Larry’s Reviews > Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong > Status Update
Larry
is on page 63 of 188
Fodor distinguishes 1) the claim that what a word means partially determines the well-formed contexts in which it can occur (perhaps equivalent to: lexical items have features), and 2) the claim that there is a single level at which all and only the semantic features of the item are specified (perhaps equivalent to: lexical items are feature bundles), and denies both
— Sep 02, 2026 03:01AM
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Larry
is on page 63 of 188
And IF Pinker had gotten his data straight, he could only buy claim 2, but he did not even get his data straight!
— Sep 02, 2026 03:03AM
Larry
is on page 63 of 188
Against Pinker (1989): if there is bootstrapping from semantics to syntax, the semantic concepts doing the work like agent, possession, etc, must be detectable by the child. But those concepts are ill-defined. Consider: “red” expresses a property; is that a semantic fact, or a byproduct of the fact that it’s a modifier of nouns? Contrast Gleitman (1990), who runs the bootstrapping argument the other way around
— Sep 02, 2026 02:56AM
Larry
is on page 55 of 188
This is a very alienating experience because I really don’t like his views but I’m incapable of forming a coherent or convincing argument against them
— Sep 01, 2026 05:38AM
Larry
is starting
Putnam: you have analyticity at the edge of the web of belief, where analyticity dissolves into one-criterionhood. But that presupposes analyticity (or synonymy—which are the same thing per Quine).
— Dec 01, 2022 03:20AM
Larry
is starting
The doorknob argument: if doorknob is not innate (as a concept), then it has to be learned; learnability relies on nomic relations, but… seriously? Nomic relations about DOORKNOBS? Ok, then it’s innate. But… seriously?
— Dec 01, 2022 03:12AM

