terry is on page 99 of 304
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Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science

Karthikeyan
Karthikeyan is on page 148 of 304
realism as representation (rep)
people make reps. reps define humans.
in contra with humans rationals, rationality is linguistic. language is a product of boredom. indexical language at first, only then descriptive
rep before reality. judging of reps -> reality
no truth in physics, only a barrage of instructive reps
transition to reality as intervention
real => what can be used to intervene and what can affect us
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Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science

Terry
Terry is on page 92 of 304
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Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science

Terry
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Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science

Karthikeyan
Karthikeyan is on page 129 of 304
Lakatos's disagrees with Kuhn's qualification of science as mob mentality

research programme: progressive and degenerating one

Objective knowledge resides in 3rd world of reality: 1st is actual reality, 2nd is a part of 1st is the world of consciousness and the 3rd is part of 2nd that can be put in words

Lakotos rationality doesn't really give a strategy to appraise theories. Feyerabend being its colourful critic
Feb 15, 2026 07:26AM Add a comment
Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science

Karthikeyan
Karthikeyan is on page 111 of 304
the most difficult chapter to follow so far
metaphysical realism (external): correspondence between words and external things vs internal realism: objects makes sense only within a theory
transcendentalism : through human mind
Kant's transcendental idealism (existence) <=> empirical realism
Kuhn's and Putnam's transcendental nominalism (classification)
Feb 15, 2026 12:32AM Add a comment
Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science

Karthikeyan
Karthikeyan is on page 91 of 304
Putnam defined meaning on 4 notions : syntactic (grammar), semantic (category), stereotype, reference and extension

The reference-extension inclusion allows two competing, successive theories differ by stereotype, but maintain the same reference, allowing comparison, circumventing Kuhn's meaning-incommensurability

Doesn't apply to branching of meaning, meaning of non-real entities
Feb 13, 2026 03:28AM Add a comment
Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science

Karthikeyan
Karthikeyan is on page 74 of 304
Incommensurability
Meaning no common measure. highest common divisor concept in Greek

Three forms of incommensurability
Topic, dissociation and meaning commensurability

Meaning incommensurability is the one most people focus as it received the most resistance and it's the most novel.

Daudeley shapere - enough commonality exists to make comparisons possible. Such are done without invoking meaning.
Feb 12, 2026 04:10PM Add a comment
Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science

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